Fleming, Essays on Rectification of Parliament (1893)
Introductory notes (by Tom Monto, 2020)
Sandford Fleming is best remembered as the inventor of standard international time zones but he was also a proponent of electoral reform.
In 1893 he was the motive force in the collection and publication of essays on the subject of rectification (correction ) of Parliament through more fair elections.
These essays were submitted in response to an appeal made by Fleming in 1892 for essays on means of "Rectification of Parliament."
He explained that he thought the House of Commons needed rectification because
- election through districts splits and divided voters
- the two-party system forced many voters to suppress their natural instincts and channel their vote to the least evil, and then a majority of a party that holds a majority of the seat, perhaps with only a minority of the vote, then dictates to government.
As there was a cash prize for the winners, the authors submitted their essays under pseudonyms. This makes the table of contents look quite odd.
The identity of the author can be surmised in at least one case. There is little doubt that the No. 10 essay, submitted by "Southern Cross," was submitted by Catherine Helen Spence, a key-person in the drive to proportional representation in Tasmania and Australia. She happened to be travelling through Canada at the time Fleming was collecting essays and it seems presented him with a written copy of her usual - but convincing - Pro-rep promotion speech.
The identity of the ultimate winner was not stated in the essay collection as published and is not known at this time.
(Actually Spence reported that she spent part of her visit in San Fran to write up the essay, and no winner was ever announced.
She also said that Alfred Cridge also submitted an essay. Perhaps he is Pacifico? He was living in San Fran, on the U.S. west coast, at the time.)
Fleming - Essays on Rectification of Parliament. Part 1 contains the Intro and Essays 1-5.
Part 2 contains Essays 6 to 9
Part 3 contains Essay No. 10 by "Southern Cross " [Catherine Helen Spence].
Part 4 contains "Essay No. 11 by Equality Part A", the first half of the essay by "Equality"
Part 5 contains "Essay No. 11 by Equality Part B", the last half of the essay by "Equality"
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Essays Received in Response to an Appeal by the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament
Table of Contents
1. Real Majority page 1
2. Nulla Vestigia Retrorsum [a Torontonian, perhaps Robert Tyson] page 6
(which translates as “We never go backward” or “No steps backwards.)
3. "Dignus Vindice Nodus" page 8
1891 Canadian federal election page 12
(Draft) An Act Respecting the Election of members of the HofC of Canada page 18
4. "NEW OCCASIONS TEACH NEW DUTIES" page 25
(Appendix) An Act to Provide for Referendary Voting page 31
5. Spero Meliora page 32
6. Canadian Home Rule... page 39
"Act relating to the Electoral franchise ..." page 45
7. "Per Asperam ad Astra" page 50
what is representation? page 50
following essentials: page 51
changes required page 53
BILL TO REFORM THE SYSTEM ... page 55
8. In Deo Spero page 57
The Representation Act page 68
9. Pacifico page 71
CHAPTER I. A PRIORI NEGATIVE DEMONSTRATION page 71
Chapter II. A Posteriori Demonstration; The "Majority Rule" Myth page 72
Chapter III. Direct Legislation page 74
Chapter IV. The Cumulative Vote page 77
Chapter V. The Free Ticket or List page 78
Chapter VI. The Preferential Plan page 79
Chapter VII. General Considerations page 83
10. Southern Cross [Catherine Helen Spence*] page 90-
Chapter I. Importance of the Subject page 90
Chapter II. Method of Voting and Formation of the Quota page 96
Chapter III. Objections Answered page 100
Chapter IV. Effective Voting page 106
Chapter V. Palliatives - The Initiative and the Referendum -
the Imperative Mandate - Direct Legislation page 111
Chapter VI. The Gove System
Chapter VII. The Danish electoral law
Chapter VI. Conclusion page 113
Chapter VII. DRAFT BILL FOR THE PROVINCE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA page 117
Appendix I. [STV elections in Australia] page 120
Appendix II. [filling up a vacancy] page 121
(*on page 95 the writer identified herself as a daughter of early town clerk of Adelaide, which Spence was)
11. Equality [a U.S. writer] page 122
[CHAPTER I Introduction]
CHAPTER II The Failure of Legislative Assemblies page 139
CHAPTER III The Single-membered District page 141
CHAPTER IV The General Ticket page 153
CHAPTER V Proportional Representation page 156
A BILL For the Election of Congressional Representatives by Pro-rep page 157
Defence of the proposed bill page 162
why should a minority party be excluded when its vote is less than 85 p.c. of quota.
In the first place, exact justice is impossible. ...
Provision made to prevent an elector from losing any of his full number of lawful
votes
CHAPTER VI ADVANTAGES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION page 165
1. Pro-rep recognizes the nature of modern political problems page 165
2. The bill proposed is as simple as any that has been offered for effecting this kind of reform page 166
3. Pro-rep is eminently elastic in its adaptation to changes in population page 166
4. the justice and equality of pro-rep page page 166
5. Pro-rep promises independence of the voters and freedom from rule of the party machine page 167
Broda Count
6. Pro-rep brings into legislative assemblies able and experienced men, the true leaders and representatives of their parties and the people page 173
two features of proportional representation that permit the voters to discriminate between individuals, and to hold them, instead of parties, responsible page 175
We have a sham representation. page 175
7. Pro-rep would purify elections by removing the most potent of inducements for bribery and corruption. page 176 8. Legislatures would become deliberative assemblies instead of arenas for party strife.
page 176
Two objections against pro-rep:
it would do away with party responsibility
give a small minority the balance of power, enable them to dictate
legislation.
solutions to clear moral issues could be compromised with benefit to all classes
and individuals page 179
Chapter VII Conclusion page 182
Appendix - (relating to "Defence of the proposed bill" page 162) page 183
[end of book = page 184]
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Essays Received in Response to an Appeal by the Canadian Institute on the Rectification of Parliament
ESSAYS ON THE RECTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT.
ESSAYS
RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL BY
THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE ON THE Rectification of Parliament
TOGETHER WITH THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL OF THE
INSTITUTE OFFERS TO AWARD ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR PRIZE ESSAYS.
TORONTO THE COPP, CLARK COMPANY, Limited. 1893
MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNCIL.
Early in the present year a letter was received from a member of the Society, Dr. Sandford Fleming, bringing to the attention of the Institute the importance of an enquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral and parliamentary system, with the view of averting The many evils now attending it.
[He appealed to the Institute as a body which, while non-political in its corporate character, is representative through its members of all shades of opinion. The object expressed was to awaken an interest in a difficult problem, which vitally concerns the whole community, in the hope that some practical and beneficial solution may be obtained.
The Council has had the matter under serious consideration for some time.
Meanwhile an old friend of the Institute, deeply impressed with its importance, [and the great public need of a satisfactory solution, has placed at the disposal of the Council the sum of one thousand dollars to assist, as far as possible, in the attainment of the desired end.
The matter was formally brought before the Institute, at a largely attended meeting, on the 20th February last, when after the reading of Dr. Fleming's communication and the discussion on the "Note" attached, the following resolution passed with substantial unanimity:
"That the generous offer of a friend (who does not wish his name to be known) to contribute the sum of $1,000 to aid in obtaining a satisfactory solution of the problem referred to in Dr. Sandford Fleming's paper, be accepted with the best thanks of the Institute, and that the Council be empowered to take the necessary steps to obtain essays or treatises, and award the premium to the best workable measure, which, if made law, would give the whole Canadian people equal representation in Parliament, and each elector due weight in the government through Parliament."
The Council thereupon appointed a special committee to carefully weigh the whole subject, and consider how best to deal with the matter and carry into effect the wishes of the meeting and the authority and trust conferred on it by the Institute.
[page VI] MEMORANDUM.
After many meetings and conferences, the Council has adopted the recommendations of the special committee, and now appeals to every member of the Institute and to all thoughtful persons within the Dominion, for their assistance in obtaining a complete solution of the problem.
While the Institute addresses Canadians as being specially interested in the good government of their own land, the prize competition is extended to all persons of whatever country, on equal terms, as set forth in the conditions issued herewith.
Canadian Institute, Toronto, April 4th, 1892.
