Here are some pithy excerpts from a few old-time and recent Australian PR texts, showing how FPTP wastes votes and produces disproportional results.
then lower down, I provide an answer to the questions "Is it more difficult to get quota of votes under STV than to be elected in a single-member district?
Do candidates have to work harder in the larger district to be elected?"
the texts talk of STV (what they call the Hare-Clark system) but the same analysis applies to any system that uses fair voting and either multi-member districts or some pooling of votes that elects multiple members.
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"In a single-member preferential voting electorate with a long history of voting Labor, a Liberal voter may feel little relationship with the local MP. In that voter’s case there may well be no acceptance that an election has reflected community views.
On the other hand, Hare-Clark, in which either five or seven MPs are returned in each Tasmanian electorate, has never failed to return some Liberal and Labor MPs in each.
Green members have also been regularly elected since the 1980s.
In years past, a number of Tasmanian independent MPs have been elected, though none since 1982"
from Inglis Clark’s Other Contribution A critical analysis of the Hare-Clark Voting System by Scott Bennett
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The chief merit of the Hare system is the large electoral division, permitting the units of any body of opinion as large as a quota to unite and obtain a member. from Bibliography of' Proportional Representation. 1913. Piesse, E. L.
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[The backbone of] the Hare system, as a whole, is not the mere mode of preference and transfer vote to which general attention is too often restricted. The latter aids are important no doubt, but of themselves they can only be regarded as valuable accessories of the Hare system. The keystone of the Hare system, upon which commonly too little or no attention is directed, is the Hare-constitution of large electoral divisions. Without the latter, all the nice arrangements of first, second, third, &c, preferences, and transfer of quota-excesses and lowest excluded candidate votes, would be a cumbrous farce. ... (page 72) It cannot be too strongly emphasized, therefore, that the chief causes that tend to produce and perpetuate unfair and unequal representation are (1) inequalities in the magnitude of the population of the various electoral divisions, and (2) the unnecessary multiplication of artificial boundaries, restricting unjustly the voting force to too narrow an area, and thereby preventing the necessary and fair combination of persons who desire to act together, without which their forces are wasted or misdirected. The following illustration will help to convey more clearly how any great inequalities in the size of electoral divisions, conjoined with unnecessary artificial barrier sub-divisions, may prevent the reasonable combination of the elemental forces, and may even prevent a strong majority within a city from securing representation justly proportionate to their total numbers. Let us conceive the City of Hobart as having 6000 voters, returning six Members to Parliament. On the basis of numbers it is clear, if there were no artificial barriers to reasonable combinations, that any body of persons properly organized could return that proportion of representatives that would fairly correspond with their numbers. But suppose the major party X, constituting two-thirds of the City electorate, to be distributed unequally, and their voting force restricted within the limit of six separate unequal electoral divisions of the City, as in the following illustration, and that for simplicity they are opposed by one other party Y in each division, thus —
X Y total Division A 800 550 1350 local majority elected the one member Division B 1050 300 1350 local majority elected the one member Division C 1200 150 1350 local majority elected the one member Division D 345 355 700 minority support for the winner Division E 320 330 650 minority support for the winner Division F 285 315 600 minority support for the winner 4000 2000 6000 By this curious illustration, it is shown how, notwithstanding its superior numbers in the aggregate, the major party X has been robbed of a fourth of its representative power by the combined adverse circumstances of artificial inequalities in the size or composition of its electoral divisions, and the unnecessary artificial restriction of voting power within each unnecessary artificial subdivision. By such unfair artificial barriers, the major party X — even aided by the wisest organisation —can only return half the number of representatives, whereas, in equity, it should return two-thirds; and, conversely, the minor party Y by such means returns half the number of representatives, when in all fairness and equity they should, under ideally proper conditions, only return two, or one-third. It is the chief merit of the Hare system that it entirely removes all such artificial barriers to just and real representation of the various parties [at least to the extent that any system that uses mutli-member districts eliminates the proliferation of districts]; for, by its abolition of unwise artificial restrictions, it gives full fair play to all the individual forces, and it enables the surplusage of [in] any one division to come to the aid of [a different candidate of the same] party in any other division, so that no vote [or relatively few votes] would form the element of a lost or wasted surplusage. By the Hare system the inequalities of electoral subdivisions are practically rendered equal and harmless. The major party X would in all fairness return four members, and the minor party Y would, in returning two members, be also justly dealt with, as this is the number which in all fairness it has a right to claim or expect. The constitution of [large] electoral divisions is thus shown to be the most important feature of the Hare system, from R.M. Johnston, Observations on the working results of the Hare system in Tasmania election 1897, Papers and proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania (utas.edu.au) (an attachment below)
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from Commonwealth of Australia The Senate Hare-Clark System of Voting https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/HPP022016000028/upload_pdf/HPP022016000028.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%221901%2046%22 (page 4) Let us examine, as far as possible, what different effect would likely have been produced had the State of Tasmania been, for Federal purposes, divided into single electorates. For this purpose, let us reasonably assume that candidates under such circumstances would seek for election in that division that would appear to the candidate to possess the largest body of his own particular following, or in that division where he was most likely to succeed. To make the comparison more fair, it may be desirable, in the interests of the single district sympathizers, to contrast the intensity of local support against all local competitors, with the intensity of first-preference effective votes obtained by all such as against other candidates within the State as a whole. At the last elections for the Senate, the following are the names of the successful candidates, together with the natural order of their precedence, based upon the percentage of the absolute first-preference votes obtained. The result of the preference transfer votes did not disturb this order of precedence, and it goes to show, therefore, that the element of chance in election was practically eliminated, thus;·—
Order of Precedence of Successful Candidates at First Count and after Final Transfer Votes.
