Fleming, Essays on Rectification of Parliament (1893)
Introductory notes (by Tom Monto, 2020)
Sandford Fleming is best remembered as the inventor of standard international time zones but he was also a proponent of electoral reform.
In 1893 he was the motive force in the collection and publication of essays on the subject of rectification (correction ) of Parliament through more fair elections.
These essays were submitted in response to an appeal made by Fleming in 1892 for essays on means of "Rectification of Parliament."
He explained that he thought the House of Commons needed rectification because
- election through districts splits and divided voters
- the two-party system forced many voters to suppress their natural instincts and channel their vote to the least evil, and then a majority of a party that holds a majority of the seat, perhaps with only a minority of the vote, then dictates to government.
As there was a cash prize for the winners, the authors submitted their essays under pseudonyms. This makes the table of contents look quite odd.
The identity of the author can be surmised in at least one case. There is little doubt that the No. 10 essay, submitted by "Southern Cross," was submitted by Catherine Helen Spence, a key-person in the drive to proportional representation in Tasmania and Australia. She happened to be travelling through Canada at the time Fleming was collecting essays and it seems presented him with a written copy of her usual - but convincing - Pro-rep promotion speech.
The identity of the ultimate winner was not stated in the essay collection as published and is not known at this time.
Part 1 covers to page 38, so includes the introduction and the first four essays.
Part 2 covers Essays Nos. 6 to 9, thus to pages 39 to 89.
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Essays Received in Response to an Appeal by the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament
Table of Contents
1. Real Majority page 1
2. Nulla Vestigia Retrorsum [a Torontonian] page 6
3. "Dignus Vindice Nodus" page 8
1891 Canadian federal election page 12
(Draft) An Act Respecting the Election of members of the HofC of Canada page 18
4. "NEW OCCASIONS TEACH NEW DUTIES" page 25
(Appendix) An Act to Provide for Referendary Voting page 31
5. Spero Meliora page 32
6. Canadian Home Rule... page 39
"Act relating to the Electoral franchise ..." page 45
7. "Per Asperam ad Astra" page 50
what is representation? page 50
following essentials: page 51
changes required page 53
BILL TO REFORM THE SYSTEM ... page 55
8. In Deo Spero page 57
The Representation Act page 68
9. Pacifico page 71
CHAPTER I. A PRIORI NEGATIVE DEMONSTRATION page 71
Chapter II. A Posteriori Demonstration; The "Majority Rule" Myth page 72
Chapter III. Direct Legislation page 74
Chapter IV. The Cumulative Vote page 77
Chapter V. The Free Ticket or List page 78
Chapter VI. The Preferential Plan page 79
Chapter VII. General Considerations page 83
10. Southern Cross [Catherine Helen Spence*] page 90-
Chapter I. Importance of the Subject page 90
Chapter II. Method of Voting and Formation of the Quota page 96
Chapter III. Objections Answered page 100
Chapter IV. Effective Voting page 106
Chapter V. Palliatives - The Initiative and the Referendum -
the Imperative Mandate - Direct Legislation page 111
Chapter VI. The Gove System
Chapter VII. The Danish electoral law
Chapter VI. Conclusion page 113
Chapter VII. DRAFT BILL FOR THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA page 117
Appendix I. [STV elections in Australia] page 120
Appendix II. [filling up a vacancy] page 121
(*on page 95 writer identified herself as daughter of early town clerk of Adelaide)
11. Equality [a U.S. writer] page 122
[CHAPTER I Introduction]
CHAPTER II The Failure of Legislative Assemblies page 139
CHAPTER III The Single-membered District page 141
CHAPTER IV The General Ticket page 153
CHAPTER V Proportional Representation page 156
A BILL For the Election of Congressional Representatives by Pro-rep page 157
Defence of the proposed bill page 162
why should a minority party be excluded when its vote is less than 85 p.c. of quota.
In the first place, exact justice is impossible. ...
Provision made to prevent an elector from losing any of his full number of lawful
votes
CHAPTER VI ADVANTAGES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION page 165
1. Pro-rep recognizes the nature of modern political problems page 165
2. The bill proposed is as simple as any that has been offered for effecting this kind of reform page 166
3. Pro-rep is eminently elastic in its adaptation to changes in population page 166
4. the justice and equality of pro-rep page page 166
5. Pro-rep promises independence of the voters and freedom from rule of the party machine page 167
Broda Count
6. Pro-rep brings into legislative assemblies able and experienced men, the true leaders and representatives of their parties and the people page 173
two features of proportional representation that permit the voters to discriminate between individuals, and to hold them, instead of parties, responsible page 175
We have a sham representation. page 175
7. Pro-rep would purify elections by removing the most potent of inducements for bribery and corruption. page 176 8. Legislatures would become deliberative assemblies instead of arenas for party strife.
page 176
Two objections against pro-rep:
it would do away with party responsibility
give a small minority the balance of power, enable them to dictate
legislation.
solutions to clear moral issues could be compromised with benefit to all classes
and individuals page 179
Chapter VII Conclusion page 182
Appendix - (relating to "Defence of the proposed bill" page 162) page 183
[end of book = page 184]
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Part 2 covers Essays Nos. 6 to 9, thus to pages 39 to 89.
[6.] CANADIAN HOME RULE AND AMENDMENTS THERETO. [p. 39]
In suggesting a system of government that will give to the people of Canada equal representation and offer a feasible substitute for the present system of party government, it may be as well to consider the principles of the present system and glance at its origin and the results that have accrued to nations by which it has been adopted.
Party government seems to have arisen in England during the reign of William III, and in the time of Queen Anne it is found as a settled system of government in that country. England emerging from semi-despotism gladly turned to party government as a system promising a measure of freedom never before enjoyed, and a remedy for many evils she was then enduring. Other nations seem to have followed in the footsteps of England in this respect, until all the civilized countries of the world have framed their schemes of government more or less on the principles of "Party Rule."
But in these latter days the system has become corrupt — it has shackled the people it was intended to free and is now the dangerous cause of an injurious effect.
As a cure for the evils it was intended to remedy, it has lost its efficacy. As it has outlasted its day of usefulness it must at no distant day give place to new methods. England and Canada are not alone a prey to political corruption. Both compare favourably with other nations in this respect.
In France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, the exposures that from time to time take place, demonstrate but too clearly that party government has fostered in spite of the formidable power vested in the executive of those countries, a spirit of corruption that imperatively demands the sternest measures for its suppression and the protection of the people. If we turn to the great republic that borders our southern frontier we will perceive a similar condition of affairs.
A recent writer on this subject says "By electing to office through the agency of party organizations, and subjecting to the domination of such organizations, and to the temptations to bribery and corruption, great numbers of politicians of pliable consciences and easy virtue and many of bad or doubtful character, the legislation of the country, all the departments of the national, state, and city governments, and nearly all branches of the public service have been more or less corrupted."
In every direction, wherever we may turn, the pernicious influence of party government manifests itself.
Speaking of our African colonies, Lord Wolseley, writing in March 1886, says: "The squabbles between party politicians in South Africa, who are more intent upon personal aggrandizement than the good of the people have hitherto prevented the adoption of any good scheme for the colonization of that vast country."
Turning again to Canada, we find that government by party is not and cannot be compatible with government for the people, and this fact has been forcibly demonstrated in the past, and is written on many pages of Canadian history. The principle upon which party government is organized is antagonistic to government by and for the people. The interests of party take precedence of the people's interests, and the identity of the nominally responsible minister is absorbed in the personality of the party leader. The party leader is maintained in office by the party combination, and the functions, authority and patronage of the office are applied to securing a party majority in the country or in parliament. Under no other system possible in Canada at the present day, could such transactions have taken place as those that have within the past two years occupied the attention of Parliament and the several Royal Commissions and the notorious expenditure of money for the un-avowed purpose of influencing the return of members to the House of Commons, who in exchange for their seats were expected to give an undeviating support to the party interests, is not so much a circumstance to entail blame upon individuals as to call down qualified condemnation on a system that renders such tactics available.
In the different constituencies of Canada we have party organizations, clubs, and conventions, under party leaders subsidized directly or indirectly by the party government for party purposes, dividing the people politically and socially into hostile camps. We have array of party managers, supporters and hangers-on, to whom contracts must be given at extravagant rates, timber limits and Crown lands sold at a nominal price, an army of incompetent persons on whom positions of emolument must be conferred in reward for party services; and the same principles pervading as they do almost every branch of the public service, offer to our contemplation the lamentable spectacle of our public affairs year after year being carried on in a manner that would not be tolerated for a day, by any member of the administration in the conduct of his private business.
[page 40]
The advocates of party government may contend that the abuses incidental to the system are not properIy chargeable to the principles of the system; but such contention is erroneous as the abuses are inherent in the system and generate and fester in it. Personal ambition and aggrandizement — the motives of the abuses — form the very life and essence of the system, and the most strenuous opposition that will ever be offered to the rectification of Parliament will emanate from those whose schemes of personal advancement and aggrandizement are most seriously menaced.
In order to devise a feasible scheme as a substitute for party government let it be considered what results it is intended to attain.
First. — The Franchise law must be amended so as to give to the whole people of Canada equal representation, so far as it is possible that such a result can be practically obtained.
Second. —The Election law must be entirely reconstructed so as to adapt its provisions to the amended franchise law, and to simplify the present elaborate procedure with a view to efficiency and economy.
Third. —Parliament must be so rectified as to place the members thereof in a position of complete independence and secure their permanent emancipation from party rule.
Fourth. —The official positions held by the ministers of the government must be abolished, and their functions transferred to a group of departments constituted in an unchangeable formation as corporate bodies.
In constructing a system that will secure to the people of Canada equal representation. It must be borne in mind that we are working on a line that has anarchy at the one extremity and despotism at the other. A strong administration effectively responsible to the people will only be attained by selecting a medium between the two extremes.
Care must be taken on the one hand not to weaken and cripple the executive by unduly increasing the powers and functions of the deliberative body. On the other hand the same caution must be exercised to avoid strengthening the administrative body by surrendering the rights of the people. In more than one instance, nations, on reaching the limits of endurance at the one extreme, have been driven to the other.
The autocracy of Louis XVI was followed by the revolution that represented anarchy in a brutal and unreasoning form. The anarchy of republican France gave place to the despotism of Bonaparte, to be succeeded at last by the constitutional government under a legitimate monarchy. In England during the latter days of the commonwealth under the parliamentary rule, the military anarchy that followed upon the death of Cromwell prepared the way for the reaction that led to the restoration of the House of Stuart, a despotism finally superseded by a constitutional government under William and Mary. The danger of autocracy with us has passed away, and it is only the despotism of party government that we have to fear, while from many causes the danger from anarchy and socialism is vastly increased. The monarchies of Europe tardily acknowledged the principle that the king reigned but the administration governed. The principle [that is] to be recognized in the future is that the king may reign, but the people shall rule.
Under such a principle the danger from anarchy and socialism is in no wise reduced but may readily be vastly increased by a system embracing unlimited or universal suffrage. Yet in constructing a system of representation applicable to the Dominion of Canada, the principle of universal suffrage must be kept in view as no system intended to still further extend the already liberal provisions of the law can be framed without embracing that principle. The present franchise law extending as it does to those possessing a mere nominal property qualification, to qualification by income, to fishermen, and to farmers" and owners' sons, so closely approaches the principle of universal suffrage, as to make it a difficult matter to suggest a more liberal measure without removing all limitations. And yet certain limitations are imperatively necessary. For without them the parliamentary representation would be largely controlled by the anarchist and socialist element and cease to represent the capital, the property, and the industry of the nation.
The scheme now submitted for consideration recognizes this position. It admits the principle of universal suffrage subject to certain disqualifications. The right to vote is limited to all British subjects, either by birth or naturalization who have been residents in Canada for one year — are of the age of 21 years, and can read and write in their native language. The exceptions consist of five classes, women under coverture, aliens, paupers, persons of unsound mind and persons twice convicted of felony.
In limiting the franchise to British subjects of full age the provisions of the present franchise law are followed, and as to the limitation to persons resident in the Dominion for a given period and possessed of some education, no reasonable objection can be urged, while much can be suggested in its favour. Some educational qualification must of necessity be required of an electoral body to whom is intrusted the important privilege of discriminating between a beneficial and an injurious policy.
[page 41]
The right to so discriminate is based on the fact, that the general policy of the country is born of its internal necessities, its foreign relations and its financial, commercial, and geographical conditions. No matter what political party may hold the reins of power, they are largely controlled by such general policy. Any essential deviation from that policy will ultimately involve the country in disaster.
Hence, we find that no matter what peculiar lines of policy one party or the other may hold out to the people, those peculiar lines must he totally or partially abandoned, altered or varied if inconsistent with the policy of the nation. The policy of the nation must be faithfully and intelligently pursued if a successful administration of public affairs is to be expected.
The policy of the country (in contradistinction to party policy) is the policy of the people. It should be initiated by the people, who constitute the source from whence the legislative authority is derived. Otherwise each elector would not have due weight in the government of the country.
[On the other hand] the policy of a party government is the policy of the leaders of the majority only. It may be initiated and carried into effect without the consent, approbation or knowledge of the people, unless indeed they have appealed to the electors on the policy previous to its adoption.
If not, it must be ratified or condemned by parliament at some subsequent time as circumstances and results may warrant. If the policy should prove injurious to the interests of the country, no redress is within the power of the people except the removal of government from office. This has more than once been found an impracticable remedy when the government has been safely entrenched behind the votes of a partisan majority.
But a policy conceived among the people, discussed on the public platform, debated in parliament, and finally repudiated or made law, as the case might be, would be dealt with in the interests of the people, and to serve the necessities of the country, without any regard to the special requirements of any party or faction.
The limitation to persons resident in Canada for one year will practically exclude no one whose interests and sympathies are identical with those of our people. It will be found a necessary precaution. Situated as we are adjoining a colossal and populous foreign state, we would be open to the danger of having at the polls a class of voters who, although resident beyond [within?] our frontiers, would yet claim the rights of electors as nominal British subjects, but whose want of personal interest in our prosperity and knowledge of our affairs, would render them open to corrupt influence, and render them a dangerous element in the hands of ambitious or unscrupulous men.
Aliens, paupers and persons of unsound mind are exceptions recognized by the franchise law at the present time. The same arguments that weighed with the legislature in framing that law must equally apply to the same exceptions now suggested. The admission of women to vote can hardly be discussed without entering on the question of "Women's Rights." But their right to vote cannot be consistently ignored without departing from the principle of universal suffrage. But the exception of women under coverture is undoubtedly advisable, because the interests of husband and wife being mutual a double vote would practically be conferred on one person.
The franchise law so amended would confer on the whole people of Canada the right to vote subject to the above exceptions. This is the first step towards securing equal representation in parliament.
The election law must be amended with a view to relieve the procedure from the complicated machinery that at present exists. This was created partly for the purpose of preventing fraud at elections, and partly in order to secure some practical advantage to the party in power. And it should also be amended with a view to greater economy, which the abolition of property qualification would render both practicable and advisable.
All matters connected with the representation of the people in parliament ought to be brought into closer relationship with the people and to a greater extent confided to their care and management. Therefore the scheme suggested imposes upon the municipal authorities of each electoral district a large share of the work at the electoral contests.
The municipal authorities, being directly elected by the local electors, are in sympathy with them, and conversant with their local interests and requirements. They would offer a better guarantee to the country that the electoral contests would be held in accordance with the the intent and spirit of the law, than would be the case were the proceedings left to the manipulation of nominees of the government who would more likely look to the interests of the government than to securing a free and independent expression of public opinion.
In accordance with this idea, it is suggested that the municipal council of every electoral district should cause the sworn assessors of each polling district to annually prepare a schedule of the names, ages, residence and nationality of every qualified voter in the polling district. This work could be easily and effectually accomplished by such assessors at the time they assess the real and personal property in the district, as they are supposed to go, and generally do go, from house to house and farm to farm for such purpose.
[page 42]
The Municipal Council would also be required to appoint a Recorder of Voters for each polling district to whom the schedule so prepared by the assessors would be delivered, and who would enter the same in a register to be provided for that purpose open for public inspection and subject to revision from time to time. The election of delegates to the Electoral Chamber would be conducted by the Recorder of Voters in each polling district, subject to the revision if necessary of the Municipal Council; and the Wardens of the Counties, and Mayors of the Towns and Cities, constituting electoral districts would be ex-officio returning officers at every parliamentary election. This method would reduce the expense of each election to the smallest amount consistent with the efficient performance of the work required, and as the cost would become a municipal, instead of a national charge, and the proceedings of the most simple form, the best results might be expected from an economical point of view.
As the system of voting at present in operation would be found unsuitable in dealing with so numerous an electoral body as any scheme of universal suffrage would enfranchise, it is proposed that the direct vote of the electors should be polled in a manner somewhat similar to that adopted at municipal elections. It would be confined to the election of local delegates to represent the several polling districts of the constituency, at the sessions of the Electoral Chamber. The limitation of the direct vote of the people to the election of their local delegates would be advisable for a further reason. It would go far to prevent such a combination by party organizations as would materially influence the ultimate result of the election, and the delegates being presidents of the polling district, socially and politically known to the voters of the district, would be selected as presumably in sympathy with the policy and interests of the people.
No system whereby the whole people of Canada would have equal representation can be conceived, even theoretically, if it is defined to mean the representation of each and every individual elector, and his private and peculiar opinions on each and every subject. Nor can election by the majority be avoided until all persons can be brought to think alike. And no practicable system can be suggested to give both the majority and minority due weight in the government of the country unless equal representation is defined to mean the representation of the social, commercial and political interests of the people, instead of the peculiar opinions of the individual voter.
One voter at an election might give the preference to a particular candidate because he belonged to the same religious denomination, and two others vote for the successful candidate because he advocated the true interests of the country. Yet the first voter would be in the minority because his preferential candidate would not be elected but would be in the majority because his true interests would be represented.
It seems clear that election by lot would fail to practically solve the problem, as the lot might fall, and frequently would fall, to the candidate who represented the minority and then the majority would be disfranchised. But nevertheless it has been partially adopted in the present scheme in the event of a tie.
[series of run-off elections]
As an approximate solution of this problem, it is proposed that the local delegates at the meeting of the Electoral Chamber should nominate such candidates as they consider fit and proper persons to represent the constituency in the House of Commons, not exceeding one for each polling district, and the names of such candidates would be entered on the record of the proceedings. A ballot for the whole number of candidates would then be taken. After the ballots for each have been counted, the name of the candidate having received the lowest number of votes would be struck from the list of names on the Record. A ballot would then be taken for second choice, and the ballots counted, and the name with the lowest number struck out as before — and so the balloting would continue until the requisite number of candidates alone remained on the Record who would be declared duly elected.
By this system — in theory — those whose names were struck from the record — not having obtained a unanimous vote — would have ceased to be candidates. While those that remained on the record would be unanimously elected as there would then be no candidate remaining in opposition to them. Practically, although the individual preferences of the delegates were not represented by the election of the successful candidate, yet the representation of the interests of the country — through the election of the successful candidates — would be secured. In the event of an equality of votes occurring between two candidates, the two delegates who had made the respective nominations would decide by lot which of the two names should be struck from the Record.
[History of responsible government in Britain]
Parliament is supposed to be summoned for deliberation by the sovereign at any time or place their presence may be required. In early ages we find the kings of England commanding the lords spiritual and temporal to meet in council and at a subsequent period the loyal towns and cities of the realm were called upon to send burgesses to represent their several boroughs in parliament.
[page 43]
The towns and cities had obtained many important privileges, and immunities from successive sovereigns. The sovereigns, distrusting the loyalty and sincerity of the nobility, sought to obtain through the burgesses and commons, the means of opposing the encroachments of the great factions, and to secure pecuniary support for the tottering throne. Among the privileges granted to the towns and cities was immunity from taxation — other than the farm-rent of the borough — except by their own free consent. Hence the necessity for their representation in parliament. The members of the community who were chosen to represent the borough were selected for their ability to watch over and guard the interests of their special locality.
The representatives of the people in parliament at the present day have a wider range of duties to perform, and national and foreign questions to decide. But it must not be forgotten that the obligation to watch over and guard the interests of their special localities binds them as strongly today as it did when first the burgesses of England gathered in the halls at Westminster, although local interests ought to give way to class interests, and class interests to national.
[To free representatives from any influence, interference or coercion]
To enable the representatives of the people to faithfully fulfil their obligations, and to deal with the interests of their respective localities, and the national, the foreign and the financial questions that affect the prosperity of the country, they must be placed in a position of absolute independence. They must be free from any influence, interference or coercion that might tend to control their actions. And they must be protected from all criticism and animadversion upon the course they might think proper to pursue.
By so protecting the members of the House of Commons and rendering parliament no longer the arena of party strife, and the path to individual aggrandizement, a class of representatives would be attracted to the public service. These would be patriots and statesmen in the best use of the term. They having no views of personal ambition to serve, would, for the love of country, seek only the welfare and prosperity of the people.
[Secret voting in the House of Commons]
This result can be accomplished in no way except by the adoption by parliament of a system of secret voting. Therefore the scheme now suggested embraces the extension of the vote by ballot to the proceedings of the House of Commons.