Arthur Harvey, President. Alan Macdougall, Secretary.
CONDITIONS On which The Canadian Institute offers to award prizes for essays on "electoral representation and the Rectification of Parliament."
The sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) has been placed at the disposal of the Council of the Canadian Institute to be awarded in whole or in part by the Institute for the best workable measure (Bill or Act of Parliament which, if made law, would give the whole Canadian people equal representation in parliament and each elector due weight in the Government, through Parliament.
The Council of the Institute accordingly invites essays on Electoral Representation and the Rectification of Parliament, accompanied by a draft bill applicable to countries with a Parliamentary System similar in general features to that of Canada.
The essays will be received by the Council before the first day of July, 1893. As the Transactions of the Institute are printed in English, it is desirable the essays should be in that language. They are to be signed with a motto, and the name and address of the writer are to be enclosed in a sealed envelope, endorsed with that motto; the whole under one cover, to be addressed to: ELECTORAL [etc.]
The said envelopes to remain unopened until final adjudication by the Council of the Institute.
The Council will immediately after the 1 July 1893 examine all the Essays received....
The Council proposes that one award be given of not less than $500, and others proportional to the merits of the works submitted.
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[1.] THE REAL MAJORITY. [page 1]
An Act Providing for the Election of the Members of the House of Commons
by Means Of Proportional Representation.
Whereas, the present method of electing members to the House of Commons fails in its purpose of securing the representation of the real majority, Therefore Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
1. That for purposes of representation in the House of Commons
the Province of Ontario shall be divided into four districts, as nearly equal in population as may be, each of which districts shall elect twenty-two members;
The Province of Quebec shall be divided into three districts, each of which shall elect 21 members;
the Province of Nova Scotia shall constitute one district, and shall have nineteen members;
the Province of New Brunswick shall constitute one district, and shall have thirteen members;
the Province of Manitoba shall constitute one district, and shall have six members;
the Province of Prince Edward Island shall constitute one district, and shall have five members;
the Province of British Columbia shall constitute one district, and shall have four members;
the Province of Alberta shall constitute one district, and shall have three members.
2. That the members of the House of Commons shall be voted for at large in their respective districts.
3. That any body of electors in any district that polled at the last preceding parliamentary election votes to the number of one half a quota, as hereinafter determined, or that shall be endorsed by a petition of voters amounting to one half such quota, may nominate any number of candidates not to exceed the number of seats to which such district is entitled in the House of Commons, and cause their names to be printed on the official ballot.
4. That every voter shall vote as a whole such ballot as he may choose, designating thereon the names of the candidates whom he most prefers.
5. The sum of all the ballots case in any district shall be divided by the number of seats to which such district is entitled, and the quotient to the nearest unit shall be known as the quota of representation.
6. That the sums of all the ballots cast by each party or political body nominating candidates shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, and the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the number of representatives to which each body of voters is entitled; and if the sum of such quotients be less than the number of seats to be filled, the body of electors having the largest remainder after division of the sum of the votes cast by the quota of representation, as herein specified, shall be entitled to the first vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled.
7. That the candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates and found entitled to representation under the foregoing rules shall receive certificates of election in the order of the votes received, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes the first certificate, and so on; but in case of a tie with but one vacancy to be filled, the matter shall be determined by lot between the candidates so tied.
8. That if a member of the House of Commons shall die or resign, or his seat become vacant for any reason, the remainder of his term shall be served by the candidate of the party or political body to which he belongs who received the highest number of votes of those not receiving certificates and belonging to such party or political body.
Ballot [page 2]
Conservative.
John Smith.
J.L. Roberts,
F.C. Jones.
R.L. George.
B.C. Blanks.
Joseph Budd.
Horatio Todd.
Simon Black.
J. Hopkins.
Geo. Sterne.
G.C. Albright.
H.L. Wills.
Geo. L. Green.
X Liberal.
J.L. Peters.
Judah P. Dicky.
A.C. Markin.
F.H. House.
H.C. Jenney.
X Hugh Josephs.
John Jacobs.
X Farlin Quit.
X Moses Soloman.
X Wm. Dixon
Thos. Brown.
Geo. Smith.
Hamilton Judd.
Reform
Joseph E. Upright.
Hamilton Steed.
Richard Black.
John Wilson.
H.D. Henderson.
The accompanying ballot shows a convenient form for carrying into effect the quota system. The voter marks a cross in the square opposite the name of the party he wishes. If he has any preference among the candidates that are named on that ticket, he puts a cross in the square opposite those names. Different voters will of course have different preferences, and hence the votes will vary.
Take as an illustration the vote of New Brunswick, which may be supposed to amount all told to 76,420 votes. Dividing this by the number of seats, thirteen, to which that province is entitled, it is found that the quota is 5,876. That is to say, if 76,420 votes are to have thirteen representatives 5,878 votes, or one thirteenth part of the whole vote, should have one representative.
Dividing the 34,202 votes of the Conservatives by the quota, 5,878, gives five full quotas and a remainder of 4,812.
By the same process the 30,043 Liberal votes make five quotas and a remainder of 653 votes.
The 12,175 Reform votes make two quotas and leave a remainder of 419.
[So 12 seats are filled by full quotas.] As there is still one seat to be filled it is given to the party having the largest unfilled quota, which is the Conservative party. This makes the delegation from the province six Conservatives, five Liberals, and two Reformers.
The six Conservatives are taken from their list in the order of their votes as has already been explained. It is well for parties to nominate a full list of candidates, as it does not alter the effect of the party vote, and offers the voter greater choice.
THE RULE OF THE REAL MAJORITY.
In presenting to your learned body the accompanying draft of an act of parliament it is unnecessary to supplement it with additional words other than the briefest explanation.
Nor will it be necessary to review the present system and enumerate its deplorable result, further than to say that the very principle upon which it is based is wrong. Not only do evil results flow from the system, but it must from the very nature of things be so.
By dividing the voters into separate districts from each of which a member is elected by a plurality or majority vote as the case may be, all the votes cast for unsuccessful candidates are unrepresented; for a voter cannot be said to be represented by a candidate against whom he voted. But this is not the end.
Legislation is accomplished by the will of the majority of the members of the legislature. As all the members together represent but a bare majority of the votes and sometimes less, it follows that the action of a majority of these representatives is really the will of a very small minority of the voters who participated in the election. Taking a majority of the members of any legislative body who received the smallest votes and it will be found that they seldom represent more than one-third of the total vote of the election, often only one-fourth, and sometimes no more than one-fifth. Examples of such results are so common, and have been presented by so many writers that it is superfluous to enumerate them here. Suffice it to say that the mere mention of the false principle upon which the present system is based will bring to mind many examples.
It needs no elaboration of reasons and facts to prove that the principle of electing representatives from single districts by majority votes is wanting in all the elements who are conducive to good government. The sole reason for the existence of representative government rests upon the assumption that all men are equally entitled to life, which involves the right to their own persons and to the results of their own labor. As the individual is the unit of the social and political order, and as governments are instituted among men for the purpose of performing those things that from their very nature cannot be performed by the individual, involving as it does the taking of the wealth of the individual for the use of the community, it naturally follows that the right to vote follows the postulate that all men are entitled to life.
[page 3]
Not only are they entitled to vote but to vote in such a manner as will give effect to that vote. Hence, not only should every act of the government be that of the representatives of the people but of the representatives of a majority of the people. As in a natural state of society where all the members of the community can meet in common the majority will determine the action of the body, so should the action of the representatives of the larger body, which is the result of a sort of political boiling down process, be the will of the majority of the whole people of the community.
The system that is destined to prove a solution of this problem seems to be some form of elections by quotas. Whether it shall be by the single transferable vote as advocated by Thomas Hare, by the multi-vote list of Switzerland, the cumulative vote list, or some other form, it seems that all new systems must be based upon the quota principle. The form that is herewith presented for your consideration is a modification of the list quota system, having the merits that it is certain and definite, whereas the Hare system is not.
The proposal here is simple and easily understood by those who are unaccustomed to the study of these matters, while the Swiss system is complicated and apt to confuse the average voter.
