Essay No. 11 by "Equality" Part B
From Sandford Fleming's 1893 book - Essays on Rectification of Parliament.
Author presumed to be a U.S. writer.
Contents
[CHAPTER I Introduction] page 122
CHAPTER II The Failure of Legislative Assemblies page 139
(Chapters ! and II are in blog "Fleming Essays Part 5")
CHAPTER III The Single-membered District page 141
CHAPTER IV The General Ticket page 153
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CHAPTER III. THE SINGLE-MEMBERED DISTRICT. [page 142]
The position of the modern voter who essays to independence of choice is well known to be an unenviable one. When he comes to the polls to cast his vote, he finds that there is just one representative to be elected for any office.
Through the machinery of the political party with which he has been accustomed to vote, there is one candidate offered to him. There are practically but two candidates in the field — those of the two great parties. It is known to everyone that one of these two will be elected. If the voter is dissatisfied for any reason with the nominee of his own party, there are three courses open to him:
- to vote for the opposing candidate, or
- to vote for a third candidate, or
- to stay at home.
It is likely that his dissatisfaction with the opposing candidate is far more extreme than for his own party's. Only in periods of exceptional unrest or as a protest against an exceptionally corrupt candidate do large numbers of voters make so radical a revolt as to go entirely over to the enemy. The great majority of the dissatisfied simply stay at home. This is their only comfortable way of condemning their party's nominee.
But should they be intensely exasperated, or should they be of an uncompromising turn of mind, they may go to the extreme of nominating and voting for a third candidate. In this case their offence is even worse than if they vote for the principal opposing candidate. They indeed give him a half vote, just as they do when they stay at home, but they gain the opprobrium of a "crank" and the scorn of having "thrown their votes away."
More bitter than the hatred towards rivals, says Bryce, is the hatred of Boss and Ring towards those members of the party who do not desire and are not to be appeased by a share of the Spoils, but instead agitate for reform. They are natural and permanent enemies. Nothing but the extinction of the Boss himself and of bossdom altogether will satisfy them. They are, moreover, the common enemies of both parties.
Hence in ring-governed cities, professionals of both parties will sometimes unite against the reformers, or will rather let their opponents secure a place than win it for themselves by the help of the "independent vote." Devotion to "party government," as they understand it, can hardly go further. (Bryce, Amer. Com. vol. II, page 3)
In this way the party machine is the master of the situation. It alone can name the candidate, the only check upon it is the fear of the bolt on the part of the voters. This fear is reduced to a minimum. Though there may be loud protests and a vigorous show of independence it is well known that most of the protesters will fall into line on election day rather than see the other party win.
Add to the foregoing the fact that districts are bounded more or less arbitrarily, so as to include heterogeneous elements of population, and that boundaries are frequently changed, and we have an additional reason for the supremacy of the party organization. The voters have very few interests in common. They see little of each other. They have few of those general and social relations that would accustom them to join and work together
They do not meet in mass meetings as in the old New England town meeting, where individuals of all parties come together and discuss in public the affairs of their district, and the qualifications of candidates before the candidates are nominated. They must therefore look to their party organization for the dictation of a policy and the designation of a candidate. It is in the party that they find their common meeting place.
The party organization is a more or less close corporation composed of a series of practically self-perpetuating committees, the committees corresponding to the different election areas.
The party primary of the smallest division - the township or the ward – is the foundation of the system. But the primary is in the hands of its standing committee.
A very small percentage of the party voters, for some reason or another, attend the primaries. The majority of the party voters are too busily employed in private callings, or they find The work of primaries and conventions distasteful, or they are systematically barred out. In cities the percentage ranges from two to ten. In the townships from ten to forty. A majority of the voters in these primaries, then, elect delegates to The nominating conventions or nominate local candidates. This is the case with both the ruling parties. These candidates are the only ones between whom the voters can choose at the elections. The nominating convention is therefore practically the electing convention.
If this be so, we are faced by the fact that our public officials instead of being elected by a majority of the voters, as is fondly supposed, are elected by a minority of a minority of a majority. And in case the election is determined by a plurality vote or a sufficiently large number of voters have absented themselves from the polls, the candidate is elected by a minority of a minority of a minority.
[page 143]
I do not mean that the minority who have this power can use it autocratically.
They must keep before themselves constantly the qualities of their candidate that would promote or mar his popularity. They must nominate a man who, as they say, is "available." But within this limit, unless the popular interest has been aroused by some unusual emergency, they have a wide field of autocracy.
Such a system results inevitably in the selection of weak and inefficient officers and representatives. They are not necessarily corrupt, and taking the country as a whole, they are very rarely corrupt. But they are tools and figure-heads. Confining ourselves to the case of representatives and councilmen, let us notice more fully the reasons why inefficient men are chosen. In the first place, the area of choice is arbitrarily limited. It is a universal principle in elective constituencies, that the larger the area over which an election district extends the more distinguished and capable are the candidates of all parties. In all districts representatives must be chosen from the ranks of the party that happens to be in the majority in the given district. It is wholly improbable that the able men of a party will be distributed about one by one in the small districts where the party has its majorities. But even were they so benevolently disposed, the chances are against their being nominated by their party convention.?. The political managers must have men who will do their bidding.