The adoption by Parliament of secret voting would doubtless meet with much opposition. But it would likewise meet with the approbation of the best and most honourable class of our politicians. It would be a complete emancipation of the members of the House from subserviency to party rule. It cannot be denied that MPs have frequently found themselves much embarrassed by their obligation to support party measures at the sacrifice of their personal opinions and the interests of their constituents. This was exemplified during the passage of the late Act to readjust the representation in the House of Commons, and the discussions on the tariffs.
All religious and temperance questions are fruitful in examples of the equivocal position MPs are forced to assume, when the party policy clashes with their conscientious convictions. But if the votes of the House were taken by ballot instead of in the present form, those members would be at liberty to vote according to their own judgment untrammelled by any consideration as to the effect their vote might have on the party supremacy, for with secret voting party government would be at an end. Secret voting would also curtail the debates to no inconsiderable extent. At present the long and useless discussions that daily take place in parliament are largely attributable to the fact that members feel themselves bound to find some apologetic or fictitious reason for supporting the party measures [against the] manifest wishes of those they profess to represent.
By secret voting [their own feelings could] find expression in the House to an extent that could be [beneficial]. Parliament would be placed in a position to deal with many vital questions in a manner [in line with] the best form of party government. The question of reciprocal trade so essential to some of the provinces would be dealt with. The question of prohibition would be decided upon its merits. [As would] the labor question containing two antagonistic elements — Capital holding to its vested rights, and labor proclaiming in no uncertain tone its indisputable right to fair pay for hard work. These questions, and others as important, call for settlement. But never can they be satisfactorily settled under a party government.
But under such a representative government as the secret voting would create, screened by the ballot from intimidation, importunity and coercion, these questions and others as conflicting would be dealt with in such a manner as to cause many of the difficulties to disappear. The complications incidental to the present situation would be so adjusted as to effect an equitable and feasible solution of these apparently insolvable problems.
Is it not a lamentable sight to behold almost one half the MPs — some of the ablest men in Canada— occupying a position worse than useless and a large proportion of the remainder degraded into human machinery for keeping a dozen or more men in office, bolstering up the policy and schemes of the office holders, while those in opposition waste their breath in ineffectual protestations?
Such a sight would no longer dishearten the people, if secret voting were adopted. The penal clauses embodied in this scheme would protect MPs from the influence of corrupt men.
[page 44]
The freedom and independence thus secured to the MPs would fill the seats of the House with honest, able and disinterested politicians and enable them to work effectively and harmoniously in the interests of the country. That those results would naturally follow the adoption of the penal clauses is too obvious to admit of dispute. So long as there remained one MP who adhered to the principle represented by those clauses, it would be a hazardous matter for any combination of members to attempt a violation or an evasion of the law. Such a clause may be ridiculed for making it penal to simply ask a MP how he intended to vote. But such a question — simple though it might be — would pave the way for other questions. As it is the object of the clause to prevent any attempt whatever being made — directly or indirectly — to tamper with the secrecy of the ballot, it is quite clear that the most effective way of accomplishing the end in view is the adoption of such a clause.
Besides the penal clause is not intended in anyway to limit or restrict the free discussion of all questions and issues during the parliamentary debates. It is also considered advisable that the duration of each parliament should be limited to three years, as it is important that a frequent appeal to the people should be compulsory.
In the present government of Canada we have a certain number of ministers supposed to be the advisers of the Crown – a harmless fiction as they generally act for the Crown on their own responsibility. Actually they are the heads of the several departments of the public service. Holding as they generally do the same political opinions and having the same party interests, they endeavour to conduct the business of their respective departments in harmony with the views of the combined administration.
Although they are responsible to parliament as a ministerial body, yet parliament has little or no control over them as far as relates to their official functions. The department is merely the bureau of the minister. He is autocratic in the management of the business of the country so far as it concerns his particular department. The officials of the department are merely the servants of the minister.
The contracts, perquisites and emoluments form the patronage of the minister and his party. The ministry as a body owe their position to the party they belong to. The leaders of the party, although they may not be either in the ministry or in Parliament, are practically supreme rulers of the country so long as their party has a majority in the House. The ministers are supposed to be responsible to parliament for their official acts. But in reality they are responsible to no one so long as their majority can be maintained.
When that majority from any cause has been reduced to a minority, the government is forced to resign its position. And another party government takes control of the departments, with a different policy and different opinions and interests. Such changes of administration cannot fail to disturb the working of departments so constituted, and to operate injuriously on the business of the country.
By abolishing the system of party rule through the adoption of secret voting in the House of Commons, a government organized as at present would be ineffective. As it would be impolitic to cripple the executive in other to extend the power of the people, a different system must be found adapted to the different formation of the representative body.
By the scheme now proposed each department would be constituted a corporate body, under the presidency of a "Director General" who would be appointed by, and be directly responsible to Parliament. He would have no seat in the House of Commons, but would be required to communicate with and report to parliament on all occasions when necessary. The departments so constituted would have an unchangeable [formation?] and be invested with all the powers and functions of the present ministers of the Crown in permanent tenure.
The House of Commons would elect by ballot three of its members for each department, to be called Councillors of State, who would hold office during the pleasure of parliament. Those members so elected would constitute the executive council. The functions of the Councillors of State would be to represent their respective departments in the House of Commons, and to exercise an advisory superintendence over the business management, but without any controlling power — to advise the Executive Council as to the policy adopted by parliament, and to communicate to parliament the acts, opinions and policy of the Executive Council.
To communicate to the respective departments the views and requirements of the executive and to perform the duties and services now performed by members of the Privy Council. The Director General and officials of each department as a corporate body would have control of the internal economy and business affairs of the department subject to the supervision of parliament.
They would submit to parliament the necessary estimates, make returns of expenditures and receipts, and perform the same duties and services now performed by the minister of the Crown and other officials in relation to the affairs of the department.
[page 45]
One Councillor of State for each department would retire each parliamentary year. It would be [within its power] for Parliament by vote to remove at any time councillors or officials from their position if it was considered advisable to do so, and elect or appoint others in their place.
The members of the State would be elected for life by the House of Commons. They would have no original legislative jurisdiction and would have no control over the proceedings or acts of parliament. They would possess judicial powers so far as such powers are adapted to the conditions and circumstances of the country and the people.
All subjects for parliamentary enquiry, and matters at present referable under Royal Commission, would be submitted to the Members of the Senate by virtue of their inquisitorial jurisdiction, and questions of foreign and international policy would when necessary be referred to them for deliberation and advice.
The Executive Council would combine the functions and powers of the present Cabinet and Privy Council and would consist of the three Councillors of State for each department, and three members to be appointed by The Governor General who would be called Secretaries of State, but who would have no seats in the House of Commons. The Governor General would be ex-officio president of the Council, and a vice president would be elected by parliament to hold office for three years. He would represent the Executive Council in parliament and preside over the deliberations of the Council in the absence of the Governor General.
It may be urged that with an Executive Council so constituted, composed perhaps of members holding different opinions, representing different classes and advocating different lines of policy, a degree of friction and misunderstanding would inevitably arise in the administrative body, seriously embarrassing the affairs of the country.
But among other examples that can be found we have that of the Irish Synod as organized since the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland, composed of both clergy and laity, where "it was resolved from the first to keep the administration of its affairs clear of all party, religious, social or political differences, and for all to labour for the common good on the acknowledged principle, that if a member was able to do good service no question was to be raised as to what part he had taken in the debates of the Synod or what politics he had professed outside the House." If Ireland could produce men capable of enunciating and carrying into effect such principles, it may be reasonably presumed that Canada could do likewise.
In the present limited space it is impossible to follow this scheme through all its ramifications and details. Much would perhaps have to be changed before anything approaching perfection was attained. But as its defects became apparent under the critical analysis of those versed in the political science, and the experience of parliament brought to bear upon its defects, a more perfect system would be obtained.
But nevertheless the scheme presented here suggests a system based on universal suffrage —an electorate represented by a delegate body in close sympathy with the people exercising the electoral franchise free from bribery and corruption, for the purpose of creating a parliament composed of able, honest and representative men. It suggests a parliament emancipated from party rule, factional strife, intimidation and ministerial control, through the adoption of an effective system of secret voting. It suggests a senate invested with judicial, inquisitorial and advisory jurisdiction, whose dignity and independence is secured by membership for life.
It places the departments of the public service beyond the influence of political changes and the executive in harmony with the representatives of the people, without in any way decreasing the powers and authority of the Crown. Any scheme in any degree calculated to attain these results might well occupy the attention of Canadian politicians.
"Canadian Home Rule and amendments thereto."
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ACT RELATING TO THE ELECTORAL FRANCHISE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINION OF CANADA. [not in this iteration]
[7.] "PER ASPERAM AD ASTRA" [page 50]
A consideration of the remedy for any disorder involves a consideration of the nature of the disorder. The character of the remedy is of necessity conditioned on and determined by the character of the disease. Any system therefore that may be submitted for the reform of the method of electoral representation must be determined in its form and nature by the nature of the necessity of which it is born. It is obvious therefore that this essay that forms a preface and exposition of a system for the rectification of representation and parliament must concern itself with an inquiry into the nature of the disorder it professes to rectify.
The questions that this essay professes to answer therefore may briefly be stated as follows:
(1). What are the functions of a complete representative system?
(2). In what particulars and to what degree does the existing system fall short of the purposes for which it was instituted ?
(3). To what causes are the deficiencies of the present system due?
(4). By what means can these deficiencies be rectified?
As the system of electing representatives has its origin in the nature and necessities of representative government, it is evident that a clear understanding of the purpose and functions of such a system involves an understanding of the nature and theory of representative government itself. So soon as the people of a country acquire the right to govern themselves the question at once arises: in what way should they do so?
The first method that suggests itself, one consistent with the principle of popular government, is that the people of the nation should meet together, deliberate on all measures affecting their common interest, and, after a discussion in which each man has a voice, arrive at a conclusion in which each man has a vote. Accordingly, to realize completely the theory of popular self-government, the electors would require to meet in national convocation, and debate and determine as a people all matters of public import.
It is evident that in a nation of any large proportions it would be impossible for the people to adopt this ideal system of self-government. It would be practically impossible for all the citizens to meet together in a mass, and even if such a possibility were admitted it would be equally impossible for them after having met to deliberate, debate, and arrive at a peaceful and harmonious conclusion on the innumerable matters of public interest.
If the people cannot meet in a mass to transact their common affairs, they must evidently adopt some other means of self-government. This method must be one that is most closely consistent with the ideal but impossible system of self-government en masse.
They cannot act in a body, therefore they must act through representatives. Representative government therefore has its origin in the theoretical impossibility of popular or democratic government. It is a compromise between the theory and practice of popular government.
It is a concession of the ideal form to the real. It is not the best imaginable, but it is the best possible system of popular self-government. The first essential [of] representative government therefore is that it should be popular government — that it should realize as far as possible that ideal form in which the people manage the affairs of the people. It must be consistent with the logic of the democratic principle. If it cannot bring about an assembly of the people in person, it must bring them together in spirit. It must be the nation in miniature, a small typical representative nation. The Legislature (which is the name by which the representatives are known collectively) must be the microcosm of the people. It should be the type of which the nation is the prototype. It should be the essence, the concentrated spirit, the miniature personality, the perfect mirror of the nation.
There should be no party of any strength, no sentiment of any power, no principle of any vitality in the country which was not also present in parliament in a strength proportioned to its strength in the nation. It is obvious that in order for parliament to attain this ideal character — to be perfectly representative of the people — it is necessary for every member to be perfectly representative of his constituency, to embody in his parliamentary personality the salient characteristics of all his constituents, to be a type of the collective character of those he represents. It would be necessary that in him his constituents should be seen. Through him they should speak. His political personality should consist of ingredients contributed by the units of which he is theoretically the aggregate. These ingredients should be grouped in his nature in the same precise and perfect proportion that they exist in his constituency.
[page 51]
He would be as it were the parliamentary molecule, the elements and atoms of whose being are contributed by the political atmosphere that surrounds him. He would be a composite whose content consists in due proportion of miniature constituents. This is the ideal representative. Theoretically he bears the same relation to his constituency as the parliament bears to the nation. He is the microcosm of his constituency. The parliament is the microcosm of the nation. A legislature consisting of such representatives as this is the closest approximation to the idea of absolute popular government.
Unfortunately for the existence of such a system of representative government, human nature conflicts with the conditions essential to its existence and stability. Man is not a mechanism, and representatives must be men. There is mixed with the web and woof of human nature an element of individuality. The man is older than the representative and earlier in the field. His parliamentary character must be built upon the basis of his individuality, and must be subject to the re-actions of his thought. The electors may impress their character upon the mind of their representative. But the MP's mind precedes the impression, and colours it with its own character, holds it subject to its varying moods.
The factors of his own personality must enter into the counsels of the representative, and exercise if not a predominant, at least a determinate influence on his actions. He can never be an absolute representation of the people who elect him. At the best he can approximate towards the ideal standard.
As a matter of fact, representative government in the truest sense of the word does not and cannot exist. The representatives cannot exactly, and in every particular, resemble the electors whom they represent. They cannot exactly combine in their persons the innumerable, diverse, and often conflicting opinions, desires and characteristics of a large number of citizens. On several large issues there may perhaps be an unanimity of opinion among the constituents, and between them and their representative. But it will be very evident that this unanimity cannot continue on the many other minor questions that may arise in parliamentary debate, or enter the arena of public discussion after the elections are over.
The existing system of government in Canada might be more properly described as responsible than representative. Responsible government has its origin in the impracticability of representative government, as representative government has its origin in the impracticability of popular government. Theoretically parliament should exactly and in every particular represent the people. Practically it cannot do this because it is composed of diverse individualities each possessed of a judgment, volition, conscience and character of his own. But the right of the people to govern themselves is still valid, and is not altered by the fact that it is impossible for them to do so as a people.
If the parliament cannot be made representative, it can be made responsible. If the representatives cannot be impressed with the collective personality of the electors so as to do precisely as the electors would have done on every occasion, they can at least be made responsible to the people for their acts. At certain fixed periods they can be called upon to justify and explain their parliamentary record, and stand or fall as the public may desire.
From this brief review of the theory and limitations of representative and responsible government, we may be able to derive the purposes of the system of electoral representation that forms the connecting link between the parliament and the people. So soon as it becomes necessary for the people to govern by representatives, the question arises — In what way shall the representatives be chosen?
The answer to this is — in such a way as will best conserve the purposes of representative government. The purposes of representative government I have indicated above. From a careful study of the purposes we may arrive at the conclusion that any system of electoral representation completely consistent with them must possess the following essentials:
(1). It must enable every elector to be represented in parliament.
(2). It must give every elector the right and opportunity to vote for whoever he wishes to represent him.
(3). It must enable electors scattered throughout the country to unite their votes for a common candidate.
(4). It must ensure the representation in parliament of all classes and shades of opinion in the country, whose supporters have attained the numerical strength necessary to entitle their candidate to a seat.
It may be safely said that no system of electoral representation has realized the purpose for which it exists if it lacks any of the above essentials. And it may also be said that the existing electoral system lacks not one but all of these essentials. It does not enable every elector to be represented in parliament. It does not give every elector the opportunity to vote for the man he desires to represent him.
[page 52]
It does not enable electors scattered throughout the country to unite their votes for a common candidate, nor does it by any means ensure representation in parliament to all classes and shades of opinion in the community, even where these classes or opinions have attained to large proportions, and even a large degree of public favour.
The deficiencies of the present and existing system of electing representatives may be briefly enumerated as follows:
(1). By it a very large number of the people do not obtain representation in parliament and it is possible that a majority of the people should not be represented.
(2). It involves the existence of constituencies, arbitrary electoral districts, for the candidates in which the electors are forced to vote, and outside of which they are not permitted to support any candidate by their votes; and by this system of arbitrary localization of votes it prevents citizens and parties of national strength by local weakness from combining their votes to elect a representative.
(3). By thus weakening the minor parties and interests of the state and preventing their representation in the legislature, it tends to unduly encourage party government and divide the people and the parliament into two parties, who monopolize the House and prevent that independence and originality of thought that are essential to the well-being and progress of the nation.
I shall now deal briefly with each of these defects of the existing system, and endeavor to ascertain their origin and their effect, and indicate in what manner they may be rectified.
Under the present system a very large number of the people have no representatives in parliament. It therefore fails to realize the basic principle of representative government, namely, that the people should govern the people. Under the present system part of the people govern all the people, and the minority have not even an opportunity of saying in what way they should be governed. Parliament does not contain the representatives of the people, but only the representatives of a part of the people. This great blunder is not due to any narrowness of the franchise, nor to any flaw in the principle of representative government. It has its origin simply in the radical errors in the electoral system by means of which representative government is at the present time so ineffectually striving to realize its ends.
The two blunders to which we allude are the selection of representatives by a majority [TM: plurality] vote, and the existence of constituencies. The country at present is divided into a number of constituencies. Each of these is entitled to a representative in parliament. Candidates are nominated and the one receiving a majority [plurality] of votes is elected.
It is evident that in every constituency there will be a large number of electors who have voted for the unsuccessful candidate. As these have no second vote, they will have no representative in the legislature. If all the minorities of the various constituencies are combined, they will be found to constitute almost half of the population of the country. The fact that the combined minorities of any two constituencies might create a group of electors numerically as strong as that which elected a representative, is apparently lost sight of by the present system.
The present system also overlooks the fact that any one group (say 5000) of the electors are as much entitled to a vote as any other 5000. Their right is not in the slightest degree depreciated by the imposition of arbitrary lines of constitutional demarkation, dividing the land into certain fixed divisions called constituencies. The elector derives his right to vote from the fact that he is a citizen of the nation, and not from the fact that he is an inhabitant of any constituency.
He is entitled to vote in the nation and in any part of it, and for any citizen of it, and to unite his vote not only with his neighbours but with his countrymen.
The system of representation by constituencies, which Canada borrowed from England, doubtless had its genesis and had its justification there in the existence of large landed interests. It was not so much the people as the land that was represented in parliament. It was considered that the interest of a citizen in the state was proportioned to the amount of land he owned. As an owner of part of the country he was entitled to have a voice in the legislature that made the laws of the country. It was probably this old English conception of representation that caused the latter to be based on localized constituencies in that country. The great reforms of recent years and the great extension of the franchise have long since destroyed the feeling that representation should be based on land, and it is now generally conceded that the true basis of representation is population.
But though the old principle is gone, its fruits survive. In constituencies there are still prevalent some relics of constitutional feudalism. The great blunder of the existing system of representation is its attempt to realize the principle of representation by population through the same worn-out and antiquated means that were established to realize the older and narrower principle of representation by land. As a consequence of this an inevitable conflict arises between the means and the end, and the end is only half effected.
[page 53]
Districts should be abolished, and in their place there should be established electoral groups, by a division of the population. Every member should be required to get a certain fixed number of votes in order to be elected, and the number necessary for election might best be ascertained by a division of the total number of representatives (as fixed by the constitution) into the total number of electors, and it should not be necessary that these votes should come from any particular locality as at present.
It is evident, therefore, that in order to rectify the errors in the existing system that I have pointed out, the following changes are necessary:
(1). Every elector should have an opportunity to vote for a successful candidate.
(2). Abolition of constituencies.
(3). Division of electors into electoral groups based on numbers, not land.
(4). Abolition of election by majority vote, and establishment of a quota of votes, which it will be necessary for the candidate to obtain in order to be elected. This would be ascertained by dividing the total number of electors by total number of representatives. [Hare Quota]
(5). Abolition of localization of votes, and adoption of a system which would enable elector to vote for candidate in any part of country.
All the above principles are embodied and harmonized in the system annexed to this essay. This system enables each voter to continue voting until he has voted for a successful candidate. It enables him to cast his vote for any candidate he desires in any part of the country. It establishes a quota of votes. And it preserves the secrecy of the ballot.
1. Districts are abolished, and there is substituted for them electoral groups. The electors of the country are divided (on the basis of the voters' list) into a number of divisions or groups, each one of which will return a representative to parliament. In order to ensure the election of any candidate he must obtain a definite number of votes (to be ascertained by dividing the number of voters by number of representatives).
Assuming the total number of electors in Canada to be 900,000, and the number of representatives 300, it will be necessary for a candidate to obtain 3,000 votes to be elected.
In dividing the country into electoral groups the question naturally arises — what should be the numerical strength of these groups? It is impossible that the number of voters in each group should be limited to the number essential to ensure election (3000). As where there were several candidates in the field it would be almost impossible for any to get all the votes in the group that he would in that case require to do in order to be elected. It is therefore necessary that the electoral group should contain a considerably larger number of votes than that necessary to ensure election. In fact the number should be sufficiently large as to make it almost certain that one candidate at least would obtain 3000 votes. I have therefore placed the number of electors in each electoral group at three times the number of votes necessary to ensure election. Thus the quota for election is 3000, the numerical strength of each electoral group is 9000.
It is evident that if the total vote in the country is 900,000 and the number of representatives 300, the quota of votes essential to election 3000, and the numerical strength of each electoral group three times that of the quota or 9000, that the number of electoral groups in which election can be held at one time will be only one-third the total number or 100. An election will therefore be held in 100 electoral groups. In each of these one candidate will be returned. One-third of the votes in each group will be satisfied, and two-thirds will as yet have no representative. The total number of representatives returned will be 100 (each group must return one representative, see clause 15 of Draft Bill). The total number of votes cast will be 300,000. The total votes remaining unrepresented will be 600,000.