In presenting a plan of action that must meet the approval of the mass of the people and which must be operated by the mass of the people, it is necessary that it shall be of such a nature as will first meet their approval, and, having been adopted, will be within their capabilities and understanding. Not only must a just principle be set forth, but it must be in such form as will be within the comprehension of those to whom it is addressed. And not only must it be within the comprehension of the ordinary voters but it must be of such a nature that designing politicians who profit by the present system cannot torture from it objections which will prejudice the minds of the people.
Take as an example the objection that has so long been urged against the Hare system, that it is uncertain. That if a quota of 1000 be necessary to [be elected] and [2000 electors choose A as first choice of which] 1000 electors mark A first choice and B second choice, while another 1000 electors mark A first choice and C second choice it will be a matter of chance whether B or C or either of them is elected. For, if in counting the ballots the 1000 necessary for the election of A should contain B as second choice, then the surplus votes of A, which under the rules of the system go to the second choice, would be counted for C, though B had just as many second-choice votes as C. Now, while it may be said that this accident may not happen more than once in a hundred elections [TM: mathematically it is alot less frequent that that], it may happen in all of a hundred elections. The mere fact that it may happen at all is of sufficient importance to make its friends pause in their advocacy.
That it might cause grave complications at some time is possible if not probable; that every political beneficiary of the present system would greedily seize upon and exploit it for all it was worth cannot be doubted. It is really an objection. It can easily be magnified into the greatest of objections.
On the other hand the Swiss, and other multi-vote systems are complex enough to cause the uninitiated voter to hesitate, and to enable the designing politician to confound him in the mazes of complicated detail that are bewildering to any but students. The Swiss system is preferable to the Hare system because there can never be any uncertainty as to the result of the counting. It is a question for the statesmen of each country to decide for themselves whether it is so complicated as to confuse the electorate. It has been the experience of the writer that this is an objection urged by the voters to whom it is presented, and with that objection in mind the Swiss system has been modified to the form presented herewith.
The province has been made the unit of representation where possible, for the reason that it is a natural political division with which the people are familiar. It is desirable that the unit of representation under any form of proportional representation shall be large enough to admit of representation to all reasonable minorities, and at the same time not so large that citizens cannot acquaint themselves with the affairs of the whole district. A district of from 10 to 25 members is preferable, and for that reason the provinces of Ontario and Quebec have been divided.
Section No. 3 of the act provides for the nomination of all the candidates whose supporters have any reason to hope for success. The money forfeiture that has heretofore been required is unjust because it handicaps the poor people. The circulation of a petition for signatures is a work so light that any body of citizens can easily do it. Indeed in some of the states of the U.S. states where anybody is allowed to present names no confusion has resulted.
[page 4]
The Section No. 4 is apt to meet with most opposition in that it requires the voting of party tickets. This is an objection, but it is one that upon second thought is brushed aside. It is urged mostly by those who deprecate party government in any form. Now, there is nothing objectionable in party government of itself. It is as natural for men and women to associate together in parties as in churches or clubs, or any other organizations that they may see it to effect.
There has always been a progressive party and a conservative party. Men are so constituted that they fall naturally into one or the other of these parties. The parties do not always bear the same names but their principles are the same. It is just as impossible for a man to be a liberal and conservative at the same issue as to be an optimist and pessimist, or a protestant and catholic at the same time.
And besides this the principle of proportional representation applies only to the election of legislators, or to bodies in which a number of members of the same grade are elected at once. The choice of an executive officer must be based upon his personality. He is to carry into effect the laws that others have made. It matters not whether he be a Conservative or Liberal so far as his executive duties are concerned; if he be an honest man he will perform his duties the same whatever may be his political creed.
But when it comes to the law makers or the creators, all depends upon their opinions regarding public policies. Conservatives will enact conservative measures, and Liberal members will enact liberal measures whether they are wise or foolish, honest or dishonest. Hence it is that the voter may with perfect consistency vote for a Conservative executive officer and the Liberal legislative ticket. But he cannot consistently vote for a Conservative and Liberal legislator at the same time, because they propose opposing policies. He may vote for the Conservative executive because that candidate is honest and upright while his opponent is not; and he may vote for the Liberal ticket because he believes in Liberal laws, and knows the members of the party will enact them regardless of their personal character.
In a word executive officers should be chosen on account of their personality, legislative officers on account of their belief in the principles of government.
Besides choosing among the several tickets in the field the voter can also choose among the names of the ballot which he does vote. And when the case of presenting tickets is taken into account it must be seen that the probability is that a party representing the belief of every considerable number of citizens will be in the field. It is necessary that the voter shall designate his preference among the names on the ticket; for if the successful candidates were taken in the order in which they appear, the nominating parties would be tempted to place the corrupt and self-seeking at the top and the virtuous at the bottom.
This designation of the names by the voter is a safeguard against corrupt primaries and enables him to exercise a double choice in the selection of his representatives.
Sections 5, 6, and 7 designate the method of applying the rules. This is practically the same in all systems based upon the quota principle, but it is much simpler in the method here presented than in either the Hare system or the Swiss. The quota having been obtained the votes of the several parties are divided by it, which shows the number of representatives to which each is entitled. This having been determined the successful men are taken from the ticket in the order of precedence as expressed by their respective votes.
If the party polls enough votes to fill only one quota and is therefore entitled to one representative the candidate who has received the most votes on that ticket is declared elected. If the party has two seats the next highest candidate goes in.
Section eight contains a very simple method of filling vacancies. The new man will be one who was voted for at the same time as the men among whom he must serve, and he always stands ready to respond when the proper officials call upon him, without the delay and expense of holding a new election.
For this method of applying the quota principle to the election of representatives, many advantages are claimed.
It is much simpler than the Swiss, and more definite than the Hare methods. It secures to each party representation in proportion to the votes polled. At the same time it is as easy of application as the method now in vogue. It secures to the new or minority parties their just proportion of political power without in any way detracting from the rights of the old parties. By its means independent political parties can put candidates in the field with the full assurance that they will receive representation if they constitute an integral part of the body politic. It secures a representative body in which a majority of the members will always represent a majority of the voters, thus making representative government that it has long claimed to be, a government of the people for the people and by the people. And yet it is all done with, so slight a change in the present electoral system as to scarcely be perceptible to the average voter. It involves the overturning of no long established customs, or the wrenching of political ties. It is a simple and logical step in advance of the position now occupied by representative governments. It will pave the way, when the people have grown accustomed to this system, for a still more nearly perfect system when it is developed.
In considering what is the best form of government for any people, full account must be taken of the general factors that are to enter into the calculation. A form of government that is ideal for one people may be the worst possible for another. So patent has this become that the great Spanish republican Castelar admits that Spaniards of this generation do not appreciate a republican form of government. Hence such a form of government would today be worse for that country than a monarchy. When the people have accustomed themselves to a limited monarchy they will the better appreciate the advantages of pure democracy; in a word the Spanish people must evolve into a republic. The same is true of Russia, of Turkey, or of any of the Oriental countries.
The best form of government for them is not that which the philosopher may evolve by a process of indisputable reasoning but that which while attaining the ends of government most nearly conforms to the people's habits of thought.
Thus it is with a system for choosing representatives for the Canadian Parliament. It is not a question of what is the ideal system for the ideal country but of what is practicable today, for an existing country.
The method that is to be submitted to the Canadian People you have well termed a workable measure.
It must embrace the elements of justice and equity. At the same time it must be so simple and comprehensible that the ordinary citizen can understand and operate it. It is submitted that the bill herewith meets these requirements.
It is of no use to talk today of government without parties. Any reform that has for its purpose the destruction of political parties will be foredoomed to defeat. Parties are a natural and logical result of human activities. Any reform that is to be effective must operate through them, not in spite of them. The evils of party government are not from the party feature any more than are the bursting of boilers from the depravity of steam.
Party government as heretofore known has been a blind, unreasoning force that people have been unable to control. Like the steam in boilers before the invention of the safety valve, they have often gotten beyond control and worked mischief. But the difficulties of party government may be overcome as were those of steam pressure by supplying a vent or safety valve.