First Preferences All Preferences, incl. Transfers.
CANDIDATE Order. Percent. Order of election. The Count when the candidate was elected
Keating ... ... 1 20 1 1st
Clemons ... ... 2 14 2 7th
O’Keefe ... ... 3 10 3 12th
Dobson ... ... 4 9 4 13th
Cameron... ... 5 8 5 14th
Macfarlane ... 6 7 6 14th
Six successful 67 percent of the vote
If we now endeavour to ascertain what the probable result would have been had each candidate been restricted to that single division in which he had the greatest local following, we must make the following analysis :—
Intensity of Local Support within Five Great Divisions where Principal Candidates were most strongly supported.
NATONE—
(Local . Percentage. Percentage
Effective to to
Candidate. Votes) Division state*
O’Keefe ... ... 1,499 32 10
Urquhart ... ... 978 21 6
Keating ... ... 949 20 20
Moore ... ... 405 9 5
Clemons ... ... 243 5 14
All others (10) ... 647 14 44
Total Natone... 4,721 100 percent 100 percent
PARATANA—
(Local . Percentage. Percentage
Effective to to
Candidate. Votes) Division state*
Murray ... ... 581 20 4
Clemons ... ... 478 17 14
Best ... ... ... 477 17 5
Cameron ... ... 420 15 8
Keating ... ... 271 9 20
All others ... ... 630 22 49
Total Paratana ... 2,857 100 percent 100 percent
MANGANA—
(Local . Percentage. Percentage
Effective to to
Candidate. Votes) Division state*
Keating ... ... ... 1,138 31 20
Clemons ... ... ... 1,130 30 14
Cameron ... ... ... 340 9 8
Waldron ... ... ... 237 6 4
O’Keefe ... ... ... 216 6 10
All others ... ... ... 667 18 44
Total Mangana ... ... 3,728 100 percent 100 percent
Intensity of Local Support within Five Great Divisions where Principal Candidates were most strongly supported.
TALUKE—
(Local . Percentage. Percentage
Effective to to
Candidate. Votes) Division state*
Dobson ... ... ... 525 2 9
Keating ... ... ... 396 18 20
Macfarlane ... ... 236 11 7
Clemons ... ... ... 211 10 14
Page ... ... ... 149 7 2
All others ... ... ... 656 30 49
Total Talune ... ... 2,173 100 percent 100 percent
LOINAH—
(Local . Percentage. Percentage
Effective to to
Candidate. Votes) Division state*
Keating ... ... ... 878 26 20
Macfarlane... ... 738 22 7
Dobson ... ... ... 549 16 9
Cameron ... ... ... 348 10 8
Clemons ... ... ... 244 7 14
Patterson ... ... ... 241 7 3
All others ... ... ... 420 12 40
Total Loinah ... ... 3,415 100 percent 100 percent
* [I actually don't know what these columns mean]
From the foregoing analysis, showing the strength of the principal candidates within each of the five great divisions of the State, we may reasonably infer that the candidates standing at the top in each division would be returned for the respective divisions. Keating, though relatively taking an inferior position of order to O’Keefe (1,499), heads the list in two separate divisions (Mangana and Loinah); but as it is probable under such conditions that this candidate would only stand for Mangana, it would have the effect of allowing Macfarlane to be raised into the first position for Loinah.