Just as the original electoral groups were formed on a basis of 900,000 electors, now a second series will be formed on the minority, unsatisfied votes, or 600,000 basis. These electors are re-grouped into new groups of 9,000 each, and the second series is thus formed, in which voting takes place on the day following the first election and in the same manner.
In this way the election proceeds, the minority or unsatisfied voters in each case forming the basis of a new system of electoral groups. The first series of groups will evidently be local in their nature, the last series consisting of one group will be co-extensive with the nation. Every series of groups will be smaller in numbers and wider in area than that preceding it. Every elector will continue voting until he votes for a successful candidate — until he is represented in the legislature. (Exc. Clause 11, Draft Bill.
The question will at once occur to the critic of this system, "In what way can the unsatisfied votes be ascertained without violating the secrecy of the ballot? How will it be possible to know who is entitled to vote in each succeeding series?" This difficulty is dealt with in Clause 12 of the Draft Bill.
[page 54]
The election cannot conveniently be held on one day because it would be impossible to ascertain the name of the successful candidate between each series in that case, and the votes in the second series cannot be identified until the name of the candidate elected is known.
I wish to call particular attention to the fact that there can be no great delay or confusion about this election. The electoral groups will all be found and candidates nominated in each before the first day of election. It will not be necessary to know the result of the vote in the first series before forming the second, or in the second before forming the subsequent ones; because when the total number of votes in each group is known and the quota is limited, the remainder is known. Only one third can vote successfully in first election. Therefore two-thirds is the basis for the second. See Clause 14.
The one objection of weight that I can conceive as being urged against this system of electoral representation that I have here submitted is, that it will prolong the period of choice — that the election instead of being hurried through in one day, as at present, may occupy several days before it is completed.
It is a very debatable question whether if this were so it would not be a merit. There is nothing meritorious in the present system of rushing through the election on one day. The elections are held only once in five years, and the selection of representatives who will for that period of time hold the destinies of the nation in their hand, is not a matter of so light and trivial a nature as to be hurried through in one day. It should rather be a careful, deliberate proceeding in which the merits of the various candidates and parties can be duly and carefully balanced.
It will be understood, however, that the only obstacle in the way of holding the election on one day under the new system arises from the difficulty of ascertaining what electors are entitled to vote in the second series, until the result of the first election is known. This difficulty is not so formidable that it cannot be overcome. I desire to say that if it be considered a merit in any electoral system that it should provided an expedient for the selection of all the representatives on one and the same day, that I do not consider it impossible that such an expedient should be attached to the system I have submitted as well as to any other.
It is not impossible to conceive of some ingenious and novel method of voting, involving a multiplicity of ballots, or otherwise by means of which this purely technical objection to the new system could be overcome. There are, however, many advantages arising from the method I have submitted that might render it rather desirable than otherwise, particularly in view of the fact that each successive group of electoral districts is wider than the other, and all classes and shades of public opinion would find a representative in the house.
In an earlier portion of this thesis I enumerated the prime essentials of a complete system of electoral representation. It will be seen that each of these essentials is present in the system I have here submitted. It may be well perhaps, in conclusion, to enumerate these advantages, and point out by what features and methods of the new system each one is achieved.
(1). Every elector will have an opportunity to vote for whoever he pleases. Clause 13 of the annexed Bill does not conflict with this privilege. Though the elector may not find the representative he desires in the first group, he can by voting for some purely nominal candidate earn the opportunity to continue voting until he enters the group in which the representative he desires has been nominated and in which, on account of its breadth, he has enough supporters to elect him.
(2). All parties and classes or men having 3,000 supporters can obtain a place in the legislature. These supporters need not, as under present system, be all living together in the same constituency, but may be scattered in various parts of the country. Thus if the scientists of Canada desired to elect a scientist to the legislature, they could not do so at present, not being 3,000 strong in any one constituency. They could do so under the new system if they numbered 3,000, though scattered in every part of the country, by nominating a man in the last electoral group, which is co-extensive with the nation, or if 9,000 strong they could nominate candidates in three electoral groups, each co-extensive with one-third of country.
(3). Every class and shade of political thought will be represented in parliament, which will thus become as far as possible the exact mirror of the people.
(4). Any man whose ability has impressed itself on the minds of 3,000 of his fellow citizens in the country can, by their support, be elected to parliament, and thus a new and original and invaluable element of genius and independence will find its way into the legislature.
(5). Party power would be weakened by abolition of its fortresses, the constituencies.
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[page 55] [Proposing a Series of Run-off Elections]
A BILL To Reform the System of Electing Representatives to the Legislature of Canada.
(Assuming total number of voters to be 900,000).
Whereas it is desirable to rectify the existing system of electoral representation, it is hereby enacted that the present system of electing representatives from constituencies be forthwith repealed, and that:
1. The membership of the legislature shall be limited to 300 members.
2. In order to entitle a citizen to a seat in the legislature it shall be necessary for him to obtain 3,000 votes. (A number ascertained by the division of the total number of electors, 900,000, by the total number of members, 300).
3. Elections shall be held every five years.
4. For the purposes of election the electors shall be divided into groups containing each 9,000 electors. The first series of these groups shall be based on the voters' lists, will be in number 100 (900,000/9000) and each elector will be assigned his group.
5. On a day and time appointed an election will take place in each of these electoral groups, and the candidate securing the quota of 3,000 votes shall be declared elected.
6. Not more than 3,000 votes shall be cast for any one candidate. [surpluses to be transferred]
7. The electors who have voted for unsuccessful candidates shall be entitled to vote again on the following day, in the second series of electoral groups.
8. On the day following the election on first series of groups an election shall take place in a second series, to be arranged as follows: The minority or unsuccessful voters in the first series (consisting of 600,000 electors, whose identity as unsuccessful voters will be ascertained by method in Clause 12 of this Bill will be divided and re-grouped into a new series of electoral groups, each containing 9,000 voters. On the day following the elections in first series the election shall take place in the new second series.
9. The unsuccessful voters in second series will be entitled to vote on the next day in a third series of electoral groups, which third series will be formed by re-grouping the minority or unsuccessful voters of the second series into new electoral groups consisting each of 9,000 electors.
10. The above system of election and x'e-grouping of unsuccessful voters will continue until the electors are reduced to less than the number required for one constituency (9,000).
The final electoral group, which will be co-extensive with the nation, will consist of the residue of voters, and if over 3,000, an election shall take place, and the candidate securing 3,000 votes be elected. In case any candidate should not secure this number, the candidates having least number of votes will be struck off and election continue until one obtains 3,000.
11. Every elector shall be entitled to vote until he has voted for a successful candidate — with the exception of electors contained in minority less than 3,000 in last group, mentioned in Clause 10.
12. The method of voting shall be as follows:
(a) The elector on entering polling booth will be given a ballot containing the names of the candidates in that group. These names will be printed one under the other on the paper, which will be perforated between each name. The elector will tear off the name of the candidate for whom he desires to vote, and drop it in the ballot box, and retain the residue of the ballot.
(b) If the candidate for whom he has voted is not elected, he will return to the polling booth the next day and present his old ballot and receive a new one, containing the names of candidates in the second group. The fact that he is entitled to vote a second time, and that he voted unsuccessfully the first time is proved by the presence on his old ballot paper of the name of the successful candidate. Had he voted for the successful candidate, this name would be torn off the ballot, and be in the ballot box.
13. No elector can vote in any series of the election unless he has voted in those preceding it.
[page 56]
14. All the 300 electoral groups shall be clearly outlined and numbered, and candidates nominated in each before the first day of the election. There shall be posted in every polling booth instructions to voters as to manner of voting, and also a list of the alternative groups in which the unsuccessful voters in each division shall cast their subsequent votes.
15. If no candidate should succeed in obtaining the necessary quota of votes (3,000) in any single electoral group, the names of the candidates lowest on the list shall be struck out, and voting proceed until one of the candidates obtains the necessary quota.
16. If two candidates in any one group obtain each the necessary quota of votes (3,000 each), the candidate who received the essential number first shall be declared elected in that group, and the other candidate shall be entitled to run in the next group, to which his supporters are attached. (This provision is necessary because the second series is based on the calculation that only one candidate will be returned in each group of the first series).
17. As soon as 3,000 votes have been cast for a candidate he shall be declared elected (subject to Clause 16), and any electors entering polling booths for the purpose of voting for the said candidate after he has secured the necessary number of votes shall be permitted to retain their ballots and vote on the following day in second series on presenting the said ballots.
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[8.] IN DEO SPERO. [a Canadian, based on info on page 61] [page 57]
If we wish to find the sources of political institutions in England, or wherever the English language is spoken, we must go back to the historian Tacitus, who in his work de Moribus Gernianoruni, tells us in his succinct style that "on affairs of small moment the chiefs consult — on those of greater import — the whole community take counsel — yet with this — that what is referred to the decision of the people is first of all maturely discussed by the chiefs." In this habit of our Teutonic ancestors, one is warranted in seeing the commencement of parliamentary gatherings, and almost tempted to find in it the germ-idea of the more modern "Plebiscitum."
One thing is sure, that as quickly as man ceased to be only a hunter, and merely a pastoral being, society having meanwhile coalesced for the mutuality of protection, popular gatherings became the order of the day. Further on, we shall find the expressed will of the majorities in these gatherings, evolving itself into law, i.e., the opinion of a majority plus something else, which is a power to impose it on a minority.
That antique people the Hebrews had their gatherings, e.g., "Joshua gathered all the tribes of Israel to Shechem, and called for the elders of Israel, and for their heads, and for the judges, and their officers etc., thus summoning in primitive form, an assembly of the peoples, not on political grounds, but on state religion, to them an absorbing issue, and this meeting was no doubt what we moderns describe as "an open air meeting."
Deborah also we are told gave judgment sitting under a palm tree.
The Greeks attributed such importance to the fact, that affairs of state should be the affairs of all individuals, that on voting days at Athens, a rope stained crimson was dragged through the streets, and so stretched that careless non-voters away from the polls should be marked by it and stained physically and receive stains mentally, objects of conspicuity to more diligent citizens. Compulsory voting is not quite the new idea some of us think.
It seems a redundancy to quote authority as to the assembling of the old Romans for political purposes — the product of their gatherings we have still in the widespread civil law, an active ingredient in our common law, and almost the vitality of continental law in Europe.
Sir H. Maine, in his book Ancient Law, reminds us that social necessities and social opinion are always more or less in advance of law; that law itself is stable, while societies are progressive, and that the greater or the lesser the happiness of a people, depends on the promptitude with which the gulf is bridged over. So there was a crying need for these large gatherings of people, each one of old was ready to contribute his share of the melioration of wrong and the suggestion of improvements. The Anglo-Saxon tribal meetings of freeholders, (Folk-Moot) the nucleus of modern parliaments, goes back historically with no break to the very origin of the English nation, till it fades in the mist of prehistoric time.
The Witena-gemot or "wise men's meeting," was a conjunction of the important officials of the kingdom summoned by the king, and invited to meet him wherever he might be staying.
The meetings were open air ones, and all that chose attended, but there was the difference between them and ourselves, that with us, the unit of society is the individual – with them it was the family. It was the lot of each family, then to have and uphold rights, and a status qua family in society just as now we speak of individual rights. For state purposes, all but the chief of the family were nobodies, and he attended to represent officially, and by summons the members he controlled.
Kemble has with diligence collected the records of 151 meetings of the "witan". It is not doubted that the church or temple of primitive society was the very spot where the people gathered and where justice was weighed out, as soon as open air meetings were inconvenient. The first recorded Witen was held near York in A.D. 627, outside its walls. Runnymede, says Matthew of Westminster, was in days of yore used as a place of gathering, to consult and hear speeches, as to the state's welfare and, as all know, the cowardly John was brought to his knees by the fierce barons camped at Runnymede.
Going on much later we know, that in A.D. 1290, Edward I held a parliament at Clipston-Park. And down to modern days, there was a very old oak in that park commonly known as the "parliamentary oak."
[page 58]
The old "shire moot" of Kent, always preeminently conservative among conservative Englishmen, did not speedily relinquish the remembrances of the ancient air meetings, if obliged to abandon as time rolled on their actual use. On Pennenden Heath, the county house is even now situated on the north side of the heath, and the sheriff to this day holds his county courts there each month, and there takes the poll for the parliamentary representatives, till its adjournment to Maidstone, and in these primitive gatherings mentioned above, the shire, the great franchises, and the manors were all represented.
Leaving for a moment this most interesting inquiry, maybe pardon will be extended if we venture to hope that some day woman will be accorded her rights in politics. We do not suggest the abandonment of the home influence, but surely if women are subject as men to laws, they might have some voice in the election of law-makers. The monastic element of the middle ages, while it exalted knightly defence of women tinged with a sad colouring of grey, the notion of her intellectual power. It is suggestive to find in some old treatises, that women had no political rights, simply because of inability to keep a secret.
But Anne, Countess of Pembroke, was considered not too weak of mind to be sheriff of Westmoreland, and no sinecure, either, was the office — she exercised it in person and at the assizes of Appleby sat on the Bench with the Royal Justices. Lucy, Countess of Kent, was returning officer and signed the return of the member for York, in 1412 AD. In 1415 AD, Margaret, the widow of Sir H. Vavaseirr, also acted as returning officer, and signed the return—so Lady Copley, in 1553 AD.
Judicial opinions came from the High Bench that a Feme Sole, owning a freehold had a right to vote for members of Parliament. So Catherine vs. Surrey, cited 7 Mod. 264.
Women when sole had a power to vote for members (Coates vs. Lisle 14 Jac. 1). If a woman owner of freehold [property] is married, then her husband is to vote for her (Holt V. Lisle, 4 Jac. I). We suppose this lady of that remote day gave her spouse a bad quarter of an hour, if he disobeyed her wishes. At all events, the principle was in these early days established to which we are not yet educated, that fairness to women insists on yielding them votes, but to guard against marital and other influences it is suggested that spinsters and widows alone go to the polls.
To resume where we left off, first asking pardon for quoting the Sage of Chelsea on woman, "Her magnificent emotional power capsuled during past aeons and mercilessly chained to the hearth or cloister, and in our time parched in that Golgotha of thought the drawing room will yet roll over the world in fructifying waves causing upheavals and destructions."
The American woman movement seems to be holding Carlyle's florid idea in the front.
Our sturdy ancestors always battled for their rights. Whether opposing the encroachments of royalty or baronial tyranny, the same brave spirit was always there, and the outspoken word, to condemn what was un-English and therefore unfair. So it came about that even the haughty Tudors when wrong doing, were compelled to use some crutch of legality, in wandering into bye-ways, which conscience said, were the abodes of lawlessness. What was wrongly done, it was attempted to be shown, was done in colour of right. Any plausible pretext was cleverly made use of in quoting or forging precedents. The law always was respected, if the worship of it was not heart-felt — it was assumed to be arr impelling factor — especially as to kings. What was earnestly desired by Englishmen, was embodied in petitions to the Crown. The monarch was allowed the grace of consenting to it, which often occurred to be more formal than sincere. But the ancient houses of parliament always had the faculty of persistence in just demands. Terrorized for a while they soon recovered themselves and haughty kings with their notions of divine lights had in the end to yield. The king's most gracious majesty feared the chimes of liberty that rang in England with the Magna Charta of the tyrant John – they had a warning note for the ears of rapacious autocrats.
There was always in England, both anterior to and after the Norman conquest, a continuation of national assemblies, from the remote years, when all England met in the open field, down to when, from change of the conditions of our insular life, the many were represented by the few — the gathering of the whole community had ceased, simply because all could not come. As is said, "the democratic aspect took on the oligarchical hue."
Zeal perhaps was less ardent, and the distances had increased. Remember it was no slight work in those days to travel over poor roads and into dangerous positions to be patriotic. It was a task of many days to leave the extreme north, south, or west of England and be present at the annual gathering; there were a great many "lions" in the way. It was evolved as a necessity that chiefs only should represent the community at large — as a rule, occasionally, some of these celebrities would get lukewarm. Summoned by royalty they ceased to come, and in time their names were omitted from the list
After, it was come about that they were conceived as having no right to attend at all. But, be that as it may, one of the best historians makes out that, paradoxical in sound, yet true is it in fact, the House of Lords, not the House of Commons, is the true modem unbroken identity with the primitive democratic meeting of old England. The Lords were the oldest, and the Commons grew up side by side, till the youthful giant absorbed nearly all the vigour and outstripped in combative energy its older brother.
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Barons in the Lords, Knights of the Shires in the Commons, mere commoners though knights, yet assuming and keeping its leadership, the old and modern phrase of "the Commons of England in parliament assembled" was about to become a mighty power and watchword. The early legislator of England got to the Parliament in spite of lonely forests, wolves, Robin Hoods, and other dangers, and in the absence of railroad passes the amor patriae was a sturdy factor to him.
And he really did represent those who sent him. He was known as a familiar object to all, he knew all their desires and wants and entered the hall with his lesson well learned, and when all was over, he knew right well an account of a stewardship would have to be given. If disposed to be unveracious or unmanly, he was aware that his omissions were unconcealable. It was the time of residential representation in purity. A time was coming on when the Crown would wrest from the sturdy knights and yeomanry of England the nomination of Parliament-representatives; seats in its halls were to be exposed in the political shambles; sessions were to be prolonged year in and year out; a big chasm was opening out between the constituents and the elected one, and the primitive and honest idea of delegated agency was fading into mist. Crown officials wishing acts passed that should be grateful to their master were in time to manipulate a new political weapon, in the shape of members of the House who were not ashamed of the designation of "managers." Even as late as James II, Middleton and Sir Dudley North wore this sycophantic livery. In social matters of policy it was to be seen that the great pendulum swing was to go back far in one direction, then to rebound in another till what physicists know as the "mean-force" should come in. The effacement of the sturdy unit from Kent was to be, and the "dauntless Hamixlen" was to be crushed in the cogs of political and kingly machines — or if not meeting so dire a fate, he was to be in future crushed into the great mass, a thing without shape, vigour, or conscience.
Guizot truly says, "Representation is a natural process, by which public reason that alone has a right to govern society, may be extracted from the bosom of its members.
All institutions, all conditions of the representative system flow from and return to this point. Election publicity and responsibility are so many tests applied to individual reasons that assume themselves to be the interpreters of the community at large."
And Mirabeau, "A representative body is to the nation what a chart is for the physical configuration of the soil, in all its parts. As a whole the representative body should at all times give out a reduced picture of the people, their opinions — their wishes — their aspirations." So it did in the early times. Like all else that is good and pure, it continued good and pure for a while, longer or shorter as the elements of life act on it, then it shows a grey spot here and there, then a black one or more sporadically, ferment and putrescence come on apace, and drastic realities are applied heroically with good or bad results, as time goes along, till Guizot's fundamental electoral axiom finds a haven where it can be said that, "Les electeurs fassent qu'ils veulent et sachent ce qu'ils font." This is the goal we are striving for.
It was not till the 23rd year of Edward I's reign that the lower House in England can be said as rightly constituted. The name of "Parliament" was first applied to the assembly early in that year. Till the middle of the 17th Century no law existed as to the life of a Parliament, except that the monarch dying, Parliament died also. The writ by which Henry III summoned Knights of the Shire and Burgesses of the Town is dated January 1265 AD. This is the earliest record of a gathering both of knights and burgesses. But there always had been in the Saxon churches seeds of a national organization, a craving for a niche in the national order; municipal life never died out, and the revered names of freeholders and freemen were cherished with a whole nation's pride.
If the Charter of John and its announcements are looked on with a proud backward glance by Englishmen, they are equally bound to remember when shouting, "St. George for merrie England," that the 49th year of Henry III's reign looked on the first Parliament where knights, citizens, and burgesses, together with the Lords, were welded into a legislative body.
It was not till the reign of Henry VI that suffrage became tightened. An act passed in his reign limiting the right to vote to electors and that to freeholders of 40 shillings. At the same time the idea of "polling" the electors took rise, but there is evidence that the right to a "poll "was not firmly established till the days of James I.
Speaking generally, parliamentary government was inaugurated in the reign of Edward I. That we now and of old had only the two chambers is the result of the gravitation of accidents. Edward sometimes conceived of more than three estates of the realm of England. The signs were there of a coming "house of merchants," and a "house of lawyers," but it narrowed down to the three houses – lords, clergy and commoners.
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Of the clergy one we have only historical recollections in our day. The clergy faded away as a legislative faculty simply through their obstinate refusal to act as a parliamentary constituent. In the 41st year of the reign of George III, they were debarred from even a seat in the Commons. This was despite the fact that for one hundred years before this law any such cleric could be a candidate, and if elected, could represent any constituency in England. The sarcastic Horne Tooke accused George's ministry of passing this act simply because one clergyman had dared to oppose the ministry of that day.
Having glanced at the skeleton of our ancient parliament, let us endeavour to get correct views of what representation should be, remembering the quotations from Guizot and Mirabeau given before, not omitting to see the spots time has cast on its ancient purity and referring to the evils gigantic that have come of "government by party."
The idea at the base of representation being that all classes have a voice in what concerns all, that which is injurious to the state be removed by parliament, and what is of benefit should be constructed, that the wants of a society running in advance of law should be supplied by legislation potential with a sanction; law then becomes what it should be, "the embodied conscience of a nation of persons."