If the people have it always within their power to nominate independent candidates and elect them, there will be such a restraint put upon the old parties and political organizations that they will always be subject to the will of the people, instead of above it as they too often are today. With ballots furnished by the state and candidates nominated freely by all parties and political organizations entitled to a place on the ballot, and representatives chosen from them in proportion to the votes polled, it is patent that the voice of the people can be heard at any and all times.
Whether or not it shall be deemed desirable at some future time to elaborate the quota system by introducing the features of the cumulative vote, or of the single transferable vote of Hare we cannot tell. But it does appear that the quota system herein set forth is all the innovation that we are warranted today in submitting for popular approval and exercise.
It embraces the maximum of benefit from proportional representation with the minimum of change from the present methods and customs. It brings the representative into direct contact with the voter. It compels the candidates to submit to the scrutiny of the whole electoral unit, thus making it the advantage of parties to nominate men who are deserving and worthy of the honour conferred upon them.
By enlarging the electoral unit, the possibilities of bribery, intimidation, and all the evils that now afflict us are minimized. At the same time the power of secret organizations that vote as a unit, thereby deciding the election, will be destroyed. Their votes will simply count as part of the total and will be effective only as they swell the number that is divided by the quota. There will be no hopeless minorities and wasted majorities penned up in single districts. Every vote will bear directly upon the final result. Gerrymandering, that dragon that threatens representative government, will be utterly destroyed, and men instead of territory will be represented.
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[2.] NULLA VESTIGIA RETRORSUM [a Torontonian] [page 6]
No essay or treatise accompanies this draft of a bill, which is thought to be a "workable measure."
The main ideas of the plan are:
1st — Plural voting, in which property and intelligence both receive due weight. At the same time no franchise is taken away. If desired, both sexes may have the privilege and duty of voting.
2nd — The rectification of parliament by providing under the name of "candidates at large" a safe constituency for men of eminence, instructed in politics, who have acquired a wide reputation, but whom local interests might defeat in territorial constituencies.
Existing legislation with respect to registration of voters, bribery, nomination, the ballot, etc., is not materially interfered with by this proposed act, for it is not desired to introduce any violent change. The principles of the measure might be extended by degrees, if found as beneficial as expected.
Compulsory voting is not alluded to. If desired, it might be introduced with respect to the "votes at large," and perhaps with advantage.
Nulla Vestigia Retrorsum.
Toronto, June 30th, 1893.
DRAFT BILL TO AMEND ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION
Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
I.—Every British subject of the full age of 21 years, excepting inmates of prisons or of insane or inebriate asylums, shall have the right to vote at elections for member of the House of Commons, if he be:
1. Owner of real estate or mortgages thereon, government or municipal bonds, shares or obligations of solvent chartered banks or joint stock companies, or cash on deposit in any bank or savings institution to the value of five hundred dollars.
2. Or occupant of a house or lodgings of which the rental is not less than five dollars per month.
(Provision for enrolment or registration of voters.)
(Provision for the right to vote of sons of farmers or others, living with parents and jointly interested in their pursuits.)
II. Any such voter shall have one additional vote in respect of each of the following qualifications.
1. If he be thirty years of age and over, married or a widower, with legitimate issue [offspring].
2. If he have property of the descriptions mentioned in the next preceding section to the value of two thousand dollars.
3. If he holds a lawfully recognized degree from a university or school of practical science, or be a member of the professions of law, engineering or medicine, or have held within five years the rank of sergeant or commissioned officer in the militia or volunteers.
III.—The additional votes that may be claimed (and duly proved and registered or enrolled, vide provision following section I.) shall be called "votes at large."
IV.—Of the members each Province of the Dominion elects to represent it in Parliament, nine-tenths shall be elected by constituencies with limited boundaries, and similar population, and one-tenth by the province at large.
(Provision for redistribution of the constituencies in each Province.)
[page 7]
V.—The mode of electing members for the territorial constituencies shall not be affected by this act,
VI.—The members at large shall be nominated at general elections, in any constituency, under the same rules that apply to other candidates, except that:
1. The returning officer shall publish, within three days of the nomination, a list of any candidates who are nominated and accept the nomination in his constituency, and shall forward the same to who shall forthwith publish in the names of all candidates so nominated and intending to go to the poll.
2. At the election, the returning officer shall give separate ballot papers to each voter who has votes at large, one for each such vote, not exceeding three in all, and the said votes shall only be cast for candidates at large. They shall be deposited in a separate ballot box, and counted the day after the election.
3. Returns of the number of votes given for each candidate at large shall be sent to ........., and these candidates, to the number required by section IV. of this act, who have received the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected.
VII. Members at large shall have the same duties and privileges as those elected from territorial constituencies, but no such member on accepting office shall thereby vacate his seat. In case of the death or resignation of any member at large or of his vacating his seat for any cause, the next of the candidates at large, according to the number of votes received at the last general election, shall become a member in his place.
(Provision for keeping the list of votes cast for each candidate at large.)
The qualification of a candidate at large shall be that he must, within the five years preceding his nomination, have been
1. A member of the Parliament of the Dominion, or of a Provincial Legislature
2. A Warden of a County, or a Mayor of a City, or
3. A Professor in some University, or a Colonel in command of a Regiment of Militia or Volunteers.
(Provision for proving the same.)
[signed] Nulla Vestigia Retrorsum.
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[3.] "DIGNUS VINDICE NODUS." [page 8]
Although England is acknowledged to be the Mother of Parliaments, the word itself is of French, not English origin. Its primary meaning may be said to be the same as that of our word "colloquy." There is some obscurity as to the date when the term Parliament was first applied to a deliberative assembly. It was however used in 1146 when Louis VII of France called a council to organize the Second Crusade. During the following century the term came more into use and henceforth it has been retained, bearing generally the meaning that it now possesses. We do not find in English history any mention of a Parliament earlier than 1215 when the Magna Charta was granted by John the term Parliamentum Runnemede was used incidentally a few years later in the documents that narrate that event.
In 1246 a national assembly was held in London. Some historians speak of this meeting as the first Parliament, but the assembly generally accepted as the origin of the House of Commons met in 1265 when Henry III was a captive in the hands of Simon de Montford, after the battle of Lewes. On that occasion two Burgesses from each city and Borough in the kingdom, and two Knights from each County were summoned to take their seats in the national Council. This was not however the first occasion on which Knights took part in the assemblies summoned by the King. There is a record that goes to show that in 1254 Royal writs were issued directing the election and attendance in parliament of two Knights from each shire (Stubbs, Vol. h. p. 232).
All previous State councils since the conquest by William (1066) were composed of Noblemen and Ecclesiastics of Rank. The parliaments mentioned (1215 and 1265) and others in the 13th Century mark the first successful efforts to shake off the fetters of despotism and restore the liberties and rights enjoyed at an earlier period by the English people. The Great Charter forcibly obtained from King John, and fifty years later the assembly of the memorable Parliament of Earl Simon, the reputed father of the House of Commons, were two cardinal turning points in English history.
From the 13th Century to the 19th Century, the constitution has been moulded by circumstances. It has step-by-step been adapted to the varying necessities that have arisen. The many struggles during the six hundred intervening years have given the British constitution the character it today possesses.
While the constitution of the Dominion of Canada so far as circumstances admit, is a reflex of that of the United Kingdom, it differs from its prototype in some important respects. The most conspicuous of these distinctions is in the second Chamber. In the British Parliament the House of Lords has a character of its own and cannot be reproduced in any part of the outer Empire; it is the product of innumerable influences traceable to the past that in no way have existed on this side of the Atlantic; it may indeed be held to be the lineal descendant of the General Councils of the Barons that assembled during the centuries of feudalism. Whatever the desire to transplant to Canada the institutions of the Mother Country the House of Lords is the one that defies successful imitation. We have however created a substitute in the Canadian Senate and as such, this second house has functions to perform of the first importance. If the Senate is not directly elected by the people it may indirectly be affiliated with the popular suffrage for its members are nominated by the executive Government known as the "Ministry "in whose hands the power and authority of the people is placed by their representatives in Parliament.
The following in brief form, presents the legal constitution of Canada, established by statutory enactments:
1. The Executive Government is vested in the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, represented in Canada by the Governor General.