The position taken up by Clemons by this restriction to one subdivision is very curious and instructive. As this candidate would in all probability stand for Mangana, where it is shown that he had his strongest following, it is likely that he would, as indicated, be defeated by Keating.
This shows how, by the single-electorate system, a candidate who commanded the second-highest-number of followers in the State, and even the third-highest following within a single division, would nevertheless be excluded from the poll;
while a candidate who only took up the eleventh position (Murray) in the single six-member electorate would in all probability be returned for his local division of Paratana,
even though Murray's local following (581) is only about half the number of Clemon’s following in Mangana (1,130), where, in all probability, the Clemon would be defeated by the superior following of Keating (1,138).
from
HPP022016000028.pdf;fileType=application/pdf (aph.gov.au)
(attachment)
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Is it more difficult to get quota of votes under STV than to be elected in a single-member district?
Do candidates have to work harder in the larger districtto be elected?
say we take artificial situation where each of six districts has same number of registered voters (in real life FPTP, there is much variance so very badly unbalanced things happen)
let's compare work involved under FPTP to what happens under STV
where the six districts are grouped together in one 6-member district. (this comparison is something like was done in the above example that used the Australian Senate election)
Even assuming consistent number of voters in each district, districts in this example have varying turnout, just like in real-life.
and percentage of vote received by winners also varies as in real-life. (the range shown in the example is just one of many possibilities - the winner's percentage in past Canadian elections has ranged all the way from 18 percent to 82 percent, so pretty much anything is possible under FPTP.)
FPTP
voters turnout winning tally (anything from 18 to 82 pc of cast votes is possible)
Division 1 100 50 17
Division 2 100 60 30
Division 3 100 55 35
Division 4 100 65 28
Division 5 100 50 25
Division 6 100 55 30
Total 335 total votes 165 effective votes
We see that one person won a seat with just 17 votes. Meanwhile likely there were others in other districts who received more than 17 votes but were not elected. (same as observed in the Australian Senate election above)
FPTP produces unequal results.
each candidate needs to get support of 51 percent of the voters inthe distrcit to have confidence he or she will be elected. and to do so means contacting perhaps each of the voters if turnout is only 50 percent.
MMD STV -- the six districts are grouped and now 1 district elects 6.
say 12 candidates ran. Only top 6 are idientified in example.
A is NDP C and E are Liberal, B, D and F are Conservative
Others of each party and others even Independents, also run but are not elected
600 voters
480 votes cast (80 percent turnout)
quota 69
5 get quota 345
1 wins with partial quota 60
effective votes (vots actually used to elect someone) 405
say candidates get these vote tallies
first count peak votes at the end
A 90 90 69
B 60 75 69
C 50 80 69
D 45 75 69
E 40 75 69
F 35 60 60
totals 320 405
(the other 6 candidates not shown here were not elected)
A won on first preferences lone.
The B, C, D, E candidates received vote transfers and passed quota.
This took an estimated 135 votes of the 160 cast for candidates who were not among six leaders in the first count. the recipients were eliminated and the voters transferred on, sooner or later finding homes among the winners.
F won without passing quota due to the field of candidates thinning to the number of remaining open seats.
in the end 75 voters were not used to elect the winners. about same amount as one quota which is normal
The 160 votes cast for unsuccessful candidates might be placed in relatively large number on a candidate or two (who were not elected)
perhaps G and H took about 40 or 45 votes (tallies higher than E and F's initial vote counts) but they did not get quota and received few vote transfers. They were passed by F and E and never were elected.
or conversely the six elected in the end might all be the most-popular in the first count.
this actually happened when STV was used in 1930 in both Edmonton and Calgary -- the six front runners in the first count all went on to be elected in the end.
but that did not mean the results of STV in Edmonton and Calgary in 1930 were the same as FPTP.
candidates of four parties were among winners in Edmonton;
candidates of three parties were among winners in Calgary,
while under FPTP it is not uncommon for one party to take all the seats in a city -- and one-party sweep has been seen for a whole province even on a couple occasions..
How many votes did the candiate need ot contact?
assuming 80 percent turnout among his supporters (the same rate as the rest of the district), and the fact that the candidate only needs 69 votes to make quota (which would ensure his or her victory)
so he needs to have support from 86 voters to be assured of election.
This indicates that the amount of campaigning a typical candidate needs to do under STV would be slightly less than under FPTP. certainly not more.
Perhaps more importantly is the fairness and the fact that a shift of just 10 percent from candidate to candidate will not decide which party takes all the seats in the district as happens under FPTP.
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