The state, as was well said, is "not to be regarded as a kind of God," as some would have it, with the hackneyed cry of "vox populi vox Dei." Such never stay to ask themselves, What is the state? Destroy the units of individuals composing it, and where is your state? The government should exist for the state, but too often strangles it, e.g., the Bourbons with their "L'état c'est moi." As the monarchs thought, so did the French nobles, and the nation in its frenzy of wrath dyed crimson-red the execution-place of Paris with the wet gore of fair aristocrats, the French tiger bathed his jaws deep in the blood of his former oppressors.
We in England took things more steadily and quietly. Where wrong was we generally righted it legally. While tyrants oppressed us, we firmly stood to our charters — our "Bills of Rights" and our "Remonstrances."
Still the public is a large animal with many wants. It is many-sided, sometimes hard to please, complaining, often growling. It is of the nature of freedom to get free expression of feeling, even if some of this is hysterical, or, as is prettily said, that under despotism:
On souffre beaucoup,
Et l'on crie peu."
while in a free land, "On souffre peu et l'on crie beaucoup."
Feeling what is called the "people's pulse," is much oftener done than we think. Arnold satirized this where he says, "The middle class is strong enough to attract attention, but it is like the enormous creature of Plato, surrounded by obsequious people, trying to find out what its noises meant, and to make in their turn the noises that might please it." Statesmen's sails too often are stretched out for the popular wind, the successful one must be as the Romans said, "populi studiosus."
Someone had so little worshipful respect for this kind of thing that he was daring enough to reduce the theory of premiership to a very fine shade when saying, "The whole duty of a political chief is to look sharp for the way in which the political coach is going and then run on in front and bark aloud."
There is a class in England, and particularly in the back parts of that land, in whom is a terse epigrammatic mode of expression and comparison, which, while smile-provoking, is also truth-containing. A Sussex farmer of this kind, teased about his idea of politics, replied: "To me politics are this: I has a sow in my yard with 12 little ones, and they little ones can't all feed to once, because there ain't room enough, so I shuts six of 'em out of the yard whiles t'other six be sucking, and they six as be shut out they just do make a hem of a noise till they be let in, and then they be just as quiet as the rest."
The beginnings of all institutions, as Freeman says, are commonly honest. It is only later on that men find out with ingenuity that they can be worked corruptly for their own ends. What, as he says, is known to but few, is that of old, all constituencies, great as well as small, sent two members to Parliament, that each might act as a check on his fellow and debar him from voting contrary to the wishes and interests of constituents common to both of them.
[page 61] These were the halcyon days; ignorant of the rotting influences of bribery and influence, of rottenness ulcerating electors, free to use the voting power and Esau-like selling their consciences for guineas, and of that other rottenness where monied magnates had so manipulated politics, as that the corruptible voter had no vote to sell, simply because as the fact was, the vote was not his individual property.
The political aspirant "reproduces in rain what he had gathered in mist from his audience." The hustings everywhere convinces us of this. Liberty, says Hobbs, "is power divided up into fragments," therefore, everyone should be allowed to vote in order that he may get his individual fragment, that is his birthright. Political opposition toe often produces what oculists call "myopsis," only (in this) it unfortunately is moral and not simply physical merely; sometimes only one eye is in use, and that so placed at the back of the moral head that it can only look back at what is gone, and sigh like the Chinese politician for a faded away golden age.
The people to be represented often rise in disgust and pitch the antiquated theories and their expositors to the wide sea. The new political doctrines, having passed through the successive ages of ridicule and of argumentation, finally and quietly glide into the calm haven of adoption.
Rousseau bade all France look only backwards to a state of nature, and the leaves of the revolution came down in rains of blood. A slender atom of truth was with impudent mendaciousness forced on Frenchmen as the whole gospel of ethics, politics and religion. It took the cannons of a rough Napoleon to blow off from Paris the misty cobwebs of a philosophy having one grain of truth to ten thousand of falsity.
No one can say that the people here, or in England, or in our neighbours the Republicans of America, have or enjoy the full benefits of a political representation in the places where laws are made by the element of force to be imposed on them. The vis-major may be an obedience-compelling factor, but the nativity of morals is in no mundane sphere.
The "ought" is born celestially and is immutably truth, whether applied to politics or religion, and can nowhere on this earth be less or more than "ought" in its potentiality any more than can there be found a spot in the universes where two + two equals five.
No political refinements, nor political torrents of eloquence, nor political brute-force can make any man say that men or women, now, here, there, or anywhere, are properly represented.
The royal or republican mint yearly turns out a great deal of debased coin, stamped as it may be with all the majesty of imperialism or simplicity of republicanism.
It is the object of these theses (asked for) to point out defects and, what is a harder task, to suggest remedies. We say it in no way of fulsome admiration, that the originator of the idea that brings out these theses deserves a perpetual niche in the memory of our countrymen.
True it is, the whole vast army of officialism will be gathered against it. Political drums and war-cries will fill the air. Ridicule will add its mite, but the attention of the day may be caught, and if no more good is done than the presentation of a bare fact, that in this great colony we have men who have been induced to turn aside from the day's din to the examination of what concerns their country. Native or adopted, a real good has come to us.
One of the greatest evils that eats into the inner heart's core of modern politics is what we know as "government by party," or if you will, "government by majorities" so called.
Originally good in idea, and necessary in the promotion of some great and important principle of state, government by party is like a heavy two-edged sword rusty with age, and properly to be hung up till wanted again for some great and new emergency. But unfortunately it is still yearly brandished, to cut and hack at the vitality of the state, on each and all, and on every occasion that the party holding it with a death grasp chooses to cleave the air of politics.
Now we in Canada have little or nothing before us in the shape of cardinal points of statecraft. The foundations of a great Dominion were well and faithfully laid years ago. What we need most is to get rid of the chains of party lines and party strife. These wise words of Hegel apply to our case: "The will of the many expels the present government and their opponents take office. These in turn have to depart; and thus this unrest and agitation like the sea, never ceases." There are no great principles to be fought for, calling up the necessity of a union of men to fight for the assertion of any truth, dear to man.
Formerly party as party was excusable in the Government of England. And in some pages of our colonial history there were wrongs to be righted, there were principles to be adjusted, and frequently these had to be battled for by a small but brave band, uniform in "honesty of purpose, and superior to the blandishments of office. But their work was parallel to the cutting down of primeval forests by our pioneers, and the weapons of war by "party" should long ago have been quietly laid in the museum of political curiosities.
The evils of competition, replacing co-operation, have left the desk of the merchant, to find a haven in the bosom of parliaments. It required no prophet, to see that the ferocious and tiger maxim of "spolia opima and debellatores et Vae victis" would follow on apace from the wild jungle of human passions.
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The elections, held on the lines of government by party, exhibit nature in curious phases. A philosophic writer long ago called attention to the naked fact that men, who all along had been good friends the moment the fiery cross of politics was carried through the land, suddenly became hostile, so as to allow no obstacle in the way of scruple, to be a lion in the path. In fact it has solidified in the common phrase that "all and everything is fair in politics and war and in love." Arraying themselves in party ribbons and decorations, they proceed to demolish the enemy politically and sometimes physically. Distinctively party terms are used — even flowers are made to yield their beauties to the strife — roses, lilies and primroses all have to go in the procession. And the victor's war cry is heard by the sulking ear of the vanquished.
Is not all this a remnant of savagery, when each stranger was accounted as a foe, and all not of the tribe had to be beaten into insensibility or death? Is the league of any political party, with its party emblems, in any way superior to the savage's totem? Distinction with this difference that the Indian and New Zealander is a savage and a savage only, while the man of the 18th and part of the 19th Century is supposed and arrogated to be civilized, and a civilizer of his savage brother.
Hark back to the old election days, when the "blues and the yellows" were at it con amore for days, nay for weeks—when beer and blood flowed into the same gutter, when as once occurred, even ladies forgot their reserve and mingled in the din, when the rosy lips of a duchess were pouted to receive the embrace of a drunken butcher, merely to gain the low vote, and ask not where party strife begins and ends. Dickens has well satirized the "Eatanswill" elections and the fights of the rival editors of the political papers of the "blues" and the "buff's" in his Pickwick Papers and well he might.
Look at the vast sums spent in bribing electors, ruining their views of moral rights and corrupting whole communities. The Reform Bill, like a neat-handed Phyllis, swept away many of those cob-webs from the scene of politics, but the spiders have been spinning new ones in quiet darkness. We have strangled open bribery, by the tawny fingers of law, and have removed much of the evils of intimidation, and force by the ballot. But the monster of partyism is as much a living factor as ever he was in the days of Pitt or Walpole. His power is little impaired yet lingers to be felt. "Ex ungue leonem" is still true.
Cleisthenes, 509 years before Christ, divided Greece into townships of one hundred people each, and by bounds. Everyone had to register his name and property, doing so he was a free man, and every one voted and was taxed at his own home. What a picture of Arcadian simplicity in antithesis to our gigantic system of wheels within wheels!
As was well said, we are when getting pure copper, obliged to rid it of dross, so with political institutions. The whole series of civilizations is one effort, prolonged through ages, to get pure copper. It is so easy when figures count up, to make them suit our preconceived theories and notions on political matters. A leader has only to marshal them in a meretricious array, to make good the proposition that falls like gentle dew on the ears of his adherents and which they were quite willing to hug complacently even if no figures existed.
"Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" is no new cry. To go roaming about the political world without a "label" pinned on one, is more atrocious than a dog without a muzzle. Any member of a party original enough to think and act for himself is doomed to political ostracism — a wounded beast stands a better chance for mercy at the horns of his fellows than an independent thinker or asserter of his thoughts in the arena of politics. Traitor, renegade, Judas are colloquial terms in the air of politics.
The truth is that in politics a sentimental bigotry has become indurated generation after generation, so as to assume the features of heredity. It is no uncommon thing to be certain as to what ground a son of an aristocratic house will occupy on the political field, as the ancestors always were Whig or Tory, as the case may be, and a desertion from the beaten path would be regarded as a monstrosity. There is no honest looking at a subject with eves blurred by the steam of the cauldron of politics.
If it originates with friends, it is bolted, however unpalatable. If with opponents, every effort is put out for its strangulation. If every conscience whispers that it is "good for food and calculated to make one wise," the only possibility of its existence lies in the fact that an outside world may insist on the measure becoming law. Political foes are pelted with mud in the hope that some of it will not wash off.
Monarchs in England did very long ago help to keep up the fires of political strife. But fancy it being done in 1780. When Keppel ran for the borough of Windsor against the candidate of royalty, poor old George III canvassed in person against Keppel. He was actually seen going into a sick mercer's shop muttering in his jumbled-up style of iterated dictation, "The Queen wants a gown – wants a gown. No Keppel! No Keppel!"
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The purchase of a lady's silk gown was a very mild and innocent bribery in those days of corruption. We have put a stop to isolated bribing, but wholesale bribery is still in the air. It assumes now the expenditure of large monies where no pressing need is for public works, gigantic monopolies granted to favoured corporations (willing hands to sustain the party in power), the immoral poison of corruption percolates through these strata of public life.
Political creeds, as they affect both head and heart, are hugged with solemn gravity. And there is a species of eloquence redundant with catch phrases lying like a fringe around the creeds — "the working man's friend," the "coming economist of public money," the "asserter of the equal rights of all," the champion of this or the other ism, etc., the "patriot," etc. The more noise that ensues the better, while the best classes, the thinking, educated and pure minded, keep aloof from the dirty sawdust of the political arena. Go back a little in our own House of Commons, and look at the enormous waste of money and time over the [CPR] inquiry, and contrast the expense with the net result.
Guizot tersely says "that the aim of representation is to oppose a barrier at once to tyranny and to confusion." How widely is the aim separated in real life from the results!
"Plurality (said Pascal) that does not reduce itself to unity is confusion. Unity that is not the result of plurality is tyranny."
Fabre (another French thinker) reminds us that '' all political struggles have a root in the variance of two principles, a new, which seeks to shape itself beside an old one already there... There always has been a party that laid the greater stress on the old, and rejected the new with emphasis. When this tendency is dominant, conservatism is the watch-word, and a condition of seeming stagnation begins. But after reaching its culmination it has to give way to the steadily increasing pressure of the new, which now, frequently with violent commotions, declares a war on the old, in a more or less radical fashion. Every revolution is based on a violently repressed or badly directed evolution.
So strong has "party" gone in France that any party would welcome a foreign invasion that would overthrow their adversaries."
Speaking of the tyranny of politics, a late American writer characterizes it justly as a survival of the savage or neo-savage community, e.g., as is shown in the Russian Mir and in the Hindoo village community and also the Indian tribe. [There] whoever submits not to what the rest dictate in custom, religion and ideas of morality becomes an outcast, is tabooed. While the Hindoo who changes his theological theories (his brethren remaining firm in Brahim [thinking] or in the profession of Mahomet) must go..."
Communism in land, coin, and property is an anachronism. But the imposition of communal shackles on thought, religious or political, is an outrage and more so if backed up by the terrorizing influences of majorities. As Sir H. Maine truly said, the vast majority of mankind have stereotyped their institutions — a political party is tolerant of just so much and no more of truth than falls within its own political lines. Any truth straggling into or within the lines of the opposing party is to be treated both with suspicion, scorn, and decapitation unless it is evident that the great creature, the public at large, wills it. It is easy then to become proprietor and sole owner of it — the patent medicine.
There is no trace of "party government "in England till after the Revolution. Before that the King's ministers were his personal friends. William III first formed a ministry based on political bases. He had essayed to rule by a ministry culled from the best men of all parties.
So deeply rooted was the poison of political hostility that his ministry was no example of the "happy family," growling and scratching assailed his royal ears and he was forced to form a cabinet of a one-party materiel who were ready to rely and hope for a majority of their own creed, on the floor of the houses. This inaugurated policy was completed by 1697. [This proved to be a] fond delusion. As we shall see that government by party by no means is in the correct sense, a government by majority. It is really, when examined, seen to be merely government by the majority of a majority i.e., by the majority of whichever party holds for the time a majority in the House.
With all classes of politicians all is fair in party warfare. The Jesuitical principle of the "end justifying the means" has full swing. As was said, truth, honour and fair dealing are all alike sacrificed to the exigencies of either party. While parliament should exercise an influence over any ministry (with the reins in hand of officialism), the ministry in one way or another by devious devices is able to mould a parliament into plasticity. But "strong governments are by no means ex necessitate good governments."
If this was true, as an English writer says, Walpole's [government] was the strongest England ever had. But strong though it was, its main strength developed from the use of a power of corrupting others, being in itself corrupt to the very core. Twenty-one years it lived, but the whole series was barren of legislation.
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Pitt's government lasted 17 years. His majority was so overwhelming that, as used to be said, "all his opponents [were so few that they] could be carried about in a hackney coach." Party government is an unknown factor in ecclesiastical, municipal, banking, railroad and other great corporations meeting together. If indulged in [there, it] would involve stockholders, churches, and finally the public at large in a beautiful series of ruins. The proposer of its use would require at once the attention of an insanity-expert. Yet strangely we go on year in and year out, still pursuing the absurd practice, in the most solemn affairs that touch every man, and that too in the halls of an assembly awful in its dignity, and superior almost to the law of the land. So much for political heredity.
In days of yore, Ministers of the Crown were not members of Parliament. The leavening influence in the House was not composed of the king's ministers but of private members. Somers (as has been pointed out), long before he became a minister, drew up the "Bill of Rights." The "Triennial Bill "was the work of a private member. It is to a committee of the House that we owe the complete "Habeas Corpus Act" and the "Great Remonstrance." In matter of stern fact the whole procedure of government by party is parallel to a good fox hunt, where the chief minister is master of the hounds, the hounds are his majority and the unfortunate fox is the public who is too often given but little chance for a fair run, but is cajoled by flattery and promises with a constitution healthy at first but now weighted down by luxurious excesses.
Jacobinism in France was a fearful example of how the brutality of majorities would prostitute acquired power. Abstract ideals were made the engines that crushed the individuality out of Parisian life. Even the natural freedom of men and women, nay of children, went down before it. The maxim that the minority must yield to the majority was borne out to its utmost tether, till it finally arrived at the absurdity of moulding a real concrete whole population into the solidarity of a bare uniformity of dress, diet, religion, and political thought.
The evil of it lay, as Professor Clifford has shown, in pushing the "equation" too far.
When you do so, it begins to talk nonsense. The leaders of the then Parisian thought seized on certain a priori principles and theories, true in the abstract, but distinctly of one class only, disregarding all principles of the other class. Half-truths were made to do duty as if they were whole-truths and the only truths. The government became at once theological, ethical, philanthropical and pedagogical, till the reductio ad absurdum was reached. Shirts were taken from the owners to clothe the community, and in one day 10,000 people lost their shoes, but the benign influence of a rule by majorities had to be their comforter. The theory of the "vox populi" being a "vox Dei" came on to be shivered to atoms. Some of the germs floated to England, and we here are slightly inoculated with the poison. A French writer of power in thought says of man, "he is too unlike the brute to be guided by an instinct equal to infallibility, and on the other hand, too like the brute to be non-dominated by passion." Therefore he is doubly exposed to error.
There is in modern politics another feature that minimizes the theory that all of the state is represented, namely, the "American caucus," in which the name or names are arrived at of those who are to represent all. No matter how impure the modes by which the conclusion is arrived at, the party or parties chosen, and only them, are the ones to go to the polls. What a field of fraudulent tricks and contrivances of wire-pulling this spreads out! The majority of a mere minority of the electors arrogate to themselves (the wire-pullers) to speak for a community at large, and the long-suffering public endures all. "Qui vult decipi decipiatur" is where the great public stand.
In truth, the falsity of representation as it is, and particularly of representation by majorities as they now are, is a lie, and "no lie rots away till its work is done."
When the due time comes, and it is coming apace, the people will get tired of the mendacious theory and pitch it into the sea. But public opinion must be wakened up and things looked at as they are in their naked deformity. What George Eliot called "the right of private haziness" must be subdued. A brutal majority may proclaim that white is black, but no numerical force or counting by heads can make it true.
As things are today, the result of elections is to evolve a majority-party holding in itself the potentiality of evolving in the House a second being, powerful enough to carry things with a high hand, but perhaps destined to be swamped out of political existence by its rival. It is a species of moral or immoral play at sea-saw, with old boys at each end of a plank. Writers and painters of the Indian council at all events represent the chiefs of our red brothers as dignified in their eloquence. Ours cannot be accused of much that is peculiar to themselves beyond vituperation of rivals and anxiety to keep the spoils of office and add to them if allowed. Such will continue to be till the sentimental error of partyism is killed out. We are by law in our day restrained from fuddling the electoral brain with alcohol and poisoning all of conscience that was in the heart by golden guineas, but we can still speciously promise and not fulfil. When asked for a "fish" give a "serpent "instead.
[page 65]
Even that small portion of the republic of letters, "the press," is preeminently distinguished by an adulterous prostitution in politics. Paid by one side or the other, it repeats with parrot-like fidelity, the story it is taught and flings all that it can of mud in a shower of vituperation over the opposition. Bought in the open market, it is no longer the dispenser of truth, but an engine strangling truth, more fiercely than an Indian thug, and painting as may be ordered the country in black colours, or white, and its masters and owners as the very saviours of mankind. This poison flows freely through the electoral veins. So strong is the sentiment of partyism in politics, that "my own party's paper," whether government or opposition, is to "me" a sort of "Protestant Koran" and I become equally ready with any follower of Mahomet to apply the fire and sword to un-believers in my "doxy."
There is a strong element of popedom-infallibility in the transactions of majorities. Power by no means carries truth in its embrace, as a vital necessity, anymore than do mere numbers. The majority tyranny, however speciously gilt over, is in essence as much arbitrary as the fiat of the Russian Czar.
In fact so ingrained in the Anglo-Saxon breast is the furor of political strife, that it requires both time and education up to a higher stand to get rid of it. Anyone seeking to restore the condition of primitive political purity may be seen by many as a kind of political "Dodo." The incongruous elements that go to make up a parliament develop too often in a turgid verbosity. Certain it is that the laws made during a session are often so unworkable as to be repealed in the next one, or if left to linger, they are the files on which judicial teeth are broken amid laments as to their meaninglessness. Or if a reasonable construction is achieved, the unfortunate suitor has felt keenly the process arrived at, both in heart and pocket.
Applied science will alone kill out the evils of un-representation, majority's brutality and crude legislation, developed in the steaming hot-beds of political strife. There is in all our race an aggressive quasi-belligerent force that if not directed in the intellectual line, is likely to be formidable in the direction of sentiment. In so far from a majority being the duplication of what is good and of "honest report and calculated to make one wise," it is a fact that the ruling minds are most often the minority of a minority.
Power crushing is always the distinguishing mark of majorities, but infallibility is by no means a necessary ingredient with them. In fact it is beyond a doubt that as we are now, the great mass of the heavily taxed electors have no representation in parliament. Even the crowds surging at a polling place are simply the specimen bricks of a party system, monotonous in its solidarity, and guiltless of free choice or intellectual criticism.
So long as "our man" is in, we are happy.
Party government will not be torn away for a good while from the jaws of politicians. It is too sweet a morsel, and has been well called a "Fetish" garlanded with dirty laurels, for many a long year. In our system the melancholy minority on the floor of the House keep company with their miserable friends who are a minority outside the House.