2. The Executive Government is exercised by and with the advice of the "Queen's Privy Council."
3. The "Queen's Privy Council" is nominated by the Governor General.
4. The Parliament consists of the Queen, the Senate and the House of Commons.
5. The Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament shall never exceed those of the House of Commons of The British Parliament, at the passing of the British North America Act 1867.
[page 9]
In Canada as in the United Kingdom are recognized certain political theories and principles that do not appear on the Statute Book. There has grown up a conventional form of Government that is not always in accord with the written law on which it is nominally based. This unwritten constitution has during a long series of years been passing through the phase of its development. One of the remarkable results that have followed, is, that the Commons, the lower House in name, has become the upper House in fact. The popular assembly is the actual ruling power in the State, and as the historian Freeman puts it in The growth of the English Constitution, "we have cast aside the legal subtleties that grew up from the 13th Century to the 17th, and have gone back to the plain commonsense of the 11th or 10th, and of times earlier still." (page 121)
As relates to Canada the chief features of our unwritten or conventional constitution may be briefly set forth.
1. The Crown, the visible symbol of power and authority, is represented by the Queen, her heirs and successors.
2. The Queen's representative in the Dominion is the Governor General.
3. All Legislative power and executive authority is derived from the people.
4. The power and authority of the people is vested in Parliament, consisting of the Senate and House of Commons.
5. The power vested in Parliament, is transmitted to an executive committee or council of Crown Ministers, known as the "Ministry" to be exercised for the common welfare.
6. All executive functions of Government are reposed in the Ministry.
7. The Ministry consisting of members of the Senate and House of Commons is appointed by the Governor General, subject to the approval of Parliament. As a body it is responsible to Parliament and the members composing it can remain in office so long only as they possess the confidence of the House of Commons.
8. The Members of the Senate are nominated by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Ministry.
9. The Members of the House of Commons are chosen by the people.
10. There are at present 78 members of the Senate and 215 members of the House of Commons.
The above presents in outline the theory of our constitution as it is generally understood. The essential fundamental principle is that the people is the origin of power and authority and that all power and authority proceeds through representatives of the people, to Parliament, constituting that body supreme. that is the theory, and in it we have a vital feature of the political constitution that we are privileged to possess. Unhappily however we have never been able to carry the theory into practice with any measure of success.
It is assumed that the people is represented in Parliament and that the power and authority proceeding from the people is vested in the assembled representatives. Our electoral usages fail to attain this end. In effect, they disfranchise a large majority of the electors. The true principle upon which Parliament should be constituted is not acted upon. This departure from the spirit of the constitution by which so large a number entitled to be represented in the councils of the Dominion, are left without any voice in State affairs, exercises an undesirable influence and constitutes a grave political injustice to the great bulk of the community.
If we enquire into the primary cause of this extraordinary irregularity, in the writer's view it may be traced to an early date. Parliamentary Government came into being in feudal times and has been developed to a large extent out of feudal materials. If we bear in view that the principles of feudalism wore diametrically opposed to every theory of popular government we obtain a clue to the recurrences of grave difficulties that have continually arisen. To this circumstance, that is to say to the interpenetration of conflicting and directly antagonistic elements, viz. freedom and feudalism, may be attributed many of the struggles recorded in the history of the past six eventful centuries. We may trace to the same seemingly far remote origin, some of the obstacles that are met at the present day in the working out of the Parliamentary system.
Feudalism prevails in Europe from the 10th to the 17th centuries. This remarkable organization with its various ramifications, extended in all directions throughout the whole social and political fabric.
[page 10]
It was first established, we are told, as a means of common protection and defence. Whatever its necessity or supposed advantage, it had the effect of permanently separating the community into distinct classes, the feudal Lords and their vassals. It crushed out every principle of popular freedom and ended in becoming an engine of oppression to the great mass of the people. Feudalism attained its highest development in France. At the time of the Conquest in 1066, the French feudalism was superimposed upon that of England, which had its own characteristics.
This superimposition of continental Feudalism completely changed the social and political condition of the English people and destroyed what rights they had possessed under the early Saxon Kings. Thus imposed on the nation, it became an exceedingly difficult task for the people to free themselves from its grasp.
"England owes her escape," says Macaulay, "to an event that historians have generally represented as disastrous. Her interest was so directly opposed to the interest of her rulers that she had no hope but in the rulers' errors and misfortunes. The talents and even the virtues of her six first French Kings were a curse to her. The follies and vices of the seventh were her salvation."
But the great Charter, won by the united efforts of the Barons, was but the beginning of her release from tyrannical rule. The struggle was continued under the Tudor and Stuart despotism. The strength of Feudalism, roughly assailed in the 13th Century, did not finally yield its power until the middle of the 17th. In Scotland, it was not abolished by Statute until 1747. (See footnote 1.)
Feudalism as a national organization has long ceased to exist. But having held sway for seven hundred years it is not surprising that the influences it created have never been wholly removed. The British Constitution has been cast in a feudal mould to impress upon it indelibly the form of its origin, It is not difficult to trace remnants of this once powerful factor in our Parliamentary usages.
As an illustration of the influence of traditional usages, reference may be made to the practice that without sufficient cause has come to be regarded as almost an essential part of our unwritten constitution. The writer alludes to the organization known as the "parliamentary opposition." A standing opposition appears to have been inherited by transmission from the period when King and people were in continual conflict, when ruler and ruled were in a condition of chronic antagonism. The "Ministry" in its executive functions takes the place of the King or ruler. But in this relationship there is no ground of quarrel between the Ministry and the people. Indeed the Ministry is the constitutional servant of the people, being recognized as the executive committee of Parliament to carry out the people's will expressed by the assembled representatives. It is difficult in this stage of our history to find good reason for the existence of a permanent organization whose main object is to oppose every Ministerial effort and impugn every Ministerial act.
Can wise legislation best be secured by continually impeding the constitutional means taken to effect that end? Is the business of Parliament best promoted by systematically interposing obstacles? Is it not a wasteful expenditure of time, energy and talent to appoint one set of men to carry out the wishes of Parliament and to organize an antagonistic set of men to thwart them in every possible manner, on every possible occasion?
Long anterior to feudalism we can discern a system of government based on the true principles of popular institutions. Before the age when Frank and Engle migrated from their German forests to later give in their distinctive names to the French and English peoples, the historian describes a state of political life of deep interest at the present moment to the Canadian observer. In the tribal gatherings of those Teutonic races with which so many of us can claim remote ancestry, we may trace the primordial germs of the true parliament of the people. Centuries before the term Parliament was given to national assemblies, before even Christianity had penetrated the forests of Schleswick the free tribal communities met regularly to consult on State affairs. According to their custom these people assembled to enact laws and impose taxes or their equivalent. Every freeman had the right to be present and take part in the proceedings. (see footnote 2.)
========================
Footnote 1. "The Norman and English races, each unfit to endure oppression, forgetting their animosities in a common Interest, enforced by arms the concession of a great charter of liberties. Privileges wrested from one faithless monarch are preserved with continual vigilance against the machinations of another: the rights of the people become more precise, and their spirit more magnanimous, during the long reign of Henry III. With greater ambition and greater abilities than his father, Edward I, attempts in vain to govern in an arbitrary manner, and has the mortification of seeing his prerogative fettered by still more important limitations. The great council of the nation is opened to the representatives of the commons.
They proceed by slow and cautious steps to remonstrate against public grievances, to check the abuses of administration, and sometimes to chastise public delinquency in the officers of the crown. A number of remedial provisions are added to the statutes; every Englishman learns to remember that he is the citizen of a free state, and to claim the common law as his birthright, even though the violence of power should interrupt its enjoyment. It were a strange misrepresentation of history to assert that the constitution has attained anything like a perfect state in the 15th Century..." (Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. VIII, p. 450)
Footnote 2. "They had Kings elected out of particular families; and other chiefs, both for war and administration of justice, whom merit alone recommended to the public choice. But the power of each was greatly limited; and the decision of all leading questions though subject to the previous deliberation of the Chieftains, sprung from the free voice of a popular assembly." (Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. II. p. 64)
===================
[page 11]
On such occasions they elected their chiefs and riders. Precisely as modern Parliaments will displace a Ministry in which confidence is lost, they exercised the right of deposing their King or other ruler whenever it was held by them to be expedient. These gatherings were Parliaments of a rudimentary character. By means of them they governed themselves and carried out a political constitution that suited the simple condition of untutored Teutonic life. (See footnote 1.)