At the same time, the election of candidates is subject to the dictation of cliques. Especially in close districts and wards, a compact faction bent on its own aggrandizement, can often name a candidate, or at least prevent the nomination of an outspoken and capable candidate. The influence of the saloon element in city and state politics is well known to depend on the power that their close organization and their unscrupulous selfishness give them over the party leaders in the nomination of candidates.
Besides factions within the party lines, there is in the closer districts always to be found a number of voters who hold the balance of power between parties. Hence candidates must placate them. Now it is the characteristic of the greatest of party leaders that they raise up about themselves a body of strong admirers and a body of equally vigorous haters. Consequently we seldom find in American politics that a great party leader can be elected in a close district. This principle comes out distinctly in the election of the U.S. President.
Those men who have achieved the highest honours in the leadership of their party, in the halls of congress and in political battles are seldom elected to that high office. They are not often even nominated. If nominated, they are almost sure of defeat. Unknown and obscure men are hunted out and given the place that in the affections and admiration of the party voters belonged to others. The real leaders must be content with appointive positions.
The same principle operates far more inexorably the further down we go to the lesser and lesser districts. When we come to ward politics we reach the very lowest extreme of political ability and the very highest power of greedy factions.
It is well known that when a party leader has achieved prominence either in the state legislature or congress, the entire resources of the opposite party throughout the state or nation are thrown into his limited district to achieve his defeat. These extraordinary exertions are usually successful, if the district be in any way a close one. Many an eminent leader in Congress, after serving a few terms and acquiring familiarity with the rules, and then becoming the recognized leader of his party, has been defeated in his district.
In this way the Democrats lost the able services of their great tariff leader, William. K. Morrison. And too how the Republicans lost their brilliant tariff leader, Wm. McKinley, Jr.
Only in the case of a man like Blaine or Garfield, who happened to live in an overwhelming Republican district, could the leaders be kept in the public stations where their services could redound to their party and their country.
This is the main reason why our legislative bodies are composed of inexperienced men.
A careful analysis of state legislatures in the U.S. will likely show that in every election at least one-half the representatives are new men, with no legislative experience.
An actual count of the Indiana legislature of 1893 shows that in a house of 100 representatives there are sixty-three men who are there for the first time, sixteen men who were serving their second term, twelve men their third term, one man his fourth term, and one man his fifth term.
[page 144]
It is well known that the American House of Representatives is becoming more and more a body of one and two term men. In the 53rd Congress, out of a membership of 353, there were 133 new men, 78 men serving their second term, and only 142 — i.e. 40 percent — who were serving their third term and upwards.
Throughout the country it may be asserted, in all legislative bodies, the laws of the people are made by a majority who have never had any previous experience in law-making.
[The power of the Speaker of the House, and the power of the lobby]
This is the explanation of two most significant facts in American legislative government, the power of the Speaker of the House, and the power of the lobby.
The American Speaker, unlike the English and Canadian, is a man of dictatorial power. In the national government he is ranked next to the President. He appoints the committees, lays down the rules and controls legislation. The reason for this is the same as that which explains the power of a tribal chieftain or an imperial Caesar: the ignorance, incapacity, and faction of his subjects. Now, leadership is essential wherever a body of men are compelled to act in concert.
But there are two kinds of leadership.
One is that of ability, merit and enthusiasm, where the followers have confidence in their chief and accept his leadership and act in concert with him voluntarily. This is the leadership of Gladstone in the House of Commons.
The other is that of necessity and circumstance, where followers distrust the ability of any leader they may choose, where they distrust their own ability to follow. Therefore they consent to the abdication of self-government and the elevation of a tyrant. This is the leadership of the American party Speaker.
Perhaps the main reason for the supremacy of the Speaker is the lack of acquaintance that exists among the members of the legislative bodies. This is due to the short terms, and the fact already shown, that one half to two-thirds of the membership of the lower house are new men. They come together for the first time in their lives. They have never met before and perhaps have never heard of one another. They know nothing of the qualifications of each. If they should keep the control of affairs in their own hands there would be nothing but wrangling and wire-pulling over the appointments of committees, and then factions and mutiny on account of the final appointments.
The only escape from this evil is in the power of the Speaker.
If our representative bodies were composed of able men, if their terms of service were longer, and their legislative experience and acquaintance wider, if the natural party leaders were not excluded from their midst by a petty district system of election, then the representatives would claim for themselves the powers that they bestow upon their autocrat. They would appoint their own committees, control their own rules, make their own laws, and the Speaker would be simply a moderator instead of a dictator.