Too much time is absorbed in the House by legislation emanating from Treasury benches, a legislation that is really not the faculty of any government of any shade, but is the right and business of Parliament, not of a government. Ministers should be confined to a bare recommendation of measures. There should be as in France, a legislative committee to put such measures into shape, and have the House at large discuss them.
This however, would probably save a great deal of money and time, consumed in scolding harangues, and quietly kill out a great deal of ministerial éclat that now attaches itself to measures of government. Therefore for a good while we are not likely to see this melioration carried out. It would tend to make ministers the servants, not the mastering manipulators of Parliament, and shear them of power and patronage. The country would be the gainer. This also would be too radically good to be welcomed. It would therefore batter itself against the granite walls of officialism and against the hoary traditions of centuries of parliaments, some worse, some better than ours.
Now leaving this branch of the subject, let us look at some of the patriotic schemes of remedy suggested. Of course it is easier to see faults than to remedy a disease, especially when the latter is very chronic, and the patient advanced in years. But the subject is a vitally important one. It comes home to every man's door.
Lubbock says the Swiss have, in conjunction with a wide suffrage, what is known as the "Referendum." That is, bills passing the assembly are referred directly to the whole electorate and are often rejected by large majorities.
[Glossary of terms]
The Scrutin de Liste [Block Voting] Each constituency returns several members, each elector has a number of votes equal to the number of representatives but can't give more than one vote to any one candidate.
Assume a constituency returning 7 members. The two great parties may be very evenly balanced, but whichever has the most votes, however small the lead, would elect all the 7 representatives.
Say for instance, Liverpool has 31,000 Conservative electors and 30,000 Liberals. Under Scrutin de Liste, the 31,000 Conservatives would elect 7 members while the 30,000 would elect none at all.
Lubbock concludes justly that the "Scrutin de Liste" gives unfair preponderance to a majority. Where parties are at all evenly balanced, the transfer of a few votes from one side to the other may entirely alter the balance of power.
[page 66]
Different Forms of Proportional Representation:
Limited Vote – Each elector has a number of votes somewhat less than the number of open seats. Unlike under Block Voting, under the Limited vote the largest group cannot fill all the seats unless very large.
Free List – The elector votes for a list.
Cumulative Vote – Each elector has a number of votes, equal to the number of open seats, and he may cumulate them all on one candidate or divide them up among the candidates as he chooses. [TM: explained further below]
Single Transferable Vote – The elector has only one operative vote, but is allowed to indicate to which candidate he desires it to be transferred if not required, by the one to whom he first devotes it.
Single System [representatives elected by plurality in single-member districts] – This system works badly... When an election is to be held, the Conservatives put one name up and the Reform party another, and the elector is presented with a sort of "Hobson's choice," as the bringing in of a third candidate would split the vote.
The clique system flows in the bed of single representation. Any number, few or large, of electors may have a favourite "fad" that they hoist up into conspicuity. The glare and noise they surround it with too often darkens and hushes the interest of a public, [who have far more pressing matters should they want considered]. The candidate is generally cunning enough to catch the breeze with sails spread and is wafted into the parliamentary haven. Often this person is known to fame only for his noisy insistence of a new doctrine, probably an attenuated part merely of a half-truth.
A majority of electors in each constituency is by no means the same as a majority of all the electors. Suppose, says Lubbock, a community of 60,000 electors is divided into three districts, each containing 20,000, and that there are 32,000 Liberals and 28,000 Conservatives, the division might be and likely would be as follows—
1st District. 2nd District. 3rd District
Liberals 15,000 9,000 8,000
Conservatives 5,000 11,000 12,000
20,000 20,000 20,000
And thus though in a minority, the Conservatives return two members out of three. This is no hypothetical case. [TM: With varying sizes of districts, the anomalies can be even worse.]
Single Transferable Vote
The Single Transferable Vote was adopted in Denmark in 1855 and still is there now in active operation.
In this system of Proportional Representation, it is suggested that each elector shall have one vote. But he may vote in the alternative for as many candidates as he chooses, by writing simply the figures 1, 2, 3, etc. opposite to their respective names. Therefore, if A's vote be not required for his candidate 1, he should be allowed to have its weight transferred to candidate 2, or in other words, his A's action at the polls is not a mere cipher in the political field. All votes for candidate No. 1 surplus to what is required to elect him are transferred to candidate No. 2, etc.
The ballot papers are all mixed up and drawn out successively and stamped with numbers, so as no two shall bear the same number.
The quotient is obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballots papers cast by the number of members to be elected plus 1 and increasing the quotient by 1. [Droop quota]
Rule 4. Each candidate who has a number of first votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected. So many of the ballot papers containing these votes as equal the quota shall be set aside as of no further use. On all other ballot papers the name of the elected candidate shall be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much in the order of precedence all votes given to other candidates after him. This process is to be repeated till no candidate has more than a quota of first votes or votes deemed first.
[page 67]
Rule 5. Then the candidate or candidates with the fewest first votes or votes deemed first, shall be declared to be not elected [and is eliminated and votes transferred] with the effect of raising by so much in the order of preference all votes given to candidates after him or them. Rule 4 shall again be applied if possible.
Rule 6. When by successive applications of Rules 4 and 5 the number of candidates is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.
The Limited Vote
In this the constituency returns three or four members, but the elector has a number of votes somewhat less than the number of members to be elected. The most common arrangement is for the constituency to return three members, each elector having two votes of which, however, he may only give one to any one candidate. Therefore the minority can return one member. Canton after Canton of the Swiss, and State upon State in America adopted this mode.
[Sterne's STV system - a multi-vote cumulative vote system]
An American named Sterne lauds the work of Thomas Hare, at the same time suggesting some improvements on Hare's great work on Representative Government.
Sterne's system, like Hare's system, has multiple-member districts. But in Sterne's each voter may cast votes equal to the number of candidates for election. The voter may concentrate on one candidate or can divide the votes up as he desires.
That is, if there are three candidates, each voter may concentrate on one or divide his vote among the three. A minority having one-third of the voters or more can therefore always, by concentrating all their votes on one candidate [accumulate quota and] secure his election.
Mr. Hare's Scheme [STV]
This system substitutes for the dominance of local majorities, a true representation of the people.
He proposes to divide at each general election the number who vote by the number of members to be elected [to get quota].
The balloting paper to be printed thus:—
Name of voter. [TM: this was not meant to be secret voting apparently]
Address.
Vote No.
Town or city of
The above elector hereby records his vote for the candidate named 1, in the list below or in the event provided for by this act for the other candidates successively in their numerical order.
Say for instance A 1, C 2, E 3, G 4. That is if A gets too many votes, C gets the un-required balance, or if A has too few, all of A's go to C.
Each voting paper after the candidate is declared elected, shall be endorsed with the candidate's name to whom it is used so that election agents may consult them.
To sum up,
1. No vote to be counted for more than one candidate.
2. No candidate to have more votes recorded or counted in his favour than is the "Quota" in numbers.
3. Each voter to have the right of naming several candidates in his order of preference so that if his vote be not counted for the first, then it may be counted for the second or the third, etc.
It has also been suggested that in a constituency, say Glasgow, any elector may vote for say Mr. Gladstone or Lord S. or Sir J.B. who never represented Glasgow and are not candidates for representing Glasgow in the election. In other words any elector may vote for any name that impresses him whether the owner is a candidate at the said elector's voting-place or not. The design, of course, is a good one to elect all available talent, but it is respectfully submitted that Canada is not yet ready for such an experiment.
[signed] "In Deo Spero."
June 26, 1893.
THE REPRESENTATION ACT [page 68]
Whereas, minorities in elections have not heretofore had proper representation in Parliaments, and it is desirable to remedy this evil.
Be it enacted, etc.:
1. This Act shall be known as the "Representation Act." and in the interpretation thereof shall be construed by all courts as having for its object the representation of minorities in Parliaments.
2. All Acts heretofore passed inconsistent with this Act, shall with regard to all inconsistent provisions be repealed, but all previous acts not so inconsistent shall remain in force. This Act shall come into force within one year from the passing thereof.
3. No property qualification shall be required from any candidate, but each candidate for election in the Dominion or any Provincial Parliament, must be either a British-born or naturalized subject of the Crown.
4. No person shall in future be a candidate for a seat in the Dominion or any Provincial Parliament who is in the employment of the Crown, or receives pay therefrom, but the members composing the Dominion and several Provincial Governments, now holding offices are exempt from the provisions of this clause, but they must on a change of ministry seek re-election as is now the practice.
5. Immediately upon the coming into force of this Act and within three calendar months from such date, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the House of Commons in Ottawa and of the clerk of each one of the respective Provincial Parliaments, to ascertain the numbers of voters recording votes at the last general elections for the Dominion and of the last general election in each of the Provinces, and the clerks of said Provinces shall officially certify within the time aforesaid such number to the clerk of the House of Commons in Ottawa.
6. On receipt of such information the said clerk of the House of Commons at Ottawa shall thereupon having previously added to such number the number of thousand or [word missing] as the case may require from the statistics of population, which addition is to be considered as a fair allowance for an increase; in population, proceed to divide the number of electors for the Dominion Parliament by the number of members allowed by the now laws to sit therefor dispensing with fractions and the result so obtained shall hereafter be known as the "Quota "for Dominion elections and he shall at the same time proceed to divide the number of voters who voted at the last election in each Province by the number of members entitled to sit by law in such and each Provincial Legislature or Parliament, adding and allowing as above for increase in each Province of population or if diminution is shown by Provincial statistics, then allowing for such diminution as the case may be, and it shall be the duty of the said clerk of the House of Commons and of the clerk of each Provincial Legislature to similarly obtain the said "Quota" at all times hereafter within one month before any Dominion or Provincial election shall be had.
7. Within two weeks from obtaining such a Quota "the clerk of the House of Commons at Ottawa shall publish officially in the Dominion Gazette, the "Quota" for Dominion elections and the "Quota" for each respective Provincial election, of which all officials are to take notice and govern themselves thereby, and such "Quota" shall be the number each candidate for election must obtain to obtain a seat in the said House of Commons or of any Provincial Legislature.
8. All persons who acted as returning officers, or shall hereafter act as such, are to give all the information in their power to enable the clerk of the House of Commons and the clerks of the respective Provincial Legislatures to carry out this Act, and any one so refusing shall be compellable by a writ of mandamus from any competent court to do so, which shall be issued on prima facie proof of such refusal, and the penalty of disobedience shall be enforced by fine and imprisonment of not less than six months in a jail.
9. When an election for either the Dominion Parliament or any Provincial Parliament is ordered to be had, the sheriff of each county in the province in which a provincial election is to be had, shall, 21 days before, cause the same to be duly proclaimed officially in the official paper of the province, and the clerk of the House of Commons, at Ottawa, shall likewise 21 days before such election, if the same is a Dominion election, cause the same to be advertised in the Dominion Gazette, and all candidates shall be called on thereby to put themselves in nomination, and the time for such elections shall be so proclaimed.
10. Within 14 days from the insertion of such notices in the Dominion Gazette, or any Provincial Official Gazette or paper, all returning officers are to be nominated by the respective governments of the Dominion or Provinces, and such returning officers shall proclaim the fact of such their appointment and shall appoint The proper number of deputy returning officers as by law now provided.
[page 69]
11. Such proclamations by returning officers shall specify the names and other information requisite for the guidance of electors, as to the deputy returning officers who shall issue official notices as to the time, day and hour and place of election, and the respective polling places in districts where such deputy returning officers reside.
12. All candidates for any Dominion election or provincial election eligible as such under this Act, shall within seven days from such advertisement by the aforesaid returning officers, lodge with such returning officers a statutory declaration showing their being so eligible, and also deposit in current money of the Dominion the sum of two hundred dollars, which shall be returned to the person so depositing the same, provided he is not elected, but if elected, the same shall be paid in at once after such member takes his seat to the Treasurer of the Dominion or Province as the case may be, and by him applied to the payment of Dominion or Provincial elections. The names of candidates so proposing themselves shall be duly advertised by all deputy returning officers, and shall by them be signified to the electors in their divisions.
Their names shall be printed on all the ballot papers and numbered them numerically in order with the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc., as the case may be, as follows:
Name of voter.
Address.
Vote No.
County or —
1. Name of candidate preferred, John Smith. x
2. Name of next preferred, W. Jones. x
3. Name of next preferred, C. Thomas. x
4. Name of next preferred, R. Williams. x
5. Name of next preferred, B. Thomas. x
The ballot papers shall be marked by a cross put by the elector as now required by law opposite to the name of the party he votes for, and no elector shall have more than one vote at any Dominion or Provincial election, but shall vote where his name appears on the legal list of voters.
The capacity of any elector to vote where he has a property qualification therefore, is by this Act abolished. It is the intention of this Act that each elector voting may vote for all the candidates whose names appear on the ballot paper, by putting a cross opposite to all or any of their names in the order of preference he shall choose to make.
But no elector's vote so recorded shall count for more than one. But if the candidate numbered one in his preference of choice shall obtain more than the "Quota" required for election by law, then such excess shall be transferred to the candidate numbered two in the voter's order of preference, expressed by such voter as aforesaid, and the same shall continue to be done till all candidates eligible through obtaining the required "Quota" are disposed of.
13. All provisions of the election laws not inconsistent with this Act are to be considered as in full force.
14. All ballot papers and other papers now required by law to be printed for use at elections, shall be prepared by the proper officials as heretofore has been the custom, but shall be altered to suit the changes made under the provisions of clause 12 or any succeeding clauses of this Act.
15. All voting shall be begun and ended as heretofore, in one day.
16. When any election is completed the ballot boxes shall be returned by the deputy returning officers to the returning officers from whom their appointments were received, and such returning officers shall within seven days after receipt thereof, and due advertisement in the official paper of the province where such election is had, either for Dominion or Provincial elections, proceed in accordance with the provisions of clause 12 of this Act, in the presence of agents who may attend (or candidates) to make count of such votes, and such counting shall be made in the order of preference and strictly in accord with the above section 12, and he shall declare what candidate or candidates are elected, and if the election is a Provincial election he shall forthwith officially declare the same, and transmit the said declaration with the ballot papers to the clerk of the Legislature of the Province where the election is held, with his statutory declaration as to the same.
If the same be an election for the Dominion, each returning officer in each province shall similarly transmit the like papers to the clerk of the House of Commons in Ottawa, where the same may be inspected by parties interested. The result shall be duly proclaimed by each clerk of the several legislatures of the Provinces and of the House of Commons if the same is a Dominion election, in the proper official papers.
[page 70]
Any official wilfully contravening the provisions of this Act shall be liable to a tine of five hundred dollars, or in default of payment thereof to imprisonment for six months, and any official guilty of bribery or corruption shall be sentenced to imprisonment for three years, and to be incapacitated from ever voting thereafter, or holding any office or emolument from the Crown.
17. The official declarations of the clinks of the Houses, Dominion or Provincial respectively, shall he made within ten days from the receipt of the aforesaid papers from the returning officers, and all election returns and ballot papers shall be retained in proper custody till after one month shall have expired from the meeting of the Dominion Parliament or Provincial Parliament for which they were used, when they shall be destroyed, unless required for judicial purposes.
18. The constituencies in the Dominion elections and Provincial elections shall be entitled for the present to send the same number and no more representatives to Parliament, as is now their right.
19. To prevent the evils of what is commonly known as the "gerrymandering system" it is declared hereby that no alteration of territorial election ts shall take place oftener than once in ten years, and all constituencies now returning members for Dominion or Provincial Parliaments shall return the same number and from the same places, and such number shall represent the same territories for the space of ten years from the passing of this Act.
20. Residence in any constituency shall not be required of any candidate. Anyone properly qualified may be a candidate for any Dominion or Provincial election, whether he resides within the territory where such election is to be had or not. Anyone may as aforesaid be a candidate at any number of election places, but in such case he shall be obliged to make only one deposit of two hundred dollars as aforesaid provided, and no more.
In case of his return for more than one constituency, Dominion or Provincial, he shall at once elect where he chooses to sit... Then the person or persons next after him of candidates in the constituency who are preferentially entitled to the number of votes immediately less in order than his, shall be declared elected.
The returning officers shall before any other candidates are disposed of, proceed to dispose of those who are candidates for more than one constituency, and finding anyone by reason of preferential votes entitled to sit for more than one constituency, such person shall be notified by the returning officer of the fact. It shall be his duty within 24 hours of the transmission of such message to choose which constituency he shall represent. In default of his doing so his name shall be dropped as if he never had been a candidate at such election. He shall signify his election to such returning officer by telegram, and in case by reason of such his neglect or refusal so to signify his election, his name is so dropped, the officials aforesaid shall proceed with the names of the other candidates in order of preference designated by the electors.
The votes recorded in constituencies other than the one he chooses to sit for shall be distributed in the order of designated preference among the other candidates at each such constituency so that such votes shall not be nugatory. The acceptance aforesaid by telegram and notification from the said officials to the candidate shall be legal and final though transmitted by telegram.
21. The elections to be held next after the passing of this Act, whether Dominion or Provincial, shall not be held sooner than three months after the date of' the proclamation directing the same to be held so as to allow full time for the proper carrying out of the provisions thereof, and the working out of the same by the officials for the purpose appointed, but this clause is not to be imperative as to subsequent elections after said first election.
MEMORANDUM.
I have ventured to put my ideas into the above form.
The bill can be altered mutatis mutandis to suit any country where the style etc. of officials in parliament are different from ours.
I have spent a great deal of time in considering what is to be done with the surplus or unused votes in any constituency after the return of a candidate is arrived at. There will likely be many such, which as a fact are left in the "air" and utterly wasted.
After considering it anxiously in every light I can arrive at no solution satisfactory to my mind, so that they shall be saved as atoms of representation. One cannot rightly take them from say constituency A and give them to constituency B because in doing so you are robbing the voter in A of what the law has given him as a right.
[signed] "In Deo Spero."
----------------------------------------------
[9.] PACIFICO [Californian, probably San Francisco] [page 71]
When the French Academicians were getting up their dictionary, they submitted to Cuvier their definition of a crab as "a red fish that walks backward," whereupon he remarked that their definition was correct, excepting that the crab was not red, was not a fish, and did not walk backward.
King Charles II asked the members of the Royal Society how it was that when a fish was placed in a bucket of water, the weight of the bucket and its contents was not thereby increased. Several presented ingenious explanations, after which one of the members rose up and denied the fact, when the king rejoined: "Odds; fish! but you're right."
Those who write so fluently and frequently about "the people's rule," "the government is what the people make it," "the power of the ballot," which "drops as snow upon the sod," etc., are as wide of the mark as the savans above mentioned, in that they have not themselves ascertained the facts, but merely accept and reiterate current dogmas. They expatiate at length on "Democracy" which has no existence outside of Switzerland, and there only partially.
W.D. Stead, in the Review of Reviews says that "Demos will regard millionaires as the cottager regards his bees." But his and others' "Demos" is as much a myth as the pagan Bacchus or Venus. De Tocqueville about half a century ago wrote a large volume entitled Democracy in America —thing that never existed on this continent; neither does ''Representative government" really exist, excepting very partially in this elections of members of British school boards and, lately, ill thrive Cantons of Switzerland.
It is primarily important to this consideration of any of the fundamental political questions now taken up by thinking persons to ascertain what is and what is not representation; how much influence voters, as such, really exert in the making of laws, or in any legislative act; and how far they might do in practice, through a better mechanism, [what] they are now said to do in theory. The answers to these questions lie at the very foundation of all intelligent effort to improve industrial and moral conditions by legislative or political processes.
CHAPTER I. A PRIORI NEGATIVE DEMONSTRATION
It can be demonstrated, irrespective of any experience, that under representation (so-called) by districts, minorities, from one-third down (the proportion growing less as the number of parties increases), can return a majority of the members in elective bodies.
Suppose three constituencies of 3,000 voters each elect for each constituency a member of a so-called "representative" body. Let each "representative" be designed by capitals and each thousand voters by "lower case" letters. Then
Constituencies Representatives
a a b A
a a b A
b b b B
Here two constituencies with 2000 "a" voters each, and 1000 "b" voters each, return an "A" member each. The third constituency, consisting entirely of "b" voters, returns one "B" member. But the ''b" voters in the three constituencies number 5,000 and get but one member, while the "a" voters, with 1,000 less voters, get two members.
Now let us try with seven constituencies, each having 7,000 voters:
Constituencies Representatives
a a a a b b b A
a a a a b b b A
a a a a b b b A
a a a a b b b A
b b b b b b b B
b b b b b b b B
b b b b b b b B
Here we have 16,000 "a" voters electing 4 members, and 33,000 "b" voters electing only 3 members, so that less than a third of the voters elect a majority of the so-called "representatives."
[page 72]
But to attempt to represent all grades of opinion by means of two parties is as absurd as it would be to undertake to fit everyone by two sizes and makes of coats, hats or shoes. In proportion as people think for themselves - differentiate - the need is felt for a third, a fourth or even a fifth party and still the current varieties of opinion on subjects pertaining to legislative action would be inadequately voiced especially as these differences would extend to the exponents as well as to the principles or platform of a party.
But let us add a third party "c."
