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Tom Monto

Political stability, strong economies and PR -- links to info

References

Birchfield, Vicki and Crepaz, Markus (1998). “The Impact of Constitutional Structures and Collective and Competitive Veto Points on Income Inequality in Industrialized Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 34: 175-200.

Carey, John M. and Hix, Simon (2009). “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems. PSPE Working Paper 01-2009. Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Jason Clemens, Taylor Jackson, Steve LaFleur, and Joel Emes (2016). Electoral Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. For the Fraser Institute: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/electoral-rules-and-fiscal-policy-outcomes.pdf

Alfano, M. & Baraldi, A. (2015). Proportional Degree of Electoral Systems Growth: A Panel Test. Rev. Law Econ. 2015; 11(1): 51–78.

Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006). “Electoral Systems and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. American Political Science Review 100-2: 165–81.

Knutsen, Carl (2011). “Which Democracies Prosper? Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Economic Growth.” Electoral Studies 30: 83-90.

Lijphart, Arend (2012). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale Press.

Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg (2013). Multi-party government, fiscal institutions and public spending.The Journal of Politics, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Aug. 28, 2013), pp. 953-967 (15 pages). Nooruddin, Irfun (2011). Coalition Politics and Economic Development. Credibility and the Strength of Weak Governments. Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa (2011). Making Democratic-Governance Work: The Consequences for Prosperity. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP11-035, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Orellana, Saloman (2014). Electoral Systems and Governance: How Diversity Can Improve Policy Making. New York: Routledge Press. Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido (2008). Electoral Systems and Economic Policy. In the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford University Press. Roberto Perotti ; Massimo V. Rostagno ; Gian M Milesi-Ferretti. (2001). Electoral Systems and Public Spending. IMF Working Papers.


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from

Fair Vote Canada info


PR and economic growth and debt

...some recent papers have studied the influence the electoral system on the composition of government spending. Specifically, they looked at single member (one winner takes it all) systems and multi-member (proportional) districts. Here is how Perssons and Tebellini put it (2008):

Multi-member districts and proportional representation diffuse electoral competition, giving the parties strong incentives to seek electoral support from broad coalitions in the population through general public goods or universalistic redistributive programs (e.g., public pensions or other welfare programs). In contrast, single-member districts and plurality rule typically make each party a sure winner in some of the districts, concentrating electoral competition in the other pivotal districts. Both parties thus have a strong incentive to target voters in these swing districts.

  • Reinforcing the findings of more income redistribution in countries with proportional representation, multiple researchers (Birchfield, Vicki and Crepaz, Markus (1998), Iversen, T., & Soskice, D. (2006), Lijphart (2012), have found lower levels of income inequality in countries with proportional systems. a

  • It is important to note that unlike many of the List PR systems in Europe (most of the OECD), the proportional models proposed for Canada all retain local MPs elected by voters in specific ridings and regions. They do not include any MPs accountable only to voters in the country as a whole. Thus the incentives for local MPs to advocate targeting spending locally would be expected to continue in Canada. a

  • Research by Persson and Tabellini – summarized by Clemens and Jackson for the Fraser Institute – and by Perotti, Rostagno and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) found that countries with proportional systems had higher government spending overall (not just on social expenditures). Increased spending in countries with coalition governments has been showing to be related to the number of parties in government (the more parties in a coalition, the more spending). This research is often cited by opponents.However, research by Martin and Vanberg (2013) challenge the traditional findings that more parties in a coalition mean more spending. In their study of 15 European democracies over 40 years, they show that budgetary rules can “eliminate expansionary pressures on spending”. For example, determining from the outset that the budget will be (X dollars) means that if one Ministry wants more money, it has to come out of another Ministry’s budget. In terms of winner-take-all vs proportional systems, they conclude:

  • “Our results demonstrate that at least for fiscal measures, there is no trade-off involved. Appropriate fiscal institutions can lead coalition governments to behave in budget making much as single member governments do. “

  • Despite the findings that countries with proportional representation spend more, there is currently little difference in overall spending between OECD countries using proportional and majoritarian systems.

Deficits and Public Debt

  • Orellana (2014) finds that countries with more proportional electoral systems and more diverse party systems may actually tend to have lower budget deficits (higher surpluses) than countries with first-past-the-post systems and less diverse party systems. He finds that the projected national debt is 65.7 percent higher in majoritarian countries than in those with fully proportional systems. a

  • Previous research by Perssons and Tabelline (2003), as cited by Clemens et al. for the Fraser Institute (2016), had come to a different conclusion, finding higher deficits and debt in countries with proportional sytems. Orellana, argues that Perssons and Tabellini’s research was flawed due to the way they classified the electoral systems of certain countries.

  • For example, Greece, an extreme outlier with a very large debt load, was treated as a country with a proportional system by Perssons and Tabellini. However, Greece’s system works more like a majoritarian system, by giving the party with the most seats a considerable winner’s bonus (currently 50 seats out of 300 in total). a

  • Carey and Hix (2010 – London School of Economics) make the same point about Perssons and Tabellini. They find that moderately proportional systems with an average number of seats per region between 5 and 9 did better than both majoritarian and highly proportional systems.

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