Achieving some of the benefits of PR without a general adoption of PR, through creative use of top-up seats, MMP
- Tom Monto
- 3 hours ago
- 2 min read
some systems in world simply do what is intended
(if that makes sense)
such as giving top-up seats to leading party just outright to ensure one party has majority. (just an example - it is not PR and is not needed IMO)
if we want shortcut to ER,
perhaps goals of ER could be done outside a wider reform -
at least the debate that such clear change would be right out front (if people simply are opposed to PR because it gives small parties democratic rep than that would be clear when all the reform says is to give rep to small parties.)
some "laser-targeted" reforms
-top-up where any party with at least four percent of the vote gets a seat.
-no member takes a district seat with less than half the vote in the district, the seat is added to the top-up seats. (justifiable as no member elected there would represent a majority of voters so no one gets it.) As part of top-up, the seat would be allocated as per PR perhaps to best losers, thus giving the same leading candidate a chance to get seat that way anyway.
-top-up to ensure that a party with less than half the votes does not get majority, with top-up seats merely given to the second- and third-most popular party.
-votes that are not used to elect local members are pooled and top-up seats awarded to parties proportionally. thus top-up seats not only go to small parties but to large parties too who also suffer from wasted votes.
etc.
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these are not necessarily proportional so are out side general scope of this list serve but i thought worth mentioning.
they would be way to achieve goals of PR and Electoral reform without engaging in wider change perhaps feared by voters.
(likely those listed are only applicable at provincial level, not at federal level
but others could be done federally without change affecting voters too much :
such as districts of three (or five?) seats where each voter has one vote same as now.
even with retention of single-seat districts, a rule that coalitions could be composed by parties and the vote for the coalition as a whole in the district pooled where appropriate.
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