"to PM Justin Trudeau, Plea for STV in federal elections"
Tom Monto
August 6, 2019
(I never received any response to this letter)
Dear Prime Minister,
RE: A plea for STV in federal elections
If you want to change from the First past the post (FPTP) system but don't want to go to proportional representation, a dual system of Single Transferable Voting and Alternative Voting is what you are looking for. Extreme parties cannot find representation under this system unless they have significant support. This was proven in the dual system's use in Alberta and Manitoba provincial elections from the 1920s to the 1950s.
In those provinces Single Transferable Voting (STV) was used in Edmonton, Calgary and Winnipeg to elect multiple candidates in whole-city districts. Alternative Voting (AV) was used in relatively sparsely-settled areas outside those cities. In those areas, it was thought unworkable to use districts large enough to have multiple seats, an essential element of STV.
STV was used with success in Edmonton, Calgary and Winnipeg to elect MLAs from the 1920s to the 1950s. Under STV, for a candidate running in Winnipeg to be elected, he/she had to receive more than nine per cent of the city-wide vote, unless proven to be the most generally acceptable of the remaining candidates at the end of the vote counting process (more on that below). In Edmonton and Calgary, a candidate to be elected had to receive more than 14 percent of the city-wide vote, or be proven to be generally acceptable at the end.
The low figure of nine per cent of the city-wide vote compares favourably with the proportion of votes required to take a seat under FPTP. This takes say 40 percent of the vote in one district of say six districts in a city, thus about six per cent of the city-wide vote.
Under proportional representation to take a seat a party must have a third of a percentage country-wide to take one seat of 300 in the House of Commons. A threshold of this small amount spread over the whole country would allow candidates of extreme sentiment to take a seat.
Single Transferable Voting works this way:
Candidates run in multiple-member districts, electing usually 3 to 7 members in a district.
Each voter casts a single vote but marks back-up preferences on the ballot.
The ballots in a district are counted and sorted. Some votes elect one or more candidates on account of specific support. The surplus votes not needed by the winners are transferred. Some go to candidates of the same party to further create proportionality of representation. Some go to candidates of other parties. These votes plus others transferred from eliminated low-ranking candidates are used to elect the best of the rest through formed consensus among the remaining voters.
Most of the MLAs elected under STV in Edmonton, Calgary and Winnipeg were elected through formed consensus, thus did not belong to extremist parties. Also because STV is a candidate-based voter-driven system, voters in those cities had the liberty to choose which candidates were elected in each party (they were not constrained by party lists) and freely choose the specific ones they preferred, not necessarily the top ones chosen by the party. As per a rule of politics, most voters are not as extreme as members of a party so would vote for the less-doctrinaire, the one most appealing to the greater masses, if given the liberty. Under STV they have that liberty, when a party runs multiple candidates in each multiple-member district.
Alternative Voting
Starting about 1924 while STV was being used in provincial elections in Edmonton, Winnipeg and Calgary, Alternative Voting was used in single-member districts in the sparsely-settled rural areas of Alberta and Manitoba. Under Alternative Voting, like under STV, a voter casts a single transferable vote and but unlike STV only a single representative is elected in each district. To be elected to a district's single seat, a candidate must have a majority of the votes cast in the district, either through first preferences or after vote transfers form a consensus. This prevents an extremist candidate getting elected - unless he has the support of the majority of voters in a district, which would make him not an extremist, by definition.
-----------------------------------------
Establishing a dual STV/AV system
All voters, even those voting in districts with multiple seats, would be given only one vote each, a vote that is transferable so that it is not usually wasted - if it can't go to to the first preference marked on it, it is transferred to another candidate whose combined votes (evidence of formed consensus) signify his or her general acceptability and whom it then helps to elect (or is transferred again).