Though the Speaker has a unique dominion, there is another power in U.S. Legislatures and the U.S. Congress still more ominous — the lobby. It is the lobby that controls legislatures today. If any law that is demanded by the people at large or even by a majority of the legislature, is defeated or emasculated, its fate can be traced to the dominating influence of the lobby.
The lobby is a new feature of representative government. It is coincident with the very recent growth of large private corporations. It is organized in their interests. These corporations have such immense interests at stake on the turn of legislation that the lobby with their unlimited resources at its disposal is practically irresistible.
But the lobby could not have acquired its powerful influence were it not for certain qualities, or lack of qualities, in the legislative bodies that place them at lobby's mercy.
It is a mistake to suppose there is a large amount of corruption. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists mainly because of inexperience and incapacity. The lobbyists themselves are the shrewdest, brightest and most influential men of the state or nation. They often control the party spoils. An ambitious legislator cannot afford to antagonize them. The lobby is organized far better than the legislature itself It has its great chiefs who band together.
All of the corporations interested in legislation practically combine as a unit. Then these able and honourable chiefs employ their resources of argument and suggestion with individual legislators and before committees. They fully size up every individual who is in their way. But if their honourable methods are inadequate they turn the legislator in question over to the lobbyist who carries the pocket-book. Their own hands are clean.
[page 145]
The power of the lobby is found mainly in the fact of the party machine. The lobbyists are usually the managers of the machine. They control state and national party spoils and offices. They have the political future of individuals in their hands. They are the actual leaders in party politics. There must be leadership somewhere. The only question is, shall the leaders be elected to the legislature by the people or shall they control the legislature from outside as mere irresponsible private citizens? As long as the people are prevented from electing the leaders they wish to positions of responsibility, there will surely arise these self-constituted leaders whose shrewdness gives them control over the weaklings and hirelings who are actually elected.
The lack of leadership on the floor of the legislative bodies is shown also in the fruitless bickerings and factious combinations which so often prevent a legislature from accomplishing any results. A party in the majority needs to be held together through confidence in some leader or leaders. But their forces are often scattered and legislation is blocked.
It is needless to say that this is the prime opportunity for the lobby.
[The District system and gerrymandering]
The district system too, exalts local interests above the general interests of the state or nation. Legislation is too often a mere exchange of favours between localities. Perhaps the most glaring weakness and injustice of the district system is the opportunity it gives a majority party to wholly crush out and disfranchise the minority.
This is seen flagrantly in the "Gerrymander." But even where the system is employed with the fairest of intentions, it is almost wholly a matter of chance whether the opinions of the people shall be justly expressed or not. This danger was not imminent under the earlier conditions of representation, as has already been shown, when electoral districts were natural units and the problem of representation was the federation of local communities. But now that party lines are drawn through the midst of every community, it nearly always happens that one party gains in the elections an unjust proportion of representatives at the expense of others.
From the theory of the matter it may be shown to be possible to exclude minority parties altogether and to give the entire legislature bodies to the minority. Suppose a legislative body is to be composed of forty members elected from forty districts, and that the popular vote at large of the two political parties stands respectively 120,000 and 100,000. If the districts are so arranged as to have 5,500 voters each and the parties happen to be divided in the districts in the same proportion as they are divided at large, we should have in each district a vote respectively of 3,000 and 2,500. All of the forty candidates of the majority would be elected, and the minority wholly excluded. An extreme result of this kind, though it seldom occurs, is not unknown.
Again it may happen, and often does, that a minority of the popular vote obtains a majority of the representatives. This can happen in the example described when parties are divided in several districts as follows:
Party A.
Narrow majority in 25 districts, 2,800 x 25 = 70,400 votes.
Minority in 15 districts, average 1,973.33 x 15 = 29,600 votes
Total 100,000 votes.
Party B.
Minority in 25 districts 2,7000 x 25 = 67,500 votes.
Large majority in 15 districts 3,500 x 15= 52,500 votes.
Total 120,000 votes.
Where a system offers in theory such fruitful opportunities, it is too much to expect party managers from using it.
[page 146]
As a result, the district system, in conjunction with party politics, has resulted in the universal spread of the gerrymander. It is difficult to express the opprobrium that ought to be heaped upon so iniquitous a practice as the gerrymander. Its enormity is not appreciated, much for the same reason that a brutal prize fight is not reprobated, provided it be fought according to the rules. Both political parties practise it, and neither can condemn the other. They simply do what is natural, make the most of their opportunities as far as permitted by the constitution and the system under which both are working. The gerrymander is not the iniquity of parties, it is the outcome of the district system.
If representatives are elected by districts, there must be some public authority for outlining the districts. And who shall be the judge to say where the line shall be drawn? Exact equality is impossible. Who shall set the limits beyond which inequality shall not be pressed? Every distribution act that has been passed in this or any other country has involved inequality. It would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such an act and give the advantage of the inequality to the opposite party. Consequently every distribution act involves more or less of the features of the gerrymander.