It is not a little remarkable that fifteen or eighteen centuries later, after all the struggles and changes of intervening years, civilized communities should return to the first principles of Government put in practice by our ancient forefathers.
This fact itself shows that the principles themselves are natural and rational, and that the races who adopted them were in their imperfect civilization imbued with sound common sense and possessed strong moral force.
At an earlier period in European history, in the last days of the Greek civilization, the Government was conducted according to the popular will. The citizens of Athens came together in formal assembly at regular intervals, to consider those matters that formed the State. On such occasions all had the right to be present, and were required to be present to take part in the proceedings.
It was the same principles that at a later day prevailed when Angle and Saxons settled in Britain. Beginning with the 5th Century, the German races, chiefly Angles, Saxons and Jutes, crossed the sea to take possession of the land now known as England.
They carried with them the simple organization to which reference has been made. For five centuries of its existence Anglo-Saxon society adapted its political system to the expansion and growth that resulted from fresh migration from the continent and from Danish and Norseman invasions, and indeed to all the circumstances of its changing situation in the end to be overwhelmed by the Feudalism of the 11th Century. At this period the constitution of the Anglo-Saxon recognized the freeman as the fully qualified political unit. As such he had a voice in the "folkmoot" or popular meeting of the shire. He had the right of expression at the "Witan," or national assembly; he was consulted in the making of the laws by which he was ruled and he took part in the election of those who administered them. (See footnote 2.)
Thus we learn that the ancient Greeks, the ancient Germans and the ancient English — Christian and Pagan alike — recognized the fundamental principle that the people should be assenting parties to their laws and participants in their own government; principles rudely set aside in the Motherland, when the popular assemblies of the early English were transformed into feudal courts. (See footnote 3.)
The fact cannot be disputed that feudalism supplanted a system of Government founded on rational principles, which had prevailed during a period extending over a great part of the first half of the Christian era.
In the constitution of Canada we possess in theory popular Government, based on the same or analogous principles to those that have been described. The writer has however already remarked that the essential principles of popular government are not carried into practice in the Dominion, and thus Government by the people exists only in theory.
If we refer to the published official returns of the last census (1891) and the last general election (1891), we shall find as follows:
(a) Population of the Dominion 4,833,239
(b) Number of families 914,504
(c) Voters on the Electoral lists 1,132,201
(d) Total votes polled 720,459
(e) Votes polled for all Government candidates 368,357*
(f) Votes polled for all Opposition candidates 352,102*
(g) Members elected 215
(h) Government supporters elected 123
(i) Opposition members elected 92
*There were five Government and two Opposition members elected by acclamation. In these cases the statistician states that he took the figure of the previous general election in order to admit of a complete comparison.
=================================
Footnote 1. "Montesquieu said very truly, that the germs of parliamentary constitutions are to be found in the forests of Germany. In the primitive forms described by Tacitus in which the Teutonic Kings co-operated with the local princes and other chiefs on the one side and the great community of freemen on the other, we recognize clearly the rude beginnings of the free representative government." (Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Page 51)
Footnote 2. "There was a time when every freeman of England. no less than every freeman of Uri, could claim a direct voice in the councils of his country. There was a time when every freeman of England could raise his voice or clash his weapon in the assembly that chose Bishops and Ealdermen and Kings, when he could boast that the laws that he obeyed were laws of his own framing, and that the men who bore rule over him were rulers of his own choosing." (Freeman's Growth of the English Constitution, Chap, I. p. 52)
Footnote 3. "We have seen, through the twilight of our Anglo-Saxon records, a form of civil policy established by our ancestors, marked, like the kindred governments of the continent, with aboriginal Teutonic features; barbarous indeed, and insufficient for the great ends of society, but capable and worthy of the improvements it has received, because actuated by a sound and vital spirit, the love of freedom and of justice. We have seen a foreign conqueror and his descendants trample almost alike upon the prostrate nation, and upon those who had been companions of their victory, introduce the servitudes of feudal law with more than their usual rigour." (Hallam's Middle Ages, Chap. VIII. p. 450)
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[page 12]
(k) Members elected with majorities under 100 50
(l) Of which there were Government supporters 28
(m) Of which there were Opposition members 22
(n) Average majorities of Government members elected 476
(o) Average majorities of Opposition members elected 230
These are the actual returns. The number of votes polled for the members elected is not furnished, but the figures given (e), (/), (n) and (o) admit of this being calculated approximately as follows:
(p) Votes polled for 123 Government candidates elected 231,238
(q) Votes polled for 92 Government candidates defeated 137,119
Total as above (e) 368,357
(r) Votes polled for 92 Opposition candidates elected 168,350
(s) Votes polled for 123 Opposition candidates defeated 183,752
Total as above (f) 352,102
Several striking deductions may be drawn from these statements.
I shall refer to two only.
First. If we examine (k), (l) and (m) the exceeding instability of the political equilibrium will at once be apparent. Fifty members on both sides, nearly one fourth of the whole House, were elected by majorities under 100. Of these fifty, twenty-eight were elected Government supporters, by less than 2800 votes. Obviously the reversal, by any means whatever, of so small a number as 2800 votes, distributed in only 28 constituencies would give the following result:
Members elected to support the Government [the ...] 95
Members elected to oppose the Government 120
This is a result that would defeat the Government by an adverse majority of 25 and produce an administrative revolution. It is a possible result.
The illustration brings out one of the glaring defects of our electoral system. It shows that a possible change of 2800 votes out of 720,459, the total votes polled, might revolutionize the Government.
What better proof could we have that our electoral system fails to give us a fair representation in Parliament of the solid sense of the people, when the oscillation of a few votes, perhaps of the least intelligent voters, might reverse the whole public policy of the Dominion ?
Second. The returns point to an extraordinary dualism in the House of Commons.
We have in all 215 members artificially separated into two antagonistic classes or divisions.
Class A, the most numerous, consists of 123 members.
Class B. of 92 members
Thus, two perfectly distinct organizations continually at war in all public matters. Power and authority is thrown into the hands of one class, A, while the other, B, is excluded from all participation in the direction of public affairs.
The 123 members composing class A were elected by the votes of 231,238 electors. It is these voters alone who have any effective representation in Parliament. There was a total of 720,459 votes cast, if we take into account those given to the 123 Government supporters.
There remains 480,221 votes describable as wasted, for they were given to defeated candidates and to opposition members, neither of whom have any participation or voice in the Government. Thus the representatives of less than one third of those electors who went to the polls and recorded their votes, assume all power and retain the right to exercise it in the name of the whole people.
Again, if we consider the whole electoral body, an anomaly still more striking presents itself. There are in the electoral lists 1,132,201 voters, but the comparatively small number of 231,238 of this number absolutely control Parliament. That is to say, the Dominion of Canada is governed, today, not by the whole people or by representatives of the whole people, according to the theory of our constitution, but by the representatives of only one fifth of the electors. There remains therefore four-fifths of the whole electoral body without any share whatever direct or indirect in the administration of public affairs.
From these indisputable facts established by the latest statistical returns, we may ask if we have made any advance in the development of popular government since introduced in the early centuries of the Christian era by our Anglo-Saxon forefathers.
[page 13]
Every sphere of practical economy is characterized by advancement and development. Can no explanation be given for the anomalous condition in which we find ourselves in respect to electoral representation?
The popular national assemblies in ancient times, to which reference has been made, whether the elected head was chief or king, may be described as "direct democracies."
Institutions that partake of this character are only possible in small states, such as were found among the ancient Greeks, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, or in modern times, remain in the mountain Cantons of Switzerland. In extensive territories and populous communities a government, on the simple type of "direct democracy," cannot be brought into successful operation.