No more seats need to be installed in the House of Commons. Under the dual system, each province could elect the same number of MPs as it currently elects. However, simply increasing the number of MPs (even if continuing to use the existing FPTP system) would tend to increase proportionality of representation by increasing representation of substantial minorities, now under-represented in FPTP. The following suggestions are based on using the existing number of MPs.
For STV, multiple-member districts must be formed by merging present ridings into larger groupings, easily done in the cities. Other districts not suited to mergers would use the Alternative Voting system. New federal electoral districts, preferably Multiple-Member Districts (MMDs), single-member districts where necessary, could be formed in these ways:
Within a medium-sized city: merging the existing ridings of a city to form a new MMD covering the whole city. This simple expedient probably works best if the city currently elects no more than seven MPs. A MMD with 10 members (covering a whole city formerly divided into 10 ridings) though is workable - 10 members were elected under Winnipeg's STV - but would suffer from ballots containing 30 to 50 names and time-consuming counts of the 300,000-plus ballots. Voters would rank candidates from across the city and elect MPs who would represent the whole city.
Within a large city: merging four to seven existing ridings of a city to form a new MMD covering a large section of the city. The number of MM districts, and the number of MPs elected in each, would be calculated to equal in total the number of seats the city currently elects. Voters would rank candidates in only their MMD and elect MPs to represent that section of the city.
Outside the cities dealt with above:
In each province, ascertain the area size of the largest riding. Then look at the other ridings in the province and combine adjoining pairs of riding (the most densely-populated smallest-sized ones) whose combined area is less than the size of the largest. Perchance, if the area of many adjoining ridings does not exceed the largest riding, then they could be combined, and the new MMD given the same number of seats as previously.
The justification being that if a riding of that size area works for one MP it can work just as well for two or more MPs. The benefit being that in a two-seat MMD, any voting block of 34 percent within the MMD can take a seat, thus securing minority representation to that degree. To take both seats a single party would need 67 percent. Under FPTP a single party can take two seats in two adjoining ridings with far less than 67 percent of the total vote. A single party in 2015 took the seat in Interlake and the one in adjoining Selkirk with only 49 percent of the combined vote, for example.
For the largest ridings, the ones larger in area than half the area size of the largest, no change in boundary would be required. The only change would be that each voter would cast one preferential ballot, thus creating Alternative Voting.
The range in area size of the current ridings is phenomenal. One riding in Manitoba covers more area than all the other Manitoba ridings put together. It seems radical but makes logical sense to merge all the ridings in the southern part of the province, except Winnipeg, into one MMD. With modern transportation and the burden of representation shared among five MPs, the workload should be just as sustainable as the work of the MP who represents more than half the province by him or her self.
STV's larger size MMDs makes it possible for more flexibility in drawing the boundaries. As much as possible, they should be drawn to conform to boundaries of existing administrative units such as counties, townships and parishes and adjoining small urban municipalities. Fairly equal representation would be created by allocating variable number of seats to each MMD as per the population size. This has the benefit of reinforcing local identities and preventing gerrymandering.
Some rural municipalities are populous enough to elect more than one MP. Each of these would encompass an entire MMD and elect more than one MP, allowing STV to operate.
Others are only populous enough to have one seat. Alternative Voting should be used there - to ensure that a candidate would have to have the support of a majority of the voters in the district to be elected.
Some sparsely-settled counties and rural areas (those with less than about 64,000 voters) would have too few voters to elect even a single MP. They would have to be combined with one or more other adjacent rural municipalities/small urban centres to assemble a properly populated district, where preferential ballots would be used to create Alternative Voting (or STV where population warrants multiple MPs and excessive area size is not a problem). None of these new ridings should be larger in size than the largest existing ones.
------------------------------------------------
In whatever fashion the new MMDs would be formed, or even if the existing ridings are continued with no change, voters could be taught to use preferential ballots. Their use, in STV in MMDs or in Alternative Voting in single-member districts, ensures that to be elected a candidate must be generally acceptable, thus preventing extremist electoral successes, while in addition STV ensures representation of substantial minorities and AV ensures majority-controlled elections.