Districts Representatives elected through plurality
bb cc aaa A
bb cc aaa A
bb cc aaa A
bb cc aaa A
ccc bbbb B
ccc bbbb B
ccc bbbb B
Here we have 49,000 voters in 7 districts. The "a"s with but 12,000 - less than a fourth of the whole - still return 4 of the 7 "representatives" while the "c"s with nearly 50 percent more voter (17,000) than the "a"s do not obtain one member and the "b"s, with 8,000 more votes, than the "a"s get one representative less.
Were there four, five or six parties, the minority of voters that might thus secure a majority of the elected body would necessarily become less and less. That is, the more intelligent voters become, the less representatives - if they vote according to their convictions - do they obtain while the least intelligent are the most represented.
It may be claimed that the cases presented as extreme, not occurring in actual life. But there are other factors, not yet considered that would increase these disparities. One is that it is practically impossible for voters, in a mass, to control party management. And a very small minority of the party not only can but do not only do but must control the nomination so the alternation - not choice - of the voter is in most cases to vote for one man that he does not like in preference for another that he dislikes. if his party wins, he is mis-represented. If the other party wins, he is un-represented.
Chapter II. A Posteriori Demonstration; The "Majority Rule" Myth page 72
I might fill volumes with most conclusive proof from the figures of electoral votes that a minority of voters, or a small majority elect all the legislators in nearly every case waiving for the time the fact that even those voters who do elect only have a choice of evils as a rule. But a few recent examples may suffice to establish that which no one well informed on such subjects would undertake to controvert.
In Oakland, California, seven councilmen and seven school trustees are elected from as many wards, into which the city is divided, and four more of each are elected "at large." That is, all the voters in that city vote for four candidates "at large" and one from their respective wards. At the election of March 1893, 28,488 votes were cast for the four councilmen elected "at large" (scrutin de liste) but only 10,195 or nearly 36 percent were cast for the candidates elect. Thus over 64 percent - nearly two-thirds - of the votes cast were ineffective. For the members of the board of education so chosen, 26,588 votes were cast, of which but 10,739 - or a little over 40 percent - were cast for the candidates elected. The votes cast in the seven wards for school trustees aggregated 7127, of which 3265 were effective for the elected members or nearly 46 percent. The seven candidates elected to the council by wards received 3079 out of 841 votes cast so that only 38 percent of these votes were, in the most latitudinarian sense, effective.
The successful candidate for the school board from the 6th Ward received 297 out of the 893 votes cast or nearly 36 percent. The candidate elected from the 7th Ward to that body received 724 out of he 1114 voters which is nearly two and a half times as many votes as the candidates elected from the 6th received yet each has the same voting power on the board, that is, in our present system of political arithmetic, 297 is equal to 724.
The elected candidate for the 6th Ward received only four votes more than one who was defeated, so that a change in three votes out of 803 would have elected another man. That is, three votes in that ward had power to determine who should represent 800 beside themselves. In three wards (1st, 2nd, and 4th) defeated candidates received more votes (329, 372, 292) than the candidates elected from the 6th.
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Of the councilmen elected by wards, two received less than a third of the votes cast in each ward (30.9 and 33.15 percent); two more received but little over a third (34.4 and 36), and none of them received half.
Taking the average, six out of the 11 councilmen voting for a measure against five opposed would represent but 20 percent of the voters. Due to the inequality of the number of votes in the several wards, they might represent less. Yet this minority can enact ordinances binding upon the whole people of Oakland. And this is called "government of the people, by the people, for the people."
At the election of six assemblymen from as many districts in Alameda County, California on Nov. 8th, 1892, 17,307 votes were cast, of which 8,078 — 46 percent — were effective in electing candidates. A change of from one to less than three percent of the voters in three of those districts, of less than a third of one percent in another, and of 5 and 8 percent in the other two would have elected an entirely different delegation to the assembly from the county. And it is much the same in most of the districts in California.
That is, a few of the most worthless, the most vicious or the most weak-kneed voters can turn the scale, so that men of character, honesty and determination can, as a rule, neither be representatives or represented.
In the San Francisco municipal election of Nov. 8, 1892, the average vote for 12 Supervisors, who are elected "at" large, through Scrutin de Liste [Block Voting] was 51,131. That for successful candidates was 19,085 — slightly over 37 percent. The Democratic party, on a vote of 39 percent of the whole, secured 83 percent — 10 out of 12 — of the Board. A vote of seven-twelfths of that Board would not, then, average a representation of more than about 22 percent of the voters.
The 12 members of the Board of Education, also elected at large, received nearly the same percentage of the total vote as the Supervisors.
By comparing these percentages with those of Oakland for similar bodies, and with those of Alameda county for the Assembly, it is clear election either at-large or by districts is equally unrepresentative. [At-large was unrepresentative in these cases because they were conducted using Block Voting.]
In 1890 the Congressmen elected from the State of California received 128,451 votes out of 252,012 cast, or 50.1 percent. In 1892 they received 119,171 out of 240,210, or 49.6 percent. The political elements at work in 1892 differed widely from those of 1890, by reason of the increase of votes for "outside" parties. Yet the percentage of voters represented varied little one from the other. Until we have complete proportional representation, independent of parties, mere changes in party names or the organization of new parties will accomplish little.
It is similar in voluntary organizations. On March 29th, 1803, the Typographical Union of San Francisco elected three delegates to the International Convention of that body, each member voting for three of the 11 candidates. The votes numbered 1,758, which, divided by three, gives 653 voters. The successful candidates received 280, 224 and 228 votes respectively, being an average of 247.
This shows an average of 38 percent of the voters represented. A change of one vote would have elected another candidate, who received 227, in place of that one who received 228.
In the whole State, on November 8th 1892, 249,363 votes were cast for assemblymen from 80 single districts, of which 116,908 votes were cast for members elected, and 132,455 against them. Only slightly more than 47 percent of the voters elected every member of the Assembly. Nearly 53 percent were totally unrepresented even in form. Most of the 47 percent were not probably fully represented in fact. The vote of 41 out of the 80 members could not therefore be fairly considered as representing, on the average, over 24 percent of the voters. Yet that proportion has the power to enact laws so far as that house is concerned. Where there are two houses, the other is elected in a similar manner, or it is appointed.
This House, by their vote on certain measures at its ensuing session, positively proved the power of a minority of State voters created under single-member voting. On February 23rd, 1893, the legislature debated an amendment to the State constitution requiring that on request of 10 percent of the voters of the State, any bill passed by the Legislature must be submitted to the voters at the polls for ratification or rejection, and that any bill proposed by that percentage should be similarly submitted. It was rejected by 32 negative votes out of the 80 assemblymen, the constitution requiring a two-thirds majority for any amendment thereto. These 32 members received a total of 44,281 votes in their several constituencies or districts, less than 18 percent of the 249,603 votes of the State received by all candidates for the Assembly. Thus less than a fifth of the voters of the State are empowered under this sham of representation — this ''majority rule" myth — to determine that the other four fifths shall have nothing to do with the laws except to vote for the class of men usually nominated by the machinery of new as well as of old parties.
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But the positive, special and conclusive proof that a bare majority would represent on an average about 24 percent of the voters, is shown in regard to a proposed amendment to the constitution, giving the Legislature power to so amend the tax laws as to permit the voters of each county or incorporated city or town to decide by direct vote what classes of property should and what should not be taxed. There were 42 negative votes on this proposition, which 42 members received an aggregate of 60,803 vows, which is less than 25 percent of the total vote for assemblymen in the State.
In the Assembly elected in November, 1890, 133,265 votes, 53 percent, were cast for the successful candidates out of a total vote of 248,423 for assemblymen. The Vagrant Bill was passed by 44 ayes to 26 noes; the ayes had received 70,277 votes at the polls — a little over 28 percent of the total vote. The 26 noes had received 47,294 votes. And 130,702 voters, being [just less than] half the voters in the State, had not even a negative voice as to that law.
The bill for an appropriation of $300,000 to the World's Fair received 44 ayes. These members representing or receiving the votes of 80,886 — less than a third of the whole. The 24 members who wanted a less amount appropriated received 36,651 votes. And 130,886 voters — 53 percent of the whole — [who opposed the expenditure] had no opportunity to be heard from.
When U.S. Senator Stanford was re-elected by that Legislature, he received in the Assembly 59 seats. These represented 97,939 voters at the polls. This was less than two-fifths of the whole, but his majority in the chamber only lacked one of being three-fourths of that "representative" body.
The whole course of legislation might thus be followed up in any session of almost any legislature in the world with similar results. And if these figures do not prove my position that legislatures do not represent the opinions of voters in the enactment of laws, etc, then no figures can prove anything, arithmetic is a delusion and all reasoning impossible. It is fully as reasonable to claim that the earth is flat, with the heavenly bodies revolving around it as to assert that by our electoral system even an approximation to true representation can be obtained. The demonstration to the contrary is much more easily understood in the latter than in the former case.
Were it not that the false view is so persistently taught in educational institutions of all grades and types, in periodicals of all sorts and sizes — in short, iterated and re-iterated on every possible occasion, the proposition that any country, outside of three Cantons in Switzerland, has a really representative government, or that "the people make the government what it is," the statement would be laughed to scorn as the gibberings of an idiot or the croaking of a parrot. Political science today is where physical science was in the 15th Century; it hardly exists.
CHAPTER III. DIRECT LEGISLATION.
This is accomplished negatively by the Referendum, positively by the Initiative. At first sight, the two together, with the power of recalling a member on demand of a majority of his local constituency [Recall], might seem to be sufficient. The workings of the Referendum and the Initiative in Switzerland, and of the former of these occasionally in the United States and British North America, have been such as to create a favourable impression.
But direct legislation compared with proportional representation is as pack mules to a railroad. By simplifying and improving our system of enacting and executing laws, their number and complexity could doubtless be much reduced. Yet with all that could be done in this line (and which never will be done under our present electoral system) the necessary collective business of any municipality, state, province or nation, to be provided for by general enactment, would be too great and diversified to be handled advantageously, or even possibly, by the whole mass of voters. Nor could even any considerable traction of these act intelligently, whatever their mental ability and moral endowments, on the hundreds and even thousands of propositions coming before them.
It is not a question of the intelligence or morality of the voters, as compared with those acting as their agents in legislatures, etc. The point is that in any but a very small and sparse community, the business of society must be transacted through agencies and by division of labor. And the tendency of social and industrial advancement lies actually and necessarily in this direction. No longer does the farmer sheer his sheep and his family turn the wool laboriously into cloth. Instead he sends the wool to market and buys the materials for his clothing, if not the clothing itself. And so of every occupation.
Whether the change is a benefit or otherwise, it had to come. And the old cannot be restored.
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Public business needs to keep pace with industrial changes. Progress in any direction necessitates differentiation. In the very lowest animals, the stomach is essentially the whole animal, and the functions of the various organs as they begin to develop are interchangeable. It is only as the species rises in the scale of being, that the several organs become more and more distinct. So as the body politic grows, its functions become more differentiated, so that the direct transaction of the business of the whole by the whole, becomes either impossible, or as costly as it would be for the pastoralist to weave the wool of his sheep into his garments, or the wheat grower of Manitoba to haul his grain to a sea or lake port by ox-teams. If it would be an advantage for men to lose the present differentiation of their organisms and become clams, it would be also of advantage for the people to legislate directly, rather than through freely chosen and really representative bodies.
"Direct legislation" may be designated "clam reform."
Even in small voluntary organizations committees are elected or appointed to conduct the details of their business, as a matter of convenience, if not of necessity. In many such only a minority of members can be induced to attend meetings where a majority of those present have full power to act.
For instance: previous to a recent change, the attendance at the monthly meetings of the Typographical Union of San Francisco, numbering nearly 700 members, rarely exceeded 150 and often fell below 100. Yet in voting for elective officers nearly the entire strength was called out.
In the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco, the vote in February, 1892 was some 1400, and on February 28th, 1893, 905. This level is only of late, owing to the agitation connected with the proportional plan. [Prior to these meetings] the attendance at its meetings only reached as high as 117 to 150, out of a membership of nearly 4000. It is evident that nearly everyone would rather vote for competent persons to conduct any sort of collective business than attend to the details themselves.
Many local trades unions and other organizations send delegations of their members to act for them in National, Dominion, State or Provincial assemblages. On March 29, 1893, the Typographical Union of Sun Francisco elected three delegates to the International Convention (as detailed in (Chapter II) by 38 percent of the vote. They had to be elected in some way from all the local unions, as it was impossible for every compositor in the United States and British America to visit Chicago. And if they had all gone there, such a large number could not deliberate or transact any business. It is true that the acts of the convention have to be ratified by the members of the Union at large. But if that was all to be done, there need have been no convention at all. Any proposed measure would have been merely ratified or rejected without bringing several hundred persons hundreds or thousands of miles to a common centre. The purpose, however, of this convention, as of any similar body, legislature or parliament, was to consult, deliberate and decide with a view to practical action. Hence the members of such bodies should as nearly as possible represent the general views of those who sent them, concentrating their efforts on devising such measures as would carry out these views, subserving the interests and securing the approval of their constituents.
"Direct legislation" cannot meet these requirements; proportional representation can.
I mention this because the Typographical Union has been cited to prove the sufficiency of "direct legislation" to solve the political problem. While the experience of that Union proves the contrary. And I may add that, as a member of that Union, it was not long since called upon to vote at about 24 hours' notice, on some 30 different propositions, having no means of forming an intelligent opinion as to much over half of them.
Everyone at all posted as to the exigencies of legislation, or other collective action, knows that where there is any opportunity (as there always would be under proportional representation) to select a few competent and reliable men, it is much easier to do so than to decide upon the merits of many measures.
Even with our present representative and un-representative processes this is shown by the popular vote.
A striking instance of this occurred in the California election of Nov. 8th, 1892 when both men and measures were voted upon at the polls. Five "propositions" and four constitutional amendments were submitted for direct vote. While 249,363 voters in the whole State voted for assemblymen and over 268,000 for presidential electors, the vote pro and con on election of U.S. Senators by the people was 201,300, being but a little over 80 percent of the vote for assemblymen. The vote for and against a new ferry depot in San Francisco was 181,726, or nearly 73 percent; educational qualification for voters, 192,729, being 78 percent; on refunding the debt. 168,504, 68 percent; constitutional amendment No. 10, 190,273 – 76 percent; constitutional amendment No. 7, 168,490 – 68 percent; constitutional amendment No. 11, 132,199 — a little over 53 percent of the vote for assemblymen and not half that for Presidential electors; constitutional amendment No. 5, 156,994 – 63 percent; constitutional amendment No. 14, 150,693 — less than 63 percent.
These figures are the sums of the vote, pro and con.
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It has been claimed that the working of Direct Legislation in Switzerland has been so satisfactory as to prove that no representative body is needed excepting to formulate measures for the approval of or rejection by the voters. Hence that with the "Obligatory" Referendum (one providing that all measures must be referred to the voters) and the Initiative, the legislature would simply be "a body of powerless committeemen." Committeemen, whether in voluntary organizations or in legislatures, are, however, well known to be far from "powerless." Everyone at all acquainted with legislative operations knows that a bill can very rarely be passed in a legislature when it has been handicapped by an adverse report of a committee. It is equally well known that very few legislators have the requisite knowledge to vote intelligently upon half or a quarter of the bills coming before them and are virtually compelled, as all the others are, to vote according to the committees' reports.
It is then a fundamental necessity for effective work not only that public and collective business should be transacted by agents, but that these agents should be chosen in such a manner as to secure the most capable persons, fairly and fully representing not merely a party, fraction of a party, clique or "ring," but the whole body of the constituents. That is, they should be actually, and not merely nominally, representatives.
No merchant or manufacturer would be satisfied with an agent or clerk, especially at a place distant from his centre of business, when not allowed to use his best judgment in the selection of a person, merely because he could instruct such agent or clerk what to do, or over-rule his action.
Another serious objection to the efficiency of the Initiative is that to formulate any measure by that means, some person or persons must be selected or empowered to draft it by some irregular process, subject to no efficient checks. These persons would be no more "representative" of the community generally, or of any portion of it than the average legislator but would probably be less so, being liable to be composed of the scum that usually rises to the top in times of excitement.
What security would there be that the persons so selected would not be the worst enemies of the proposed measures, secretly paid by powerful classes opposed to it to introduce some provision fatal to its efficacy or constitutionality, which the mass of voters would fail to detect? Even if they did detect it, when too late, they could only vote it down, and that would be claimed as proof of their hostility to the principle of the measure.
Even in our present legislatures, all measures are liable to be exposed to close criticism, while in a truly representative legislature, no bill could escape a close analysis both as to its principles and details. But a bill presented for direct vote of the people can only be voted on by ayes and noes, amendments and substitutes being out of the question.
And would it not be much easier by proportional representation, to secure a body of men that would be competent to act on all legislative business rather than spasmodically and specially by some uncertain and irregular process to organize a special committee for each and every measure for which there seemed to be a popular demand?
Legislation under the Initiative would be even more a work of Sisyphus than it is at present.
As to the experience of Switzerland, direct legislation would naturally work better in a small and nearly stationary population, where every man's record is known from childhood, and public opinion therefore a greater power, than in large cities, or in states or countries where the population is migratory and the people given to frequent changes of residence, or that the antecedents of individuals are, for ordinary purposes, untraceable.
But even in Switzerland the Cantons of Ticino, Neuchatel and Geneva have found it altogether inadequate. They have in succession adopted a form of proportional representation that admits of parties being represented measurably in proportion to the number of voters in each party.
In the Canton of St. Gall, a similar plan was rejected at the polls on January 30th, 1893 by 21,982 against 19,826; in Soleure on January 15th by 6620 to 4950; and in Bale on Nov. 3rd, 1890 by 4217 to 2755.
In the Cantons of Zug, Lucerne, and Vaud, it will probably soon be adopted.
These figures indicate a progressive and rapid increase of public sentiment in its favour, even in the three Cantons wherein it has been, for the time, defeated. In all these Cantons the Referendum and Initiative are in operation and the action in each proves that they are inadequate.
The Imperative Mandate may be regarded as a species of direct legislation, consisting in the power of a majority of the voters in any elective body to recall a member with whose course they are dissatisfied. Whatever benefit could bc accomplished thereby has been reached in Switzerland by the Referendum and Initiative, so that in that country it is no longer mentioned. As it can only be used by a majority in a, district, it is incompatible with a representation of the whole body of voters, and would make political agitation incessant and intrigues without end. I am not aware that it has ever been put in practice, and may be regarded as a political fossil.
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Little, if anything can be accomplished on this continent by picking up Switzerland's old clothes that are worn nearly threadbare or cast off altogether, when we can get something better than even its new apparel.
Finally, "Direct Legislation" in America (particularly on the Pacific Coast) would work on the plan of a Prohibitory liquor law passed by the Rhode Island Legislature some thirty years ago, in which the prohibitory clauses were clear and strong, but the penal clauses somehow "got left." One man remarked that everybody should be happy, in that the temperance men had secured the law, which was what they wanted, and the liquor sellers could continue their business unmolested, which was all they wanted. Even so, the people would get the shell by the permission to propose a law, but the financially strongest and the machine politicians would get the oyster by injecting what they pleased into the law before its submission, much the same as manufacturers of glass lamp chimneys are said to put materials in the glass to make the chimneys break quickly.
CHAPTER IV. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE
This process, as applied to the election of directors in corporations and trustees for Reclamation Districts, is thus defined in Art. XII., Sect. 12, of the Constitution of California:
"In all elections for directors or managers of corporations, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in person or by proxy, the number of shares of stock owned by him for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number or his shares of stock shall equal, or distribute them on the same principle, among as many candidates as be shall think fit," etc.
It is a movement towards the proportional representation of parties rather than of people, which can only be worked to advantage in small organizations where all can be present, or in districts returning three to five members, and then only imperfectly, whereas full proportional representation by the preferential process works with the greater accuracy as constituencies are enlarged. Sir Rowland Hill, the father of cheap postage, in 1840 drafted a form of organization for the municipality of Adelaide, South Australia (which colony was then new), and included therein a provision for cumulating the vote in the election of 20 town councillors, so that one-twentieth of the voters, by concentrating their twenty votes apiece on one man, could elect him. This was before the secret ballot was introduced, and hence it could be known when any candidate had been elected in time to avoid any waste of votes on him. It was used for three years, when the municipal organization was discontinued because of the expense to a scanty population.
The process was suggested in England in 1857, by James Garth Marshall. In 1868 it was advocated in the United States by U.S. Senator Buckalew. In 1870 it was used to elect members of school boards in Great Britain, and has been so used ever since.
About that time it was introduced for the election of members of the House of Assembly in Illinois, in districts returning three members each. It is still so used. The effect is that the absolute waste of votes is much lessened. But it perpetuates the evils of party rule by the fact that nearly all votes are wasted that are not cast for one or the other of two leading parties. Hence the Illinois Assembly is but little, if at all, more than a reflex of public opinion than are other legislative bodies.
As applied to the election of more numerous bodies, it is liable to great inaccuracy and a large absolute waste of votes. In the Marylebone (London) election of November, 1870, for seven members of the school board, Miss Garrett received 47,858 votes out of 165,165 cast (each voter casting seven votes), of which total the successful candidates receiving in all 111,649 votes. The lowest of then received 8,355 votes, and the highest of the 15 unsuccessful ones 7,927, so that it appears Miss Garrett could have been elected on a much less number than she received. Had her supporters known their strength they could have elected several other candidates sharing her views.