The gerrymander consists simply in constructing districts in such a manner as to economize the votes of one's own party by giving them small majorities in a large number of districts, and cooping up the opposition party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of districts. This may involve a very distortionate and uncomely shaping of districts, and the joining together of distant and unrelated localities into a single district.
Such was the case in the famous original distribution act of Governor Gerry of Massachusetts, whence the practice obtained its amphibian name.
But it is not always necessary that districts be cut up into distortionate shapes in order to accomplish the unjust results of the Gerrymander. A map of all the congressional and legislative districts of the U.S. would by no means indicate the location of all the outrageous gerrymanders. In fact many of the worst ones have been so well designed that they come close within all constitutional requirements. They are made of compact and contiguous territory and have each a population as nearly equally divided as could be expected. The truth is, that the district system itself is so vicious that constitutional restrictions cannot keep it within just bounds. The U.S. Congress has attempted to do so by requiring that districts for congressional representatives must be compact and of contiguous territory and of nearly equal population. But the law is everywhere disregarded.
Parties are compelled to disregard it, for a gerrymander in a Democratic state can be nullified only by a gerrymander in a Republican state.
As a result of the district system, the House of Representatives in congress can scarcely be entitled to the honour of a representative body. It has never had a representation in proportion to the popular vote of political parties throughout the country. At some elections a minority of the people have returned a majority of the representatives. This was most strikingly true of the noted 51st Congress in which a Republican majority of three enacted the famous prohibitory tariff. That this tariff was opposed by a majority of the people is evidenced by the popular revulsion that at the next election returned a majority of 119 overall and a majority of 128 over the Republicans. Such a political avalanche must have had deep causes, and these causes are well shown by the following table taken from an article by Mr. Stoughton Cooley in Belford's Magazine for December, 1891. It shows that the Acts of that Congress were the work of a minority of the people.
[page 147]
Fifty-First Congress, 1889-1891.
[Table of figures not included in this reiteration]
This estimate is made upon the basis of the Presidential vote for 1888. There Democrats got 5.5M and Republicans 5.4M, giving, when allowance is made for minor parties, the Democrats 49 percent, and the Republicans 48 percent of the total vote.
Instead therefore, of a Republican majority of three and no representatives of the People's party or the Union Labour party there should have been seven representatives of the latter two parties and a Democratic majority of two overall.
[page 148]
The unparallelled revolution that took place in the composition of the next Congress giving the Democrats a majority of 128 over the Republicans likewise displays the fortuitous consequences of the district system. The Democratic minority of 49.9 percent of the membership of the House was changed to the Democratic majority of 70 percent.
But in the popular vote the Democratic proportion of 49 percent of the total was changed only to a proportion of 55 percent of the total. In this 52nd Congress there were 99 Republicans, 227 Democrats and 9 Independent and Farmer's Alliance men, giving the Democrats a majority of 119 overall. If the popular strength had been truly represented the Republicans would have had 141 members, and the Democratic majority would have been only 39. As it was, 168 Democratic votes, giving a majority, were elected by 15 southern states and the gerrymandered states of New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Indiana, where representation was a follows:
In New York, 500,395 Democrats sent 23 representatives, and 421,403 Republicans sent 11 representatives.
In New Jersey, 128,417 Democrats sent 5 representatives and 114,808 Republicans only two.
In Ohio a minority of 350,528 Democrats sent 14 representatives, and a majority of 360,624 Republicans sent only half as many.
In Indiana with a congressional vote of 239,858 Democrats and 216,766 Republicans sent 11 Democrats and only two Republicans. Consequently in this state one Democratic vote at the polls was equal to five Republicans.
If representation had been proportional, New York would have sent 18 Democrats and 16 Republicans, New Jersey 4 Democrats and 3 Republicans, Ohio 10 Democrats and 11 Republicans, and Indiana 7 Democrats and 6 Republicans.
John M. Berry has pointed out that in the 52nd Congress "less than half who voted at the North secured 202 of the 211 representatives from that portion of the country," and that "3,172,999 citizens elected 107 representatives, a majority of the 332 in Congress from all the states, both North and South. 3,301,692 who voted in 167 northern districts failed to elect any...
One half the northern representatives were elected by less than a quarter of the northern voters. More than twice as many who voted in the same states did not elect even one...
In the northern states 2,703,976 votes elected 167 representatives, a majority of Congress from the North and South, while 3,420,246 in the north voting at the same time could not elect even one."
In the 53rd Congress, 1893-95, if we take the presidential vote as a basis of comparison, we get the following results:
The Democrats with 46 percent of the vote secured 61 percent of the representatives, and a majority of 79 overall whereas they should have lacked 28 percent of a majority. The Republicans with 43 percent of the votes get only 33 percent of the representatives; the People's Party with 8 percent of the votes have only 2 percent of the representatives and the Prohibitionists with 2 percent of the votes get no representative though entitled to eight.