The assembly of the whole electors in one body in a country like Canada is impracticable. If practicable, the confusion and clamour, which are the inevitable consequence of assembling great multitudes, would in no sense lead to calm deliberation or further the ends of legislation and good government. To meet the difficulty the representative system has been devised, with the design of having the mass of the population represented by a limited number of carefully chosen deputies. The number necessarily must be sufficiently limited to admit of full and fair debate on the part of the representatives when gathered together in a deliberative assembly. It is by no means an easy task to carry out this design as it should in practice be realized. We require new electoral machinery to attain, un-imbittered by strife and contest, the choice of representatives who may command general respect; men worthy to be entrusted with the confidence of the nation and authorized on behalf and in the names of the whole people to act and speak in their stead in Parliament.
It has been shown by the returns of the last general election (and it may be affirmed that the results of all general elections present the same features) how far short we are of obtaining in Parliament even an approximately true representation of the whole people.
However unsatisfactory these results, it by no means proves the representative system to be a failure. It establishes, however, beyond all doubt that the means taken to obtain an accurate and faithful representation of the people is much in fault. To find some better means is the primary purpose, as the writer understands it, of the Appeal that the Canadian Institute has submitted to the public. This Appeal therefore presents a problem of profound interest to the political student, and its solution even affects the political well being of future generations. The object of its solution is not to destroy, or reform, or even amend our constitution. It is simply to carry out the fundamental principles on which it has been established.
One of the first consequences of the proposition is to revivify the conceptions of our remote ancestors who recognized the importance of ruling wisely and being wisely ruled.
Self Government was an essential principle with the ancient Teutonic commonwealths in their tribal gatherings, the type and precursor of that which we desire our own national assembly to be. They sought in a rude fashion to carry out the assurance of liberty and justice held by them to be the primary principles of their constitution. Had not the system conceived and begun by them, been set aside by the intrusion of the feudal system, the ideal Parliament we are today seeking would have been long since evolved.
On a cursory view we may feel astonished that the intellectual activity observable in the last two or three centuries has not succeeded in putting the plain rational principles of free Government into practice. On examination the reason becomes apparent; the tardy regeneration of English freedom has been owing to causes deeply imbedded in the political groundwork of the English nation. The popular Government introduced by the Saxons was not only completely suspended for centuries. It was crushed out, leaving but the memory that it had existed. The feudal system rose and fell, but it remained a great political force tor nearly seven hundred years and it did not pass away without leaving its lasting impression on every phase of society.*
The innovations introduced in these evil times have one by one been removed, but it exacted a long period for even the theory of free institutions to find general recognition. From the first day of their partial re-introduction they have been forced so to speak into a foreign matrix by which they have been cramped and confined so that natural growth and expansion became impossible.
In this fact we find an explanation why the process of the evolution of popular Government has been prevented. It is Freeman who points out that from the 13th Century onward the development of popular Government has been chronologically inverted, that the English constitution has from that period of history made progress by a retrograde movement, by a falling back "from the cumbrous and oppressive devices of feudalism, to the sounder, freer, and simpler principles of the days of our earliest freedom."
===================
* "Transported to England in the 11th Century by the Normans, and firmly rooted there till the middle of the 17th Century, the influence of feudalism on the habits and customs of this country, and on its social order, was undoubtedly extensive." (Feudalism by Abdy, page 112)
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[page 14]
Every age has to provide against its own difficulties and the dangers that beset it. Possibly there were special reasons for the extension of feudal institutions at one period of history that are unappreciated in another. We are not called upon to enquire whether feudalism was a necessity or a supposed necessity in the ages when war and conquest were the chief pursuits of mankind. We have only to recognize that these institutions at one time universally prevailed, in order to account for the marvellous influence they have had in determining much of our present political condition. The habit of thought of earlier generations is still to some extent rooted in our national life. Hence it is that we have long tried with but partial success to engraft our modern requirements on the traditions of the past.
It has been remarked that it was owing to the superimposition at the conquest of continental feudalism without any formal change in the English laws and Kingship that determined much of the later features of English history. The despotism imposed by William under legal forms crushed Saxon national life but it did not obliterate Saxon laws; so likewise in the 13th Century. In succeeding centuries, when the old national spirit was evoked, to regain some concessions of the early freedom, the super-imposed feudalism remained, at least in form. The political fabric was never wholly demolished and rebuilt; the old walls were conserved and in some parts reconstructed and improved.
Hence arises much of the divergence between the legal and the actual, between fiction and fact, in our modern constitution. Hence the peculiar features of the traditional forms that cling to and characterize our parliamentary system.
There is indeed a long chain of causes extending over centuries that has operated in producing the parliamentary system and the electoral form and practices, as we find them established. Not a few of them spring from the feudal age rather than from the age of freedom that preceded the reign of feudalism. If therefore we attempt to solve the problem set before us, we must reject all that is baneful inherited from feudal times, and seek to rectify our national assembly on the early Teutonic model, so that every member of the community, by right entitled as were Saxon freemen of old, may have a voice in his own government.
If it be an understood principle of our constitution that power and authority proceed from the people, it should be our aim to see that that fundamental principle is something more than a delusive fiction. At present our representation system is so imperfectly developed that we have but a figment of popular government, and no true responsible government. The Ministry is practically responsible to only one section of the House of Commons, the representatives of a comparatively small portion of the whole electorate. The Ministry is not and cannot be responsible to the people or the representatives of the people in Parliament seeing that the people as a whole is without representation.
With these brief remarks bearing on the origin of Parliament, its slow and imperfect development, and its need of rectification the writer respectfully submits a draft of a measure embracing the principles by which as he believes, the Canadian electorate may be fairly represented in the popular assembly, and each individual voter may through Parliament have due weight in the government of the country.
The first section of the Bill is a humble and respectful recognition of the symbol of Power and authority, represented by the Sovereign who stands at the head of our constitution. We cannot ignore the force of association and the prevailing attachment to the Crown. The Canadian people cling with confidence to the Monarchical character of government, which had its origin not so much in the feudal days as in the age anterior to feudalism. In theory and practice it has happily become blended with our representative democracy. Beyond this recognition of the Crown, the measure submitted is limited in its range to the election of Members of the House of Commons. There is no reference to the Second Chamber, the Senate.
With respect to the Senate, it may be remarked that we have not, as in England a powerful aristocracy, as a rule carefully trained and educated with a view to the station they have in after life to fill and the duties to pursue, not the least important of which is that attendant on a seat in the House of Lords. Nevertheless the Canadian Senate by judicious appointments may become, as at one time that of Rome, an assembly of statesmen who have previously held high office, or in some measure have proved themselves, by their experience, capacity and patriotism, worthy occupants of the exalted position.
The first section of the Bill provides for the appointment of electoral officers. The highest officer proposed is an Electoral Commissioner, who as a Minister or Deputy Minister of the Crown would be held responsible for the proper regulation of all matters in his department. The other officers acting under him, would assist in carrying into effect the provisions of the Bill, the Commissioner and his deputies being governed by the Orders in Council from time to time issued for their guidance.
[page 15]
Section II provides for the holding of elections at stated times. It is proposed to have one-fifth of the members elected regularly each year. The annual elections to be evenly distributed throughout the several Provinces so as to bring to Parliament yearly from all sections of the country new members fresh from the people. By this means the House of Commons would be regularly renewed and the entire Assembly re-elected every five years. This system of renewal would practically result in maintaining a continuous or permanent Parliament annually brought into direct touch with the people, avoiding those general elections that are so familiar to us, and which every few years strain the State to its centre. These periodical convulsions are struggles for political supremacy,
Their tendency is to inflame the passions and arouse feelings that render it impossible to obtain a calm judgment. In these times of great popular excitement, even individuals of intelligence and character proceed to lengths that in their sober moments they would utterly condemn.
As a consequence to the proposed system of annually renewing the House of Commons there would be a corresponding change in the Ministry, a proportion of which would be understood to retire each year, to be replaced by others or to be re-appointed, as might be found expedient. In other words there would be an annual reconstruction of the administration, to bring every branch of the Government into harmony with Parliament, to which the regular restorations at yearly intervals would give a character of flexibility combined with continuity.
Sections III. and IV. The provisions of these sections are designed with the view of constituting the House of Commons an express image of the general spirit of the nation and giving to each electoral unit in the community its due share of political power and no more.