Besides this drawback, 53,516 votes — nearly a third of the whole — were entirely wasted for unsuccessful candidates. In the Board itself, Miss Garrett, representing over three times the vote of the next most popular elected candidate, and nearly six times the lowest, had only the same voting power. This is, however, an extreme case.
But at the best, it must require very much canvassing beforehand to enable this system to work out even an approach towards justice.
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CHAPTER V. THE FREE LIST OR TICKET.
This is said to have been first proposed by Mr. Gilpin of Philadelphia, in 1844, and has been advocated at different times in England. It is, however, principally interesting through its energetic advocacy in Belgium for many years, and in Switzerland since 1864, resulting in its adoption there in 1890-92 by three Cantons of Ticino, Neuchatel and Geneva, as previously stated in the chapter on direct legislation.
Under it the number of votes cast is divided by the number of candidates to be elected, and the quotient is the quota. Or the number of votes is divided by the number of candidates plus one, and one added to the quotient to form the quota, as is done in Ticino. Or it can be combined with the cumulative vote by a fractionizing process advocated by Messrs Seelbohm and Parker Smith in England, and M. D'Hondt in Belgium, whereby a vote for one candidate counts as one, a vote for four as one-fourth, a vote for three as one-third, and so on.
In the former processes, the voter, as in the cumulative vote, has as many votes as there are candidates to be elected from the district.
Stated generally, the principle is that the number of candidates elected from each list or ticket is proportioned to the aggregate vote cast for that ticket, and the fractions of quotas result, in additional members either for the list in which there is the largest fraction, as in Neuchatel and Geneva, or for the list casting the largest vote in the district, as in Ticino.
Three elections have now been held under it in Ticino, and one each in Neuchatel (May 1st, 1892) and Geneva (November 13th, 1892).
The first in Ticino, was on March 10, 1892, in which the Conservative vote in its ten districts (each returning from five to 15 members) was 11,348, and the Liberal vote, 11,480; but the Conservatives returned 50 members, and the Liberals on a vote of 11,480 returned 45 members.
(These figures represent the number of voters).
In the election for two members of the "Council of State," on Feb. 19th, 1893, the Conservatives received 58,245 votes (each voter voting for five candidates) and the Liberals or Radicals 61,488, the former returning two and the latter three candidates. In each case the candidates taken on each list are those receiving the highest numbers, the voter signifying his preference for candidates at the same time as he votes for the list.
In the election for the Grand Council (the canton's legislative body), on March 5, 1893, the districts were reduced to eight instead of ten; 172,390 Radical votes elected 53 members, and 143,089 Conservative votes elected 43 members. The following is a statement of the result in each district as tabulated by the Brussels La Representation proportionelle: [table not in in this reiteration]
Under the usual system [Block Voting] the Radicals would have secured 80 and the Conservatives 16 only.
In September 1890 there were armed conflicts in Geneva canton resulting in the death of one prominent politician caused by a similar inequality the other way – the Radicals, with nearly half the vote, secured less than a third of the representatives.
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Nothing but the intervention of the Federal troops had prevented a civil war. This had led to the adoption of the improved system, with the result of removing that bitterness of feeling naturally resulting from the grossest injustice. Proportional Representation is peace.
In the Geneva election above mentioned, 13,349 persons voted in three districts for 100 members of the cantonal legislature. The wasted votes amounted to 3.9, 3.4 and 1.7 percent, in the several districts, which were not equally apportioned, however, as 5,412 voters elected 40 deputies from Rive Gauche, 26 deputies were elected by the 2,972 voters of Rive Droite, and 34 by 4,965 voters of the City of Geneva. There were five parties represented substantially in proportion to the number of votes cast by each party.
One week earlier 53 percent, of the votes of California were wasted.
In the Neuchatel election, three parties were represented, viz.: Radicals, Liberals, and Workingmen, besides local parties. The total of voters was 20,059, including 9,961 Radicals, who elected 57 members; 5,786 Liberals, 29 members; 2,906 Workingmen, 18 members; and 1,106 "mixed" (local), 9 members. The strict proportion would have been 57, 33, 17 and 7.
Under the old system, aside from coalitions, it would have been 65, 10, 30 and 9.
Professor Adrien Naville, of Neuchatel, in his Report as Secretary to the members of the Swiss P. R. Association, remarks that before the election it was noticeable that, "notwithstanding the very active work of the electoral committees, the struggle was less bitter and less personal than at any preceding election, each party knowing that it would have its part;
"that is, secure its pro rata of representatives. He further states that more votes were cast than ever previously because all knew their votes would count; that the counting of the ballots, etc., was rapid and easy. I repeat. Proportional Representation is peace.
Hon. Tom L. Johnson, in 1892, proposed a bill in Congress to enable members of the National House of Representatives to be elected in a similar manner, but rather more simply.
The imperfections in the List system are that without great complication, a voter cannot cast his ballot for candidates on two or more party tickets, and it requires as much elaborate party machinery to work it as the present system. It admits of much less absolute waste of votes than the present system, but still leaves the voter within party trammels, more or less, instead of leaving free play to his individuality in his selection of candidates without impairing the effectiveness of his vote.
M. D'Hondt, of Belgium, has devised an elaborate modification of this system, referred to at the beginning of this chapter. It would require three or four times the space of this pamphlet to explain. Much space is occupied in La Representation Proportionelle in elaborate discussions on the details of the List plans, the complications of which would seriously obstruct its acceptance on this continent. Nor are the reasons that obtain for its acceptance in Belgium or Switzerland (where the people are in the practice of voting for a large number of candidates from one district, 32 from Brussels, for instance) operative in the U.S. or British North America, where single districts have always been largely predominant.
M. D'Hondt defines proportional representation as "the repartition of several seats between divers parties proportionally to their relative importance."
But what is really required, and can be obtained by a much more simple process than the List system, is a repartition of seats not between parties, but between the whole body of voters, independently of party machinery or party leaders. This ideal accords with the spirit of a decision by the California Supreme Court, in October, 1892, that the clause in the so-called Australian ballot law permitting party headings on the ballot, so that a voter could vote for the entire party ticket by making one mark, was unconstitutional, because it was "an attempt to discriminate against classes of voters," and ''its effects would be to subject such classes to partial disfranchisement, or the casting of such votes upon more burdensome conditions than others no better entitled, under the fundamental law, to the free and untrammelled exercise of the right of suffrage."
But this is done under our present system of so called representation by the mode of apportionment, irrespective of and before the act of depositing the ballot. For it gives to voters acting with party organizations an advantage in securing an alleged representation over independent voters. And to the extent that the List systems do this, they retain the old leaven.
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CHAPTER VI. The Preferential Plan
This has been designated by Rev. Ernest Naville, of Geneva, to whom the success of the movement in Switzerland has been so largely due, as the ideal of proportional representation. It was introduced, in a very limited and imperfect way, into the election, by indirect vote, of the Denmark "Folkething" in I855, by Prof Andrae; and is still continued similarly in the election of a few members of the "Landsthing," or upper house, of that country; that is, a number of persons, designated "electors of the second degree," are elected by the ordinary mode, and these electors of the second degree elect the legislators by this preferential process.
It was independently discovered by the late Thomas Hare, barrister-at-law, London, and published in 1857. John Stuart Mill was among its earliest and most enthusiastic advocates, claiming that "it lifts the cloud that hangs over our civilization." It has since then been much simplified by Sir John Lubbock and others, and can now be claimed as at once the simplest (aside from the Gove system and the most effective of any plan yet proposed, in that it upholds and expresses the individuality of the voter to the largest possible extent.
The quota is ascertained, as in one form of the "Free List," by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of candidates to be elected; but its paramount feature is that the wasted votes are reduced to a minimum. Each voter numbers the candidates on the ballot (all the candidates should be on one ballot) in the order of his choice, placing the figure "1" opposite the name of the candidate whom he most desires to see elected, "2" opposite the name of the candidate next preferred (hence "preferential") by him, "3" against his next choice, and so on.
The ballots are then arranged according to the first choice (figure 1) and counted, so many for each candidate, after which the surplus ballots, over the quota, that any candidate may have received, are transferred to the second choice on each ballot. If that candidate has received no quota; but if, or when, such candidate of the second choice has received a quota, the ballot is transferred to the third choice candidate, and so on, until all the surplus ballots have thus been disposed of.
These transferred ballots count the same as if they had been originally cast as first-choice for that candidate. As soon as any candidate's quota is thus made up by transferred votes, that candidate's ballots forming the quota are withdrawn and packed up in any convenient manner, and the candidate declared elected.
After the surplus votes are thus disposed of, if there are still candidates remaining to be elected, the ballots of the candidate having the least number of first-choice votes, are transferred in the same manner as surplus ballots, to the second, third, fourth, or fifth choice, etc., as the case may be; and whenever by these transferred ballots any candidate reaches his quota, his ballots are withdrawn in the same manner as in the case of surplus ballots. This process — termed "elimination" — is continued until the number of candidates remaining is no greater than the number to be elected. The process is thus specified in the amendment to Section 2 of Article IX. of the Constitution of the Mechanics' Institute of this city, passed in September, 1892.
Under that amendment, seven trustees of that institution were elected on February 28, 1893.
The voting shall be by the process known as the preferential method of proportional representation, as follows:
1. Each voter shall have one vote, but may vote in the alternative for as many candidates as he pleases. by writing the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names of those candidates in the order of his preference.
2. The ballot papers having been all mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers, so that no two shall bear the same number.
3. The number obtained by dividing the whole number of good ballot papers tendered at the election by the number of trustees to be elected shall be called The quota. If such number has a fraction, such fractional part shall be deducted.
4. Every candidate who has a number of first votes equal to, or greater than, the quota, shall be declared to be elected, and so many of the ballot papers containing those votes as shall be equal in number to the quota shall be set aside as the quota of that candidate, in a sealed envelope, and sealed and signed by the judges of election. On all other ballot papers, the name of such elected candidate shall be cancelled, with the effect of raising by so much in the order of preference, all votes given to other candidates after him.
This process shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first votes, or votes deemed first.
5. Then the candidate or candidates having the fewest first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not to be elected, with the effect of raising so much in the order of preference all votes given to candidates after him or them, and Rule 4 shall be again applied, if possible.
6. When by successive application of Rules 4 and 5, the number of candidates is reduced to the number of trustees remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.
[page 81]
On February 28th, 905 votes were cast, the quota being 129 [seven open seats; Hare quota]. Two candidates received 187 and 178 votes respectively as first choice. The distribution of their surpluses did not raise any other candidate to the quota. By the "elimination '" process two more gained full quotas; one was elected on 123 votes, one on 128, and a third on 122. This shortage resulted from 15 votes being ineffective - eight of them having but one candidate marked. The counting was completed in four hours. It could probably have been done in half the time, had it not been considered desirable to so arrange the details as to secure publicity and exactness. Out of five judges and tally clerks [few] only had any previous experience of the process. Yet none of them had the slightest difficulty in connection therewith.
The only objections made to it worth considering are these:
1. Complexity. This is mainly apparent. It is much more simple in its working than in its description. Its working should be exemplified, wherever possible, by "trial ballots." Any one who has assisted at one or two of these made under competent direction, can himself become an instructor. And anyone in the least degree conversant with the elaborate and (to most persons) unintelligible organizations of political parties would know, if he understood the Hare system also, that it is simplicity itself.
2. It has been objected, in the case of the Mechanics' Institute election, that two candidates not elected, were on more ballots, including sixth and seventh choice, than others who were elected. To give this objection full force, I subjoin results of a count, giving the number of marks received by each candidate on all the voting papers. The names of the elected candidates being italicized:
[Note these are totals across all ballots, not similarly-marked groups of ballots.]
905 total votes Seven seats Quota 127
Candidates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Totals.
Ayers 186 63 74 66 82 195 87 753
Doolan 68 104 157 49 29 26 26 459
Dow 68 103 112 62 48 44 53 490
Dunn 33 45 82 67 186 65 40 518
Ewing 62 46 60 77 44 35 37 361
Formhals 47 172 76 63 32 38 31 459
Giesting 16 34 52 183 150 67 54 556
Lewis 59 74 68 80 70 70 32 453
Malm 180 71 55 56 39 53 83 537
McNicol 43 51 50 67 84 153 226 674
Mosebach 6 7 9 6 12 18 27 85
Symmes 79 50 31 36 34 64 81 375
Wilkie 42 61 58 46 53 31 85 376
To make the subject clearer, I will exemplify:
Ayers received 186 votes as first choice, 63 second, 74 third, etc.
But of these no more than 129 (one-seventh of the 905 votes cast, dropping the fraction) were counted for him, the remainder having been distributed among the candidates marked 2, 3, etc., on them. Ewing received 62 first-choice votes and 46 second-choice. Doolan's total vote of all grades reached 459. And so on.
The following shows the sum of the 1st and 2nd choice votes cast for each candidate, including such as were on the 16 ineffective ballots [TM: many small math mistakes for some reason]:
Elected candidates—Avers, 250; Doolan, 172; Dow, 171; Formhals, 226 [219]; Lewis, 132 [133]: Malm, 251; Symmes, 129.
Candidates not elected—Dunn, 81 [78]; Ewing, 118 [108]; Geisting, 20 [50]; McNicol, 98 [94]; Mosebach, 13; Wilkie, 105 [103].
That is, all the members who were elected received each a greater number of first and second-choice votes than any of those not elected, while the aggregate of the 1st and 2nd choice votes cast for the elected candidates exceeded those cast for the others by nearly three to one. The lowest elected candidate thus received more votes than the highest not elected. That is, all who received the highest 1st and 2nd choice votes - all that the voting members wanted most — were elected. What more could be reasonably asked?
[Two slates and an Independent received due representation]
As further illustrating the perfect fairness and palpable advantages of the process, it may be stated that there were two distinct sets of candidates, one consisting of Messrs. Ayers, Doolan, Dunn, Formhals, Giesting, Malm and McNicol; the other of Messrs. Dow, Ewing, Lewis, Mosebach and Wilkie.
Symmes ran alone, entirely unsupported by any organization or party; yet he was elected — a result that would have been entirely impossible under the usual plan. He has proved, from what I learn, to be remarkably capable and efficient; and it is just such men that are certain to be brought to the front by proportional representation, and as certain to be kept in the rear by the usual method.
[page 82]
For the first lot there was a total of 3,956 marks on all the ballots, of which 1,131 were first and second choice; and four of them were elected. For the second list there were 1,756 marks on all the ballots, of which 538 were first and second choice, and two of them were elected, the due proportion being substantially retained even as to classes of votes that are not necessarily criterions of estimation.
[Lending library metaphor of STV]
I borrow from Miss Spence the following illustration of the purpose of marking different numbers opposite the names of several candidates when the vote is counted for only one: If any person wants a book out of a circulating library where but one book can be taken out at a time by one person, and sends a messenger, he—not knowing whether the book he wants most is out or not, writes a list of several books hi the order of his choice, and if No. 1 is not in, he gets No. 2 on his list, if that is in; if it is not, he is given No. 3, and so on; he does not grumble because he does not get every book on the list. If a voter knew the exact state of the polls when he deposited his ballot, on the proportional system, he would simply mark one name; but the ballot being secret and the situation as to the vote not being known until after the close of the polls, the preferential process of numbering the candidates' names in the order of his choice enables him to act with exactly the same effect as if he knew when depositing his ballot just how many votes each candidate had received.
The objectors under this head seem to have expected that a fraction over half the voters should, under proportional representation, have elected all the candidates [as is done under FPTP], and that a system is not fair under which one voter cannot aid in electing several candidates*, while [thinking] it is quite fair when 53 percent of the voters in California, and similarly elsewhere, elect even one candidate. No just system can satisfy those who "want the earth."
*[TM: This is mis-statement by writer as under STV each voter only aids in election of one candidate.]
3. Chance. This has been a never-failing objection, and a thousand refutations would not silence it. The "chance "of picking up a few drunken, corrupt or weak-kneed voters may, under our present system, decide the fate of nations or even civilizations. But that counts for nothing with such objectors.
Sir John Lubbock, on Feb. 3, 1885, wrote Professor Stokes, Secretary of the Royal Society and Professor of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge, asking him as follows:
"According to our calculation, supposing a constituency of 25,000 electors returning three members [making the quota about 6,000], and that a candidate receives 10,000 votes, of which one-half are marked for a candidate 'B,' and one-half for 'C,' and suppose that 4,000 have to be distributed, the element of chance would generally affect the result by less than 20.
Your authority on such a question would, of course, be accepted as conclusive. Will you therefore allow me to ask you whether this is so, and also to state the odds would be against the result being affected by chance to the extent of 100."
To which the professor replied on February 5th, as follows:
" I have carefully calculated the chances and quite verify your result. I find that the average difference from two thousand in the votes assigned to 'B' and 'C ' would be as nearly as may be 16, and that the odds against the difference being as great as 100 would be, in round numbers, 44,000 to one."
As the ballots cast at the Mechanics' Institute were available, it was determined to test the "chance" objection somewhat a posteriori, which was done on June 5th, after every ballot had been previously marked with initials showing for what candidate it had been counted at the election in the following manner:
The ballots, including the 15 ineffective ones, were arranged according to the first choice. Next the ballots of Ayers and Malm were each arranged in two piles, one consisting of the ballots that had been set aside for the quotas of each, and the others of those that had been distributed, in the order of the voter's choice in each case, as not being needed to elect Ayers and Malm.
Then came this important proceeding: All the 58 ballots with Avers' name as first choice that had been transferred to other candidates at the election were now put in as part of his quota, and 58 other ballots that at the election were treated as part of his quota were transferred to other candidates in the order of the voter's choice.
Mr. Malm's ballots were treated in like manner.
Thus no ballots treated as surplus at the election were so treated at this count, thus making the greatest possible difference in the order of the count. Yet the same candidates were "eliminated" as at the election, and, as well as recollected, in the same order.
It is certain that Ewing was the last "eliminated" and Lewis the last elected. There were, however, slight differences as to the number of votes on which each candidate was elected at the election of February 28th, and the figures that he would have been elected on had last Sunday's count been an election.
They are as follows, the first figures denoting the number of votes on which each was elected; the second the number that fell to each at the close of the last count:
Doolan, 128—124; Dow, 126–129; Lewis, 123–118; Symmes, 128–129.
[page 83]
No candidate obtained a quota by surplus transferred votes. Only two candidates received any surplus votes. Moreover, at each succeeding election, as the strength of each candidate becomes better known, the surplus votes will become fewer.
The ineffective votes, which numbered 15 at the election, became 17 at this count, of which 9 voted for one candidate only, 2 for two, 1 for three, 1 for four, and 4 for seven.
To test the ''chance" objection in another manner, Mr. George Cumming, a Trustee of the Institute, counted the second-choice votes on all the ballots cast for the candidates who received surplus votes, and then calculating by the proportion between the candidate's quota and his surplus, the number of the second-choice votes being treated as a third term, how many of these surplus votes belong equitably to each of the other candidates. The result corresponds substantially to the actual distribution [which had been done through random selection].
The Gove Plan. page 83
The Gove System is similar to the Hare System in principle. It is also similar to two advocated by Archibald E. Dobbs, barrister-at-law, of London, as far back as 1879.
It is embodied in a bill advocated by John M. Berry, of Worcester, Mass., offered to the Massachusetts Legislature in 1891, and given at length in the Appeal to the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament, by Sandford Fleming, O.M.G., LL.D., pp. 143-149.
The quota is ascertained as before [Hare quota], but the voter marks one name only. Each candidate publishes, not less than three weeks before the election, a written statement containing the names of one or more others of said candidates "with whom he believes himself to be in accord upon the most important public questions, and to one or more of whom he wishes to transfer any ineffective votes cast for himself." The Secretary of the Commonwealth (Massachussetts) is then to publish a list showing the names of the candidates and also the names of those candidates to whom each candidate wishes to transfer his ineffective votes, so that the voter may know in advance to whom such votes may be transferred. Every ineffective vote of a candidate (surplus or eliminated, as in the Hare plan) is to be transferred to the eligible candidate named on the first candidate's list for whom the largest number of votes were originally cast, but who has not a quota, until all are transferred as far as possible. Then the forty candidates having the largest number of votes (forty is the number of the Massachusetts State Senators whose election the bill was designed for) shall be declared elected. [TM: If eliminations go far enough, there will be only 40 candidates left standing.]
The objections to this bill as compared with the Hare plan are as follows:
1. A popular candidate would, in many places, be pestered with solicitations to place on his list persons whom he would not voluntarily select. Where an object was to be gained, intimidation and other undue influences would be brought to bear.
2. While the voter might desire his vote, if ineffective as cast, to be transferred to a candidate belonging to a different party, the candidate himself might feel obliged to name on his list only candidates of the same party. This might lead to great waste of votes, as in the List system. The voter himself is altogether free from such influences in a secret ballot, and it is his right to determine to whom his vote should be transferred.
The Gove system, however, might be of advantage in the Province of Quebec, and perhaps Ontario, very sparsely settled in some parts, as the local returning officers could themselves count and report the votes, without the risk involved in transmitting the ballots themselves to be counted at some central point [where transfers take place under STV]. The process would thus be simplified and expedited as compared with the Hare plan. However the Hare system is the most accurate and would be best adapted for municipalities and thickly populated states or provinces.