The injustice of the district system is seen strikingly when we observe its effects on new parties or minority parties. Such parties suffer for two reasons. In the case of the dominant parties there is a rough equality, because a Democratic gerrymander in one state is likely balanced in another by a Republican gerrymander. But a new party cannot establish a gerrymander to suit itself until it gets control of a state government. Also a new party is usually scattered throughout a large number of districts and states, and the district system prevents them from combining to elect their fair share of representatives.
[page 149]
For example, in the 51st Congress the Prohibitionists should have had five representatives and the Union Labor party should have had three, whereas they received none, and in the Fifty-third Congress the People's Party should have received thirty-one instead of only eight, and the Prohibitionists should have received eight instead of none.
Endless examples might be given from individual states to show the unrepresentative character of Congressional Representatives. Those states that are close in their political majorities, and whose legislatures alternate frequently, show an endless see-saw of gerrymanders.
Ohio has perhaps had more of these partisan displays than any other state. It was during the U.S. Civil War that the first Republican legislature overthrew a long standing Democratic districting act, the results of which were brought out forcibly by Mr. Garfield in a speech in Congress in 1870.
Garfield said: "When I was first elected to Congress in the fall of 1862, the state of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 20,000. But by the adjustment and distribution of political power in the state there were 14 Democratic representatives upon this floor and only five Republicans. The State that cast a majority of nearly 25,000 Republican votes was represented in the proportion of 5 Republican representatives and 14 Democrats. In the next Congress there was no great political change in the popular vote of Ohio — a change of only 20,000 — but the result was that 17 Republican members were sent here from Ohio and only two Democrats.
We find that only so small a change as 20,000, changed their representatives in Congress from 14 Democrats and 5 Republicans to 17 Republicans and two Democrats.
"Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a system that may in theory, and frequently does in practice, produce such results as these."
The Republicans retained power in the Ohio legislature until 1876 with a consequent unfair advantage in the distribution of Congressional seats. In 1876 a Democratic legislature passed a new re-districting act. Since that time there have been eight re-districting acts, the results of which upon the fortunes of the two parties are [seesaw alternation of victors. This is clearly shown in the historical record. The worse case of injustice is the 51st Congress where 16 Republicans and five Democrats were elected, while proportionately the result should have been 11 Republicans and 10 Democrats, the two parties receiving almost the same number of votes. This yielded disproportionate ratio of representation: each Republican voter had the power of three Democrats.]
The following from a writer in the Atlantic Monthly, April 1892, brings out pointedly some of the inequalities of the present system.
The apportionment of 1880 gave to Kansas seven representatives, which is at the rate for one for 14.3 voters in each hundred. In 1882, the Democrats of that State polled 32 percent of the votes cast for Congressmen but failed to elect one. In 1884, they mustered 37 percent of the votes cast, but it availed them nothing. In 1886, they rolled up 40 percent of the votes without breaking the solid Republican delegation. In 1888, they polled 32 percent votes cast, with the same result. Not since Kansas was admitted to the Union have the Democrats of that State had a representative in Congress, though they have polled at the different elections from thirty to forty percent of the votes cast.
Minnesota tells the same story. There being five representatives from that State, twenty votes in each hundred should have one seat. But the Democrats, in 1882, cast 40 percent, and in 1884, 41 percent without effect. In 1886, owing to the curious make-up of these same districts, they elected two representatives, with a vote of 39 percent; in 1888, a vote of 41.2 percent availed them nothing.
"That this result is not due to climate, altitude or the innate depravity of the Republicans, Kentucky or any other Democratic State can testify. In 1876, the Republicans of Kentucky polled 35 votes of every hundred cast for Congressmen, but failed to elect one of the ten Congressmen, though ten votes in the hundred should have been sufficient to elect one. The same party, in 1878, cast 29 votes of every hundred, without effect. Since that time the Republican vote has ranged from 32 to 40 in the hundred, securing them sometimes two, but more often one representative.
In 1890, the Republicans of Missouri polled 40 percent of the total vote, but failed to elect one of the fourteen representatives from that State. Almost forty out of every hundred men voting cast their ballots for Republican candidates, and the whole was thrown away, though a trifle over seven in the hundred should have been sufficient to elect one.
The Republicans of Indiana, in 1890, cast 46 votes in every hundred and elected two of the thirteen Congressmen; 46 percent of the vote secured them 8 percent of the representation.
In 1888, Republicans in Michigan, with 50 percent of the vote, had 82 percent of the Congressmen. In 1890, it cast 45 percent of the votes and got but 27 percent of the representation. A loss of five percent of the vote lost the party 55 percent of its representation."
In Missouri the Democrats elected the entire contingent of 14 representatives, though the popular vote stood: Dem, 253,736; Rep., 184,337; Union Labour, 23,492.
