Here are some PR-philosophical notes taken from the 1991 essay "The Debate Over Electoral Systems" by Andre Blais.
"The Debate Over Electoral Systems" by Andre Blais.
(International Political Science Review, (1991), vol. 12, no. 3, p. 239-260
file:///home/chronos/u-7471ce29d386ae6b6c8a0356e0b3c71f1425c61b/MyFiles/Downloads/The_Debate_over_Electoral_Systems.pdf
Basic choice: leadership versus fairness
At-large versus district elections, and if district, single-member district versus MMDs
at-large = broader perspectives = responsibility District elections = diversity = Responsiveness = legitimacy
The major argument in favor of district elections is that it is a "fairer" system, that is, "a city council elected in this fashion is likely to be more "representative" of the municipal population"
said to be an established fact in regards racial representation
[due to small district with strong minority group allowing the minority group to get a seat]
[Monto: but PR produces diversity of representation as well]
At-large said to elect better accomplished and educated members
City councils elected on an at-large basis "see the city as a whole as their proper focus of attention."
The debate over at-large versus district elections is thus basically about the relevance of territorial representation. On abstract grounds, at-large elections would seem to be the "logical" choice. Since the purpose of an election is to select representatives who will have to make decisions for the whole polity, it makes much sense that these representatives be chosen by the entire electorate:
...the idea of districting subverts the concept of a majority. ...
The case for district elections rests on the belief that such a "subversion" is needed in order to represent (minority, territorially concentrated) groups whose voices are unlikely to be heard if elections are held at large.
District elections said to produce fair representation of diverse interests
Monto: However the benefits of District elections can all to a large degree be achieved with PR. diversity for sure
(although a local candidate can win a local contest with very, very small percentage of overall vote which is unlikely under PR.
But such victories may be un-proportional because the small group was not proportionally due a seat anyway.
Other times, a local candidate who ascribes to a large thinly-spread voting block can win a local contest and be a representative for that otherwise un- or under- represented section of the electorate.
But such a section of the electorate would get representation under PR anyway.
Local elections are easily seen to be not responsive when there are safe seats or when the member is elected with the support of just a minority of voters.
legitimacy of such systems is more from tradition than any inherent benefits of the system itself.
SMDS versus MMDs
SMDs == closer ties between members and constituents
Blais: Single-member districts provide not only closer ties between representatives and constituents but also, and more importantly, greater accountability.
Greater accountability.
There is one individual who is expected to defend constituency interests and who can be held responsible if those interests are not well protected, whereas in multi-member districts that responsibility is diluted among many MPs.
Monto: The individual member might be expected to defend constituency interests, but if he or she is elected by minority of votes, where is accountability?
and if the member is elected by minority of voters, does he or she truly represent the majority of voters on general policy or wider issues?
Accountability does not mean anything when the majority of district voters did not choose the representative in the first place.
What is the case, then, for multi-member districts?
fairer representation of various groups, especially minority ones
greater flexibility (easy to change number of seats) and stability (as to dimensions of the district)
smaller districts = smaller districts = closer rep to voter ties
smaller districts = one rep per district = greater accountability
MMDs = better rep. of minority groups = responsiveness
MMDs = stable districts = simplicity
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Monto: In Canadian PR history,
Edmonton went from 5 to 6 to 5 to 6 to 7 with no change in district boundaries (other than changes caused by changes to city corporate limits)
Calgary went from 5 to 6 to 5 to 6 with no change in district boundaries (other than changes caused by changes to city corporate limits)
St. Boniface (Manitoba) went from one to two with no change in district (at least it seems to me that the change was done with no change in boundary)
other times that the number of members changed was due to the district being divided into two or more single-member districts, with no change to area covered
or other times the area covered was changed at the same time that SMDs were created.
(This is difficult to assess as comparing district boundaries is time consuming, due to having to access and reference old maps)
or other times SMDs were brought in at same time as total number of members are changed. as compared to the total number of members in the old district.
in 1958 the 7-member Edmonton district was broken into SMDs and representation of the city was changed to nine MLAs elected in nine SMDs.
Sometimes a MMD is divided into two or more MMDs, either with change in total number of members or not.