Even if STV is brought in only where its adoption is easiest, in the medium-sized and large cities, it would be a boon to representation of substantial minorities, a major goal of proportional representation.
STV achieved fair minority representation in Edmonton and Calgary during its use. For example in 1955, seven opposition (Conservatives, Liberal and -ers) and six government (Social Credit) MLAs were elected in the two cities, fairly proportional to their first preference votes. This was a fairer result than the single opposition and 15 Social Credit MLAs elected in the two cities in 1959, after the two MMDs were broken down into single-member districts and STV was replaced by FPTP. Under STV substantial minorities were sure of representation, very popular parties were sure of sizable representation, all were sure that no one party would take all the seats (no one party ever took more than 60 per cent of a city vote in first preferences, thus none came close to being owed all the seats and never was one party given all of them).
Substantial minorities, if substantial enough, receive fair representation under STV. A Communist was elected in Winnipeg in many STV elections, in accordance with his popularity among voters, as but one of ten Winnipeg MLAs. This representation under STV in accordance with popularity provides faith in the system, and historically has been used as way to defuse a potentially-violent situation arising from an even contest between two sections of the population, such as Labour and management in Winnipeg in 1920, Catholics and Protestants in the Republic of Ireland about the same time)
On the whole, extremists learn that under STV they have little chance of being elected and in the 1950s did not even bother running in Edmonton. In its entire history of use in Edmonton, all elected candidates belonged to the big three parties (Liberals, Conservatives and ), to the provincial governing party (the United Farmers, then the Social Credit), or to an anti-SC Liberal/Conservative fusion party. Extremist Independent candidates did run, Communists did run, but none were elected in Edmonton under STV. Even unpopular candidates belonging to the big three parties were passed over by the voters. But their votes were not wasted, they were transferred to their back-up preferences helping elect the most generally acceptable of the remaining candidates.
Preferential (transferable) votes, under both STV and AV, prevent most of the waste of votes that plagues FPTP elections. In the 1948 Edmonton STV election only 17 percent of the votes did not go to help choose successful (generally acceptable) candidates. About that same number went to elect a candidate by first preferences; the other 66 percent were unsuccessful in electing their first preference but they were not wasted but were transferred to elect the best of the rest of the remaining candidates, according to the personal choices of the voters who formed themselves into combined consensual voting blocks through the marked preferences on their ballots.
Some of the waste occurred through voters not marking sufficient preferences. This showed their lack of concern once they had to pick and choose far past their first preference and indicates their perfectly human lack of interest at this point, a point far past the sensitivity practised under FPTP. As the field narrows, and more votes are "exhausted," candidates were elected with less than the nine or 14 percent quota mentioned above. However for a candidate to hang on to the end he/she must be generally acceptable, so this lower threshold never allowed an extremist candidate to be elected in Canada's STV experience nor never could.
Reducing the wastage of votes by the use of preferential voting, under either STV and AV, makes the electoral system appear considerate of the voters and produces results that are democratic, inspiring good candidates and reducing voters' feeling of ineffectualness. Often it inspires higher voter turn-out.
Earl Grey, who gave us the Grey cup, was an advocate of STV. Sir Richard Cartwright, the longest-serving MP in the House of Commons was a strong advocate - he preferred the term proportionate representation, for STV does not produce exact proportional representation but does ensure democratic generally acceptable representation. Labour, farmer, veterans groups of the 1920s all called for it. The Liberal MP of Red Deer in the 1910s was a strong advocate.
STV does not guarantee success for any one party - it only ensures that a party will be represented in rough proportionate to its popularity or general acceptability proven through formed consensus as per preferences marked on the ballots.
Another important reform could be having voters place two preferential votes, one ranking local candidates and one ranking parties they would like to see in power. A system that would have this, the Double Democratic System (DDS), combines district-level STV-AV elections and a Majoritarian system at the government-power level. It would be a Mixed Member system if circumstances require. This Double Democracy system is described below.