In Indiana, in 1892, the Democrats cast for Congressmen 259,190 votes and elected eleven Congressmen; the Republicans cast only 5,522 less votes, namely, 253,668, but elected only two Congressmen. It required 126,834 Republican votes to elect one Congressman against only 23,565 Democrat votes. In other words, one Democrat vote was worth 5.4 Republican votes. The Democrats casting 47 percent of the total vote secured 81 percent of the representatives, and the Republicans, with 46 percent of the vote secured only 15 percent of the representatives. The smallest majority received by any Democrat candidate was 42 votes, the largest was 3081, whereas the smallest majority received by a Representative candidate was 4,125, and the largest was 8,724.
The inequalities of the district system are not at all confined to the U.S., though it is doubtful whether in any other country there have been such wide opportunities for the manipulation of the system. The following table, kindly furnished by the Statistician of the Dominion of Canada, through the request of Mr. Sandford Fleming, will show that the relative popular weight of parties is not represented in the Dominion House of Commons:
[page 151]
CANADIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1891 AND 1887.
[table of numbers not fully reproduced in this reiteration]
total voters increase percent increase
over previous el. [over previous election]
1887 993,914 190,327 24
1891 1,132,201 138,287 14
Total votes/seats Gov't vote/seats Opposition vote/seats Maj for govt Maj for opp.
1887 725,056/215 370,342/125 354,714/90 15,628 (net) -------
1891 730,457/215 378,355/123 352,102/92 27,153 (net) 539
Average majorities
Gov't Opposition
1887 307 351
1891 476 230
Number of members elected with majorities under 100
Govt Opp.
1887 34 25
1891 28 22
Number of elections by acclamations
Govt Opposition
1887 4 4
1891 5 2
It will be seen that in 1887 52 percent of the voters elected 57 percent of the representatives and that the government majority of 31 should have been reduced to a majority of 9, the proportionate representation being 112 to 103. In the election of 1891, the government majority of 35 should have been only five since the true proportion with the reference to the popular vote was 110 to 104. In this election 51 percent of the voters elected 59 percent of the seats.
Says Dr. Sandford Fleming regarding these two elections (Address at Queen's University, 1891): "The government had on this occasion (after the election of 1887) the largest support given to any administration since Canada became a Dominion. Yet including every vote polled for government candidates who were defeated at the elections the supporters of the administration represented only 39 percent of the whole body of the electors. The opposition members represented 37 percent of the whole, counting also the votes polled for the defeated candidates on their side. Thus it became perfectly obvious that a large majority of the people, whatever party may rule, has no part whatever through representatives in the administration of public affairs. In the case referred to 61 percent of the whole body of electors had no share in the government of the country.
The administration was supported by the representatives of 39 percent. It was opposed by those of 37 percent in every measure carried in the house by a party vote, leaving as a net balance the representatives of only 2 percent of the electors to determine legislation, to settle the policy of the government, and to speak and act for the nation, with the whole weight and supreme authority of parliament.
I have presented no extreme case. If we take the results of the recent general elections (1891) it will be found that the number of votes cast for government candidates was only 33 percent of the electors, and the government's net majority in the House represents but 1.5 percent of the total number of voters on the list."
[page 152]
[England]
Some interesting results for England are given by Sir John Lubbock in his excellent little book, Representation. (The Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 1890.)
In the parliamentary elections of 1886, there were contested 460 seats. "The total number of votes given were 2,756,900, of which 423,500 were for Unionist, 1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a majority of 90,000 voters for maintaining the Union. According to the general votes polled, the number of members returned without a contest – 111 Unionists and 99 Home Rulers – would have given overall result of 349 Unionists and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of 29. The actual numbers, however, were 394 Unionists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, therefore obtained 45 seats more and the Home Rulers 45 fewer seats than they were entitled to from the votes polled, making, of course, a swing of 90 seats.
Then, in 1874 Conservatives obtained 38 seats more than their votes entitled them to, counting a swing of 76. In 1880, on the contrary, Liberals had forty-four too many, counting a swing of 88...
Thus whatever side has the majority, we are confronted with a violent contrast between the voting strength in the constituencies and the voting strength in the House of Commons. (Lubbock, Representation, "Preface")
"In my own County of Kent," continues Sir John Lubbock, "Liberals polled in the three divisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes, against 16,000 given to the Opposition. Yet the Opposition had all the six seats. Taking all the contested seats in the county, the Liberals polled 32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conservatives carried 16 members and the Liberals only two. (Lubbock, Representation, p. 17)
"At the general election in Ireland in 1880, 86 seats were contested. Of these the Home Rulers secured fifty-two, the Liberals and Conservatives together only thirty-four. Yet the Home Rule electors were only 48,000. The Liberals and Conservatives together were no less than 105,000... If the winner of the uncontested seats were estimated, the results would remain the same." (Lubbock, Representation, p. 19)
In the Italian elections of 1884, the popular vote stood in the proportion of 1.85 for the government to 1 for the opposition, but the representatives in the Chamber of Deputies was 519 for the government to one for the opposition.
[in all countries the people are not actually represented in their legislative assemblies.]
These election results are enough to show that in all countries the people are not actually represented in their legislative assemblies. This is true whether the gerrymander is employed or not.