In 1949, Winnipeg went from ten members elected in a city-wide district to three districts each electing four. Thus the districts were changed and the total number of members elected in the area covered by the old district was changed as well.
Likely the one change caused the other. Winnipeg needed more members and a DM of 12 was thought to be too large so division of the old district was thought necessary.
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The values involved are numerous, such as, stability PR is stable (coalitions are long-lasting in power, stability PR is stable -- if 15 percent of the vote shifts, only 15 percent of the seats shift, not about a third of seats due to shift of just 8 percent of the vote (as happened in the 2019 Alberta election) stability MMDs are flexible (easy to change number of members without changing district boundaries) so district boundaries can stay stable leadership At-large said to produce leadership accountability, SMDs said to produce accountability [although I doubt that] fairness MMDs with fair voting said to produce fairness [SMDs by themselves cannot produce fairness] legitimacy District elections said to produce legitimacy, through responsiveness produced through representation of diversity legitimacy PR produces legitimacy through incorporation of diverse viewpoints. Such legitimacy should ensure political harmony and order. responsiveness District elections = diversity = Responsiveness* [responsiveness = PR also produces responsiveness but gauged perfectly in proportion to shift in votes (which means almost always a slight shift of votes means slight shift of seats. Seldom is there a vast shift in votes)] responsibility At-large elections produce responsibility ("When representatives are concerned first and foremost with the problems of their own districts, as they seem to be in the United States (Williams, 1985) and Ireland (Farrell, 1985), there is great risk of collective irresponsibility." [But at-large elections produce responsible governments] * Monto: actually FPTP is sometimes quite responsive. Sometimes a change of just 8 percent or so (or different vote splits) determine a different party is government. (Alberta 2019 election) Other times despite a drop of popularity from 60 percent or so of the vote to 45 percent or so of the vote, or even more of a drop, the same party is elected. (1979 to 1989 Alberta election) That list has striking similarities to the list of the general and specific functions of representation, elaborated by Birch (1971: 107-108). According to Birch, the general functions of representation are: popular control, leadership, and system maintenance; the specific ones include responsiveness, accountability, peaceful change, leadership, responsibility, legitimation, consent, and relief of pressure. These similarities highlight the fact that the debate over electoral systems is very much about what democratic representation is or should be.
Monto: As Dennis Pilon puts it, PR is democratic, and any opposition to PR is basically opposition to democracy. =============================
Ill-founded charge against STV
"Also by contrast, single transferable vote (STV) method electoral systems can enable large majorities of voters to elect candidates of choice, but its complexity often forces voters into guessing who they elect with their votes. "*
[A voter doesn't have to guess who he or she has helped elect. Either one (or more) of that voter's choices were elected or they were not. About 80 percent or more of the voters will see one or more of their choices elected. Whether or not his or her vote was used to elect any of those choices is not important.]
* from online website named "Overlapping election district system"
https://electiondistrictsvoting.com/
"STV electoral systems.
Small multiple-member district (few representatives per district) electoral systems ensure large proportions of voters fail to elect preferred representatives.
For example, two-member districts ensure about 33% or less of all voters fail to elect a preferred representative.
[Most STV elections elect five or more members so then we see a smaller proportion not used to elect anyone.
Five-member districts ensure about 17% of all voters or less fail to elect a preferred representative. I would not call that a "large proportion of voters"]
Again like FPTP, this election failure rate result creates a disincentive to vote.
By contrast, large multiple-member district (many representatives per district) electoral systems can ensure very large proportions of voters elect preferred representatives.
But the big problem with high election rate STV electoral systems is complexity. This complexity may discourage people who yearn for simplicity from voting."
[actually voting under STV is no more difficult (usually) than FPTP. It is the counting of the votes that is moderately complex.]
...
"The average election rate is obtained from a series of past state elections in New South Wales and Queensland in Australia where the method of voting is ‘Optional Preferential Voting’. Also, of further interest in New South Wales and Queensland, about 57% of the total valid vote of voters tends to express a voting preference for elected members of the legislative assembly."
[I'll look into these numbers -- they seem small to me.]
Meanwhile the writer assures the reader that the Overlapping District Election system will see about 94 percent of votes cast used to elect someone. [I am not convinced that piling three-member districts on top of each other will have that effect.]
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