Double Democracy
In this dual-vote system, voters would place two votes, one in each of two sections of the ballot, Section A and Section B. In Section A, the voters' preferential vote would be used to help elect an MP – elected through STV in multi-member districts or in single-member sparsely-settled districts by the Alternative Vote (ensuring majority support in the district to be elected).
In Section B a voter's second vote would be used to help determine which party would be put in majority power in the House of Commons. The vote would be a preferential one. Vote transfers would be used if no party has a majority of First counts, as under Alternative Voting to determine which party is the most generally acceptable. Then additional representatives of the majority-supported party would be elected, if needed, to bring its representation to more than half the seats in the House.
The party chosen in the first preference in Section B is likely to be the same as the party of the candidate that he/she ranked in first place in Section A but not necessarily. The dual system allows the voter to vote for an independent, for example, in his district and then to signify his preference for a party to compose the majority of seats in government overall.
If a party takes the majority of the votes it likely already has a majority of the seats and no change to the composition of the House would be required. But if it does not have a majority of seats additional members would be added to bring the party's representation up to more than half the seats.
If no party had majority in the First Count, transfers would be made as under Alternative Voting to determine which party was more generally acceptable. Once the party with the most general acceptability is determined, further members could be elected (from party lists) to give that party a majority in the chamber, if it does not already have it.
The party with the majority of the votes should be ensured a majority of two members. This ensures that the preferred party has a majority even after appointing the Speaker of the House, a feature of the Canadian parliamentary system.
DDS would not ask too much of the voters – they generally know which local candidates and which party they most prefer and a couple of back-up preferences. Usually (but not always) the party label of a voter's first choice for the district candidate and his first choice for the party in power would be the same. The voter would have liberty to mix and match.
Marking back-up preferences in Section A or Section B would be optional, and the lower preferences used as under Alternative Voting only if necessary, as safeguards against unfair representation.
The Section B vote would be a safeguard against the vote being split and allowing an unpopular party to ascend to power. As a by-product, the Section B part of the election would prevent the possibility of a government having only a minority of the seats. This would settle a charge often held against STV and pro-rep governments - that it creates weak minority governments.
Under DDS tidea of generally acceptable representation that is the backbone of the Alternative Voting system would be extended to the overall effect of the election. Just as under Alternative Voting only one representation is elected in each district so in an election only one party will form government. Alternative Voting ensures that the district representative must have majority support to be elected. The Section B vote ensures that a party must have majority support to form government.
The Section B vote could be simplified by only listing the six most-popular parties (as calculated from district elections from the previous election to start with and then using the last Section B First Count vote total after the system has been used once.). The Section B majoritarian government goal could instead be achieved by reference to the vote for the local MP. If a voter gives first preference to a local independent candidate with no federal prominence, that could be skipped and his/her First Preference allocated to the highest-preferred major party.
Some voters may be more concerned that either of two parties form government (rather than the alternatives) than if a certain one of the two is elected. But without majoritarian government safeguarded, vote-spitting can put the alternative into power, instead of either of the other two, the voters' preferred result.
While proportional representation can allow representation to an extreme party, STV and AV does not. While the first past the post system can give prominence to an extreme party in a minority government situation, the Double Democracy system prevents that - to be government a party must be at least generally acceptable to the majority of voters, and minority governments are impossible. (Perhaps by-elections could be refigured so as not to foil the will of the majority in an evenly-divided House.)
A dual system of STV and AV, with or without an increase in the number of MPs and/or the majoritarian government safeguards of the Double Democracy system, allows flexibility to the voter, ensures responsiveness to changes in voters' sentiment and protects us from extremist representation. I think they would address many of the problems currently plaguing Canadian elections.
Thank you for your attention.
Most respectfully,
Tom Monto
コメント