[Benefits of pro-rep]
With the elevation in the moral tone of candidates and of voters that any plan of proportional representation would certainly bring about, it might prove entirely safe to assign the distribution of surplus or eliminated votes to the candidates themselves. But by reason of the demoralizing effects of existing political systems, that is a question for the future.
As to the present, any considerable loss of votes under the Hare system is simply impossible. While under the present one so large a loss is absolutely certain that a mere majority of a legislature, so far as the electoral process itself is concerned, never can represent, even approximately, a majority of the voters.
CHAPTER VII. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. [page 84]
It is unnecessary to do more than make a general reference to the critical condition of present society, especially in the great industrial and commercial centres throughout the world, and the consequent necessity of securing the ablest, most experienced and best persons in our "representative" bodies, of all grades. Whether our civilization shall grow into harmonization or relapse into veneered barbarism, combining and intensifying the vices of both the savage and civilized states, (such being the drift today) is mainly to be determined by action or inaction on this question of representation. This cancer of false and corrupt politics must be extirpated, and the body politic reconstructed on hygienic principles, or that cancer will permeate (as it is now doing) every form of industrial, social and individual life, to the extinction of all love of the good, the beautiful and the true.
Of what use is it to prove a paradise possible without showing how to find the key?
Purify politics by making representation accessible to all. Do justice politically to all. Then the tendency will be upwards and onwards — a real, and not merely material advancement.
As evil now permeates, so would good "leaven the whole lump." Let one province, one state, even one municipality lead the way, by introducing full proportional representation, and the whole civilized world must eventually follow. Inspiration and aspiration will impart that superiority to evil it always secures in a fair field. Proportional representation will make the field a fair one. Then,
"Ever the right comes uppermost
And ever is justice done,"
will become more than a poet's ideal.
New occasions teach new duties; Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward, who would keep abreast of truth;
Lo, before us gleam our camp-fires, we ourselves must Pilgrims be,
Launch our Mayflower, and steer boldly through the desperate winter sea.
Nor attempt the Future's portal with the Past's blood-rusted key. —J. R. Lowell.
The false belief that the people rule, "the people make the laws," and that "to make governments better we need only to make the people better," are the most efficient paralyzers that could be devised to arrest any form of advancement through political action.
The removal of that false belief would invigorate a public opinion, now paralyzed, so that it would become a force so powerful that its insistence on being embodied in the processes of election would have to be heeded.
But if men of thought and conscience fail to realize how deep this political cancer reaches, their slumbers may be rudely broken. Better is chaos than systematized corruption. Better is the insane than the Satanic. Better that the corpse of a rotten civilization should, preparatory to interment, taint the air, so that out of its putrefaction shall, in after ages, come new life, than that it should remain a walking pestilence — a living death.
Must our civilization thus perish?
By no means. A few in earnest can arouse a demand for the right to complete representation of all voters. Already their voices echo and re-echo, each helping the other, from Canada in the far north to the lands of the Southern Cross, from the mountains of Switzerland to the plains of Illinois; from the metropolis of the British Empire to the marvellously beautiful and varied Pacific slope of America. From all these and more, men and women will gather in the populous city on the shores of Lake Michigan, to inaugurate a vaster enterprise than was ever dreamed of by the founders of the Chicago World's Fair — a world's convention of workers for political equity.
The evolution of science by investigation, the evolution of industry by invention, the evolution of the social order by co-operation — all these demand political evolution in harmony with science, with industry, with social progress, and above all, with justice.
The old Roman said "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" — let justice be done, though the heavens fall. Rather I would say, Let justice be done lest the heavens fall. This political justice would bring not fallen heavens but a risen, redeemed earth, seen by the prophet — " a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."
Pacifico.
APPENDIX. "Draft Bills" for "The Best Workable Measures."
An Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, 37 V, c. 9, s. 135.
Section 1. — Hereafter the House of Commons shall be elected by the process known as the preferential method of proportional representation, also known as the transferable vote, as follows:—
Sec. 2. – Excepting as hereinafter provided for districting the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, members of the House of Commons shall be elected by each Province without regard to districts for the number of members to which they shall be entitled by law.
[page 85]
But each voter's vote shall count for one candidate only in the manner following:—
Sec. 3. — The voter shall place opposite the name of such candidate as he may prefer above all others the figure "1" and opposite the name of the candidate next preferred by him, as being his second choice the figure "2," for his third choice the figure "3" in like manner; for his fourth choice, the figure "4; "for his fifth choice the figure "5" and for his sixth choice, the figure "6." But he can mark any number of candidates not exceeding six with figures from one to six.
Sec. 4. — The ballot boxes, after being duly sealed, as provided for in Sec. 58 of the aforesaid Dominion Elections Act, shall be forwarded to an official to be known as the Central Returning Officer, at the seat of government for each Province (excepting as hereinafter provided for the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec), where they shall be counted, in the presence of the candidates or their agents, by said Central Returning Officer and his deputies, in the manner following:
Sec. 5 — The ballot papers, having been fully shuffled and mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers in the order of their being so drawn out, so that no two shall bear the same number, and the whole number as stamped shall correspond with the actual number of such ballot papers.
Sec. 6. — The whole number obtained by dividing the whole number of ballot papers by the number of members of the House of Commons to be elected from that Province, or from any district in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, shall be called the quota.
But when such quotient has a fraction, that fraction shall be dropped to form such quota.
Sec. 7. — The ballot papers shall then be placed on files, or otherwise be conveniently segregated, according to the first choice votes on each ballet paper; and, after that is done and the votes on such first choice for each candidate are duly recorded by the Central Returning Officer, if any candidate is found to have a surplus of first choice votes above the aforesaid quota, a number of ballot papers equal to that quota shall be taken from the tile or pile of ballots of such candidate and set aside as his quota, placed in an envelope or other suitable package and sealed and signed by the Central Returning Officer and his deputies or clerks. If more than one candidate has a surplus over the quota, the first candidate's ballots taken shall be that having the highest surplus, and so on in succession to the candidate having the least surplus, which shall be taken last.
Sec. 8. — All other ballot papers having the name of such candidate or candidates as first choice, shall be distributed in the same order, by cancelling with pencil the name of the first choice candidate and counting such ballots for the candidate numbered "2 "for second choice; and if that candidate shall have previously received a quota, the ballot shall be counted for the third choice; and so on to the number of six, if so many are marked by figures as provided by Section 3 of this Act, the effect contemplated being to raise by so much in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after the first choice. If all of the candidates marked on such ballot shall have been elected before such ballot has been reached, it shall be set aside, in an envelope or other suitable method, as an ineffective vote, with all similar ineffective ballots.
Sec. 9 — Whenever by the distribution of such ballot papers as are specified in the preceding Section, added to the ballots cast for any candidate as first choice, a quota shall be reached, such quota of ballots shall be sealed, certified to and sot aside as provided in Sec. 7, the same as if such candidate had received a quota by first-choice votes. The process described in this and the preceding Section shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first-choice votes, or votes deemed first.
Sec. 10.—It! case the requisite number of candidates be not elected by the distribution of surplus votes as hereinbefore set forth, then the candidate having the fewest number of first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not capable of being elected, with the effect of raising so much in the order of preference, all votes given to the candidate, or candidates after him, which ballots shall be counted for such candidates in the same order and manner as specified in Section 8; that is to say, the same as if they were surplus votes.
Then the ballots of the candidate having next fewest votes as first choice shall be disposed of in like manner, and so on until there are no more candidates' ballots remaining than the number of candidates remaining to be elected. And whenever, by the distribution and transfer of such insufficient votes, any candidate shall receive a quota, the package of such ballot papers thus apportioned to him shall be sealed and set aside in the same manner, and with the same effect as provided in Section 9.
Sec. 11.—When, by the distribution of surplus votes as provided in Section 9 and of insufficient votes ("elimination") as provided in Section 10, the number of candidates remaining is reduced to the number of members of the House of Commons remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.
Sec. 12.—In disposing of ballot papers not tilled up according to rule, the primary purpose shall be to carry into effect, in counting the vote, the intention of the voter. When it can be ascertained for what candidate the voter desired to vote, the ballot shall be counted accordingly, even if irregular in form.
Sec. 13.—For the purpose of avoiding the insertion of an inconvenient number of names on the ballot papers in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, the same shall be divided into electoral districts not exceeding six in each of said Provinces by a Commission of three members for each Province, to be appointed by the Governor General of the Dominion. Provided that no city, present electoral district or county shall be so divided into more than one district; provided also that the districts or counties contained in the Island of Montreal and such other islands adjacent, as may be comprised in the districts or counties of that island, shall not be divided, but shall constitute one entire district, or a part of one district. The commissioners shall also designate suitable places in each district in which all the ballots for such district shall be counted with a view to declare the return of candidates in substantially the same manner as at present, with such differences only as the proportional preferential system may necessitate. The number of candidates to be returned by each of said districts shall be made to conform, as nearly as possible, to the population of each district as determined by the last preceding census, and it shall be the duty of the said commissioners to make a re-apportionment as soon as possible after the result of each succeeding census shall be officially declared.
Sec. 14.— All the provisions of the sections 1 to 12 inclusive shall apply to the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, excepting as to their division in districts, and the same shall apply to those districts, after they are formed, in the same manner as if they were separate provinces, excepting as to such general superintendence and revision as the parliament of each province may provide for at the capital of each province for the verification of returns.
Sec. 15.—Whenever one or more vacancies occur between elections, the ballots which have been counted for the vacant members shall be re-distributed among such of the previously unsuccessful candidates may be still eligible and willing to accept, as provided in sections 8, 9 and 10, and the candidate (or candidates, if there shall be more than one vacancy) highest on the list after such distribution shall be declared elected.
In view of the great extent, sparse population and other features of the Province of Quebec, or a large portion thereof, the Gove system may be more available, though less theoretically exact. Its workings are clearly defined in a bill prepared for the Massachusetts Legislature and given at length in pages 147-9 of "An Appeal to the Canadian Institute." For the words "Secretary of the Commonwealth "might be substituted the words "Secretary and Registrar," the word "Assemblymen" for "Senator" and "Province" for "Commonwealth."
The reduction of the number of Legislator would be very desirable, and forty would be sufficient for any province or state.
[Essential portions of this bill]
I subjoin a copy (slightly modified) of the essential portions of this bill with some modifications.
Section 1. — In order to provide for a representation of the citizens of this Province founded upon the principle of equality; any resident of this Province, eligible by law to the office of Assemblyman, may be nominated as a candidate to said office by any person.
No such nomination shall be valid unless the following conditions are complied with:
(1). The nomination shall be in writing, signed by the person making it, and shall contain the name and place of residence of the candidate.
(2). An acceptance of the nomination, signed by the candidate, shall be endorsed thereon.
(3) It shall be deposited in the office of the Secretary and Registrar of the Province not more than three months nor less than five weeks before the day of election.
(4) There shall be deposited with such nomination the sum of ten dollars, or such other sum not exceeding fifty dollars, as the Legislature may hereafter direct.
Sec. 2.—Not less than four weeks before the day of election, the Secretary and Registrar shall furnish to each candidate and to every voter who shall request it, a printed list containing the names of all the candidates in alphabetical order, with the place of residence of each, and the name of the person by whom each was nominated.
Sec. 3.—At any time aft«r his nomination and not less than three weeks before the day of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the Secretary and Registrar a statement in writing, signed by himself and acknowledged before any authorized notary, or other official authorize to take acknowledgement of deeds, which statement shall contain the names of one or more others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to be in accord on the most important public questions, and to one or more of which he wishes to transfer any ineffective votes cast for himself.
[page 87]
Sec. 4.—The Secretary and Registrar shall prepare a new list of candidates similar to that named in Section two of this article, but containing also against the name of each candidate the names in alphabetical order of all candidates named in the list, if any, furnished by that candidate, as provided in Section three; and he shall, not less than two weeks before the day of election, furnish to the a sufficient number of copies of said new list. Every such shall, immediately upon the receipt thereof, post conspicuously, and open to the inspection of the public, one copy of said list at each and every place in his where votes are to be received at said election, and shall also furnish one copy to every legal voter resident in said who shall demand the same, to the extent of his supply over and above two copies reserved for file in his office.
Sec. 5.—Every legal voter, wherever resident, shall be entitled to cast his vote for Assembly an in favour of any candidate whose name appears in the aforesaid list of candidates; but no person shall vote for more than one candidate, nor for any person whose name does not appear upon the aforesaid list of candidates. But wherever a candidate duly nominated is omitted from the list published by the Secretary and Registrar, votes may be cast for him with the same effect as if his name appeared on said list. If the Secretary and Registrar shall knowingly omit such name from the list when the same is entitled legally to be there, he shall ....
Sec. 6.—The returns of votes having been transmitted to the Secretary and Registrar, as provided by law, he shall make a list of all candidates voted for, with the vote received by each candidate in each precinct or voting place, and his total vote, and said list shall be transmitted, published and distributed in the same manner provided in Section 4 concerning the list therein named; and after the Secretary and Registrar shall have ascertained he shall make a list of the successful candidates, with the computation by which, as hereafter provided, their election has been ascertained, and shall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each candidate and to every voter, especially published of newspapers or other periodicals, who shall request it.
Sec. 7.—Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate for whom they were originally cast, to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate, as provided by Section 3. The . . candidates then having the highest number of votes shall then be declared elected, and the Secretary and Registrar shall issue certificates of election to them. In case two or more candidates have the same number of votes, the candidates residing at the greatest distance from the legislative capital of the Province shall be preferred.
Sec. 8.—The following shall be deemed ineffective votes, and shall be transferred in the order named:
(1). Any vote cast for a candidate in excess of one-fortieth of the entire vote cast, beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceeding to the one next highest, and so on. In the case of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer shall be from each alternately in alphabetical order.
(2). Votes cast for candidates who have died or become ineligible in the same order.
(3). Original votes cast for candidates who fail of election, beginning with the candidate receiving the smallest total vote, and proceeding to the next lowest, and so on; in case of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer to be made from each alternately in alphabetical order. No voters shall be transferred from any candidate who has not furnished the statement named in Section 3.
Sec. 10.—-Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate named in his said list living and eligible at the tune of counting the vote for whom the largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote, by transfer or otherwise, does not equal one-fortieth of the vote cast, until all are transferred as far as possible. Section 10 provides for return of money to candidates for whom a thousand or more votes were cast.
Sec. 11.—In case a vacancy shall occur in the Assembly after the declaration of election provided in Section 7, the votes cast for the member whose seat shall have become vacant, together with any ineffective votes assigned to him, shall be re-distributed in the same manner as if he had died or become ineligible before the canvassing of the votes; and the candidate not before elected, who, after returning to him any votes originally cast for him, shall then appear to have the largest number of votes shall be declared elected.
(I prefer the phraseology of Section 15, Dominion Elections Act to this).
Section 12.—Provides for the correction of errors by the Supreme Judicial Court, etc.
[page 88]
Section 13.—Provides for the election of representatives of the lower House by means of districts.
I have retained that part of the bill providing for the division of votes by forty, believing that the best interests in the community would be consulted by limiting the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec to that number, so as to enable their Legislatures to be really deliberative bodies. As I presume the number could be reduced by the Acts of the respective Legislatures, the proposition may not be out of place.
Its bearing on the subject of proportional representation is that by the reduction in number there need be no division of those Provinces into electoral districts. Such division unavoidably necessitates more or less inequality in legislative power of voters and leads to endless and useless controversy.
If, however, the present or similar numbers of representatives were to be retained concurrently with the enactment of proportional preferential representation, they could be divided into districts as provided in the proposed Act to amend the Dominion Elections Act, Section 14, in this Appendix.
For the application of the Gove system to the Province of Ontario, the same bill would be adapted with the following changes: —
For "Secretary and Registrar" substitute "Secretary."
Fill up the first blank in Section 4 with the words "to the clerk of every city, town, village and township;" the second blank with the word "clerk;" the third blank with the words "city, town, village or township;" the fourth blank the same.
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PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND. An Act to provide for the election of members of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly.
Section 1.—Hereafter, the members of the Legislative Council and of the Legislative Assembly shall be elected by the process known as the preferential method of proportional representation, and also known as the transferable vote, in the manner following:
Sec. 2.—There shall be no division into districts, but the representation shall be quotas, each quota consisting of the quotient obtained by dividing the whole number of votes received at any election for each House by the number of candidates to be elected from the whole Province for each House, and dropping the fraction, if any, in such quotient, and any candidate receiving that number of votes shall be declared elected.
Sec. 3.—The voter shall place opposite the name of such candidate as he may prefer above all others the figure "1," and opposite the name of the candidate next preferred by him, as being his second choice, the figure "2," and opposite the name of his third choice, the figure "3," and so on; but any mark beyond "6" will not be noticed.
Sec. 4.—The boxes or other packages containing the ballots, having been duly sealed, as provided by law, shall be sent to the office of the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer, to be there counted by him in the presence of the candidates, or their agents, in the manner following:
Sec. 5.—The ballot papers, having been fully shifted and mixed, shall be drawn out in succession and stamped with numbers in the order of their being so drawn out, so that no two shall bear the same number, and the whole number so stamped shall correspond with the number of such ballot papers.
Sec. 6.—The ballot papers shall then be placed on files, or otherwise conveniently assorted; according to the first-choice votes on each ballot paper; and after that is done, and the votes on such first choice duly recorded by the Provincial Secretary and Treasurer (the ballot papers being thus gone through for each House separately, if both are voted for on the same ballot by each voter), if any candidate is found to have a surplus of first-choice votes above the aforesaid quota, a number of ballot papers equal to that quota shall be set aside as his quota, placed in an envelope or other suitable package, and sealed and signed by the Provincial Secretary. If more than one candidate has a surplus over the quota, the ballots of that candidate shall first be taken having the highest surplus, and so on in succession to the candidate having the least surplus, which shall be taken last.
Sec. 7.—All other ballot papers having the name of the candidate or candidates as first choice shall be distributed in a similar way. Cancell with pencil the name of such candidate of first choice and count the ballot for the candidate numbered "2" for second choice. If that candidate shall have previously received a quota, the ballot shall be counted for the candidate marked "3," and so on to the number of six, if so many are marked by figures as provided for in Section 3 of this Act, the effect contemplated being to raise by so much in the order of preference all votes given to other candidates after the first choice. If all the candidates marked on such ballot shall have been elected before such ballot has been reached in the process of transfers, then it shall be put aside as an ineffective [exhausted] vote.
[page 89]
Sec. 8.—Whenever, by the distribution of such ballot papers as are specified in the preceding section, added to the ballots cast for any candidate as first choice, a quota shall be readied, the ballots constituting that quota shall be set aside as provided in Section Six for a like number of first-choice votes. The process specified in this and the preceding section shall be repeated until no candidate has more than a quota of first-choice votes, or votes counted for him as hereinbefore provided.
Sec. 9.—In case the required number of candidates be not elected by the distribution of surplus votes as hereinbefore provided, then the candidate having the fewest number of first votes, or votes deemed first, shall be declared not capable of being elected, with the effect of raising so much in the order of preference all votes given to the candidate or candidates after him. The ballots shall be counted for such candidates in the order and manner specified in Section 7 of this Act, that is to say, the same as if they were surplus votes. Then the ballot of the candidate having the next fewest votes as first choice shall be disposed of in like manner, and so until there are no more candidates' ballots remaining than the number of candidates remaining to be elected. And whenever, by the distribution and transfer of such insufficient ballots or votes, any candidate shall receive a quota, the package of such ballot papers shall be set aside in the same manner as provided in Section 8. And the process as defined in this Section shall be known as "elimination."
Sec. 10. When by the distribution of surplus votes, as provided in Sec. 8, and of insufficient votes, as provided in Sec. 9, the number of candidates remaining is reduced to the number of members remaining to be elected, the remaining candidates shall be declared elected.
Sec. 11. In the disposal of ballot papers not filled up according to rule, the primary purpose in counting and assigning such votes to the several candidates, shall be to carry into effect the intention of the voter, so far as that can be ascertained.
Sec. 12.—(Same as Section 15, Dominion Elections Act).
These provisions can be readily adapted to the several Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia, Manitoba and the North-West Territories [of which Alberta and Saskatchewan was still a part]. It would facilitate operations if the membership was reduced to from ten to twenty members for each Province.
Municipal Elections.
Aside from the cities, as to which I am not informed in detail, the municipal organization of the Province of Ontario would need but slight modification to adapt it to the proportional and preferential system as hereinbefore defined for Prince Edward Island. The affairs of the townships and villages being administered by a reeve and four councillors and the election taking place entirely (as I presume) in one room, no transportation of ballots, etc., would be required and the votes could be counted then and there.
The towns are governed by a mayor and three councillors for each ward, if less than five, or two for each ward, if more than five wards. These would present but little more difficulty.
It might be a good measure to provide for the election of reeves and mayors in common with councillors, assigning the office of reeve or of mayor to the candidate for councillor receiving the largest number of first choice votes.
It appears to me that pro-rep could be introduced more easily and work more smoothly in the municipalities than in the Legislatures. And that the practical experience to be reached through the municipalities (where the working would be as simple and clear as in the Mechanics' Institute of San Francisco) would be an excellent preparative for its introduction into legislatures.
It would work very smoothly from the outset in the smaller Provinces, especially in British Columbia, where in Victoria the Single Tax has already commenced its advocacy.
Pacifico.
[end of Part 2]
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