Perhaps, taking a nation as a whole, the gerrymanders of the U.S. do not affect the average result, since, as already shown, both parties practise it, and the work of one is offset by that of another. The inequality lies in the very nature of the district system of election.
[U.S. state elections]
State legislatures show even greater inequalities in the constitution of their legislative bodies than do national legislatures.
Mr. Berry summarizes the vote in Massachusetts as follows: At the state election of 1892, 162,028 votes elected 35 out of 40 senators, while 166,776 votes were cast for defeated candidates and 89,391 votes (less than one-fourth of those cast) elected 21 senators, a majority of the 40. 116,708 Republican voters elected 25 Republican senators while 119,045 Democratic votes failed to elect the Democratic candidates for whom they were cast.
The Democratic vote was 165,606, and 10 Democratic senators were elected. Thus an average of 16,560 votes were required to elect a Democratic senator. The Republican vote was 185,479, and 30 Republican senators were elected. Thus an average of only 6,182 votes was required to elect a Republican senator.
[page 153]
A Republican vote was therefore worth more than 2.66 as much as a Democratic vote. A change of less than 1.5 percent of the vote in 21 districts from the candidate elected to the next larger candidate would have elected he latter, and a majority of the senate would then be made up from the opponents of the candidates actually elected. A similar change of 6.25 percent in all the districts would have defeated every senator elected and made his opponent a senator."
[municipal elections results also disproportionate]
Municipal elections give results equally disproportionate with state and national. The Chicago elections for aldermen in 1891 were as follows:
Total Votes Elected Proportional portion of seats
Democratic 1167,024 21 15
Republican 63,721 11 14
Socialist 3114 0 1
Independent 4495 0 1
U.C. 1308 0 0
C.D. 14022 1 3
In the actual results of the election it required 3191 Democrats to elect one alderman, 5793 Republicans and 7011 C.D., while Socialists and Independents were wholly deprived of their rightful share of representation.
All these statistics go to prove conclusively the excessive inequality and minority domination of the present system wherever applied. But we have not yet reached he end of the story of minority rule under this system. We must enter the legislative halls in order to see the final chapter. To say nothing further of the rule by the speaker of the House and by the legislative committees by which power is taken out of the hands of the assembly itself, there is on all party question the imperium in imperio of the party caucus. If one party in a legislature has 60 representatives with the 40 but the majority party withdraws and in secret conclave determines by a majority vote what shall be its united action. Thus 35 members - a majority of the 60 - may determine the policy of the legislature and enact the laws of he people.
This is no fanciful sketch. The power of the party caucus is well known. A man who "bolts" the caucus can have no influence whatever in legislation. He is sure to have several measures of his own that he is anxious to have enacted into law. There may be appropriations of money for improvements or for state or national institutions in his own district. They may be measures or they may be bad. But he knows that in order to carry them he cannot afford to stand out against the wishes of his fellow party caucus. He cannot stay out of the caucus, and when he enters the must agree to abide by its decisions. To say that legislature are deliberate assemblies under such circumstances is the keenest of irony. They are rather war-camps.
Deliberation involves consultation between opposing interests and opinions and the development of a compromise policy that will be modified more or less by all who have a voice.
But the caucus rule, dominated in the interests of the party rather than of the people, begets intolerance and the overriding of minorities. The party emerges from its caucus like an army from its fortress, runs upon he enemy, listens to no cry for quarter or compromise, beheads its own deserters, and then carouses over its own victory.
Chapter IV. The General Ticket [Block Voting]
Enough has been said to show the army of evils that spring from the single district system. These evils have not escaped observation, and various attempts have been made to modify them. Especially in France have very interesting experiments been made by the substitution of "Scrutin de Liste" or the "General Ticket" [AKA Block Voting].
[page 154]
Under this method each constituency elects several members, each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected, and those candidates are declared elected whoso votes stand at the head of the list. In this way the majority party gets the entire list and the minority is wholly unrepresented.
There are two applications in this system that lead to important differences in the final results.
1. The first has been adopted in several instances in the U.S. in the election of Boards of county commissioners and Boards of Education, where the entire legislative assembly is elected on a single ticket [at-large]. With such a system the question of equal representation plays no part whatever. The minority parties are without a single representative. But the system usually results in the election of abler men than the district system. This would naturally be expected from what has already been said on this point.
[Under the General Ticket and at-large elections] a party in making nominations for a large area cannot afford to nominate obscure men. For example, the city of Cleveland, Ohio recently introduced, by the sanction of the state legislature, far-reaching reforms in the system of public schools, one feature of which was the abandonment of the district system of electing the school board and the adoption of the general ticket. In the elections that followed, it is acknowledged on all sides that far abler men were nominated by all parties, and the new boards have been remarkably superior in quality to the old.
But the results have been as follows (figures being given for the 1892 election):
Republican. Democratic.
Buss 15,714 Dodge 13,661
Boutelle 15,595 Goulder 13,551
Backus 15,385 Pollner 13,306
House 15,860 Ryan 12,851
Daykin 16,198 Burke 12,814
McMillan 15,690 Hoffman 12,777
Ford 16,036 Plent 12,804
Total 110,518 Total 91,764
It will be seen that the Republicans obtained the entire board. Had there been a change of only 1,000 to 2,000 votes from Republicans to Democrats, the Democrats would have carried their entire list.
The Cook County (Illinois) Commissioners are elected on a general ticket with the result that in 1892, the Democrats with a vote of 133,000 elected their entire list, and the Republicans with 100,000 voters were unrepresented.
2. The second application of the general ticket is a combination of the district and the general ticket [Block Voting and multi-member districts]. Districts are made larger and a solid delegation of from 5 to 20 representatives is sent to the legislature, representing of course only the majority or plurality party of their district.
For example, the County of Cuyahoga (including the city of Cleveland) sends repeatedly a solid delegation of six Republicans to the Ohio slate legislature, and not one Democrat.
The county of Hamilton (including the city of Cincinnati sends a solid delegation of nine Democrats.
Representatives to Congress in the first half century of our constitutional history were elected by this system. Each state sent to Congress a solid delegation of one party or another, elected either by the state legislatures or by popular vote. So unjust did it prove to be that gradually the single[-member] district system was substituted by individual state action. Finally in 1842 Congress made the latter obligatory on all the states.
Presidential electors [the electoral college?] are still elected by this system. The state of Michigan made in the election of 1892 a notable departure by substituting the single[-member] district system.
The legislature of 1893, however, controlled by the opposing party, has repealed the law and returned to the general ticket [in multi-member districts].
It will, of course, be observed that a legislative body elected upon this basis will not wholly exclude a minority party. [TM: Alberta examples of Block Voting show variety of results, some mixed and some elections of solid slates.]
Indeed, the experience of France seems to show that as far as equality of representation is concerned, the general ticket -- scrutin de liste — is as good as the single[-member] district ticket — scrutin d'arrondisement.
[page 155]
[French Block-voting elections]
In the election of members to the [French] Chamber of Deputies in 1885, conducted on scrutin de liste the Republicans with 4,300,000 votes obtained 366 seats, whereas their numbers entitled them to only 311, while the conservative-monarchists with 3,550,000 votes obtained 202 seats against their rightful proportion of 257. The general ticket was abandoned in 1889, after the trial of only this one election. The French method at present is the same as that of other countries.
But the general ticket is wholly erratic and vicious. Sir John Lubbock gives the following account of the Belgian election in 1884 based on this method (Lubbock, Representation, pg. 29-31). According to him, the chamber is elected in sections.
In June, 1884, 52 seats were contested with the following result:
Results of the Belgian Elections of June, 1884
Anti-MINISTERIALISTS. MINISTERIALISTS.
Voters Members Voters Elected
Bruxelles 9311 16 7924 0
Louvain 2340 5 1244 0
Nivelles 1655 4 1568 0
Bruges 1658 3 1024 0
Ostende 572 1 556 0
Ypres 1182 3 690 0
Arlon 240 0 334 1
Harche 282 1 229 0
Neuchateau 331 1 286 0
Virtors 293 0 301 1
Dinant 818 2 502 0
Namur 1825 4 1522 0
Phllippeville 605 2 536 0
Anvers 6818 8 5405 0
Total 27,930 50 22,117 2
According to their just proportion, the Anti-Ministerialists ought to have carried 30 seats out of the 52, but they actually secured all but two.
This election took place in June. In the following month, the same constituencies had to elect representatives in the Senate. Warned by their recent defeat, the Ministerialists exerted themselves to the utmost, and polled 6,000 more votes. This increase, small as it was, turned the scale, and this time they secured 19 seats out of 31.
Results of the Belgian Elections of June, 1884
Anti-MINISTERIALISTS. MINISTERIALISTS.
Voters Members Voters Elected
Bruxelles 8969 0 9517 8
Nivelles 1552 0 1650 2
Gand 3926 4 3547 0
Ostende 569 1 548 0
Soiguies 1365 2 1246 0
Charleroi 2728 0 2855 3
Ath 895 1 875 0
Leige 2477 0 3800 4
Huy 596 0 658 1
Verviers 1803 2 1620 0
Namur 1746 2 1558 0
Arlon 560 0 593 1
Total 27,186 12 28,467 19
[page 156]
Thus the city of Brussels in June sent all its 16 members to oppose the Government in the Chamber; while in July it sent its eight senators to support them; so that it is now represented by 16 Conservatives in the Chamber and eight Liberals in the Senate.
Nor are results of this character at all unprecedented; for instance, in the elections of June, 1882, 29,142 Liberals secured 39 seats, while 28,052 Conservatives only carried 11.
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This essay continued in blog entitled "Fleming - Essays on Rectification of Parliament. Part 6 - Essay No. 11 by "Equality" Part C."
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