Admitting the generally recognized truth that every member of the community is individually concerned in the good government of the country, it follows that if we can adequately reproduce in Parliament the true spirit and will of the people we shall obtain the essential elements necessary to the wise and harmonious administration of affairs.
The community is composed of many members differing in age, education, religion, sex, occupation, position and intelligence. The existing statutes relating to the franchise define the qualification of persons entitled to be placed on the list of voters. Those excluded are women of all ages, Mongolians or Chinese, male persons under 21 years of age, criminals, certain Judges and certain Government Officers.
In England and elsewhere there has for some time been a movement for the enfranchisement of women. It must be confessed that it is difficult to give a reason, apart from special disqualification, why women should be debarred from taking part in a matter that concerns them equally with men. All will admit that there are many women in every community far better qualified by experience and intelligence to exercise the franchise than young men as they generally present themselves at 21 years of age. As the voter is the political unit, and the right of being well governed is the common heritage of both sexes, it is clear that no good reason can be found why women should be excluded wholly from representation. It is undeniable that woman's true sphere is in her household — she is associated generally with family life; the wife lives with her husband, the daughter with her father or elder brother, the widowed mother with her son.
Moreover the family is the true unit of the state, and the family life is or ought to be, an important factor in the development of a high moral public life. Why then should we not recognize the family as the political unit and bestow the voting power on the family, to be exercised through its head?
In this way the just right of woman would be recognized and her influence felt, she would thus share with her husband, or senior male relative, the political dignity that full citizenship confers. A reasonable exception to the rule that families only should be allowed to vote, would be in the cases of unmarried or widowed householders of mature years.
It does not appear to the writer that youths of 21 years of age would consider their disqualification a great deprivation, if they regarded the matter in its true light. The privilege would in their case only be deferred. They would look forward to the day when they too would become heads of families, when their interest in the State and its affairs would be increased and when they would be better fitted by the wisdom that experience brings to exercise one of the privileges of the highest condition of manhood.
On whatever basis the franchise may be established, it would in no way affect the principles of the Bill. In any case the names of the qualified electors would be regularly enrolled on the voters' list for each Electoral District, and each elector would be entitled to a certificate setting forth the facts as in form E. The Bill provides that the certificate shall be required for the purposes of identification whenever the elector is called upon to vote.
[page 16]
It has been pointed out that a large percentage of the electors of Canada, are at this moment deprived of their rightful share in the Government of the country. I do not hesitate to say that this is a political condition deeply to be deplored. The men in power may be wise and capable, their public policy may be beneficial, the country may be advancing and commerce may be flourishing. But there can be no political peace so long as any considerable number of the people are without participation in public affairs. When no less than four-fifths of the whole electoral body are practically shut out from any direct or indirect share in their own Government, is it to be wondered at that leading men from all parts of the Dominion should have recently assembled in a great political convention at Ottawa (June 1893) planning, devising and urging means to overthrow those in power?
To secure confidence and a general sympathetic interest throughout the community there must be a change in the Government, not merely a transference of power from one portion of the community to another. It cannot be in the public interest to perpetuate the system. In order that there may be an entire change, the goodwill the support and the co-operation of the whole people must be sought and obtained. The people generally should be made to feel that each elector by the part he takes under the electoral law is fairly made an assenting party in ail matters that concern the commonweal. It is unwise and inexpedient to narrow down the governing power to a portion of the people.
The Legislative Assembly, the supreme governing body, should not be permitted to stand on the narrow basis of one fifth of the population. It should be supported by the whole five-fifths. It is therefore expedient to widen representation and enlarge the base of responsibility by seeking the co-operation of all, and by acceding to as many individuals as possible, a share in the administration of public affairs.
The meaning of this proposition is by no means that each individual elector should become a ruler, or attempt to rule. Government by the people does not mean government by each voter, manifestly an impossibility. It means government by the collective will and spirit of the people expressed by the people's deputies in a national assembly. The very least that should be done, perhaps the most that can be done, is to extend to each individual elector a voice through his deputy and give him the freest possible choice in the selection of that deputy.
Bearing on this point, I will quote from a well-known democratic writer (Stickney) with whose view to a large extent I agree:
"If it were a possible thing to give to every individual a direct voice on measures other than in local affairs, it would not be desirable.
I believe in the expediency of giving to the individual citizen the fullest part that he can possibly take, under any political system that can be devised, in the administration of public affairs. But the function of the individual citizen must be limited to his voice in the selection of men. As to measures other than local, the individual citizen never is, and never can be, able to act wisely. I do not here draw any distinction between rich men and poor men, between learned and unlearned. I say that all individual citizens, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, alike, are incapable of forming a wise judgement on the great questions of State and national policy.
The large public questions, if they are to be decided wisely, must be decided by men carefully selected, who can take time to learn the special facts of special cases, who can take part in the common deliberations of men who represent diverse interests, and who can, alter such conference and deliberation take part in the forming and uttering of a calm common judgment. The judgment of single individuals, however learned or skilled, on great public questions has comparatively little value. That the individual citizen, however intelligent he may be, however able he may be, shall be allowed to pass his individual judgment on great public questions to which he cannot give special study, on which he cannot deliberate with other men, is not in accordance with any sound theory of democratic government.
Democratic government means, not that every citizen shall have a separate individual voice on every public measure in his own person, but that every citizen shall, in the person of his representative, have one voice in the peoples meeting, by which all questions of general public policy are decided.
On mere local questions he can have this voice in his own person. On questions other than local he must have this voice always in the House of his representative, in whose selection he has had, with all other citizens, his equal part. The actual decision of actual questions is, and necessarily must be, in the hands of representatives."
Representation is a comparatively modern device. It was unknown to the Saxon freeman of old, who claimed a direct voice in his tribal legislative assembly. It introduces a new principle and the only principle adaptable to the circumstances of populous states.
In the Bill, it is proposed to carry the representative principle a little further than has been customary in electoral matters in order effectively to accomplish that which has hitherto been impracticable, viz. government by the great mass of the electors.
[page 17]
In an ordinary Electoral District there are let us say 5000 electors. The number is too large to allow each elector to meet for consultation in order to arrive at a common opinion as to the choice of a Member of Parliament. The Bill provides a means by which they can reach this end by a gradual process.
The proposal is for groups of electors of similar views to nominate one of their number as a representative elector. In this each voter will have a perfectly free choice and he will only have to associate himself with a few others entertaining similar views. The number in each group in no way affects the principle, provided all groups have an equal number. Twenty-five is considered a convenient number for each group. This number would reduce the 5000 political units in the district to 200. Precisely as the design of Parliament itself is to bring the whole nation within a compass small enough to admit of orderly debate, so likewise by means of the representative principle we propose to bring the whole electoral district for the purpose of consultation and concentration of action within the compass of a court consisting of 200 persons. The selection of 200 representative electors would involve time and attention mostly of a routine character. Electoral Agents would be appointed to assist, and supervise, the expense being borne by the public exchequer. The task no doubt would be attended with difficulty, but the ultimate object, the formation of the people's national assembly, in accordance with the theory of our constitution, is a matter of paramount importance and no trouble, no reasonable expense should be held too great to secure its accomplishment.
On a day to be determined all the representative electors appointed would assemble in a general court, presided over by the Electoral Warden, for the express purpose of electing a Member for the House of Commons.
Section IV prescribes how the election is to be proceeded with. As any ten electors present may nominate a candidate, there would be perfect freedom of choice and any number of candidates from one to twenty may be nominated. If there be but one candidate nominated, after a sufficient lapse of time he would be declared elected.
If there be several candidates the election would be decided by Ballot. Dependent on circumstances there may be a series of ballots, the number of candidates being reduced by the process of elimination until one candidate receives the requisite number of votes — viz., more than half the number of Representative electors. If no candidate receives the required number of votes, then as a last resort the choice to be determined by Lot in a fair and equitable manner as set forth in the Bill.
This extension of the representative principle has incidental advantages. As a rule the best men in the community, certainly not inferior men, would be chosen as representative electors and the latter would elect the members of the House of Commons. Thus our modern representative democracy would become exalted above a democracy that ad
mits the ignorant and the corrupt equally with the better class of citizens. By the selection of the best men the representative electors might indeed be likened unto an aristocracy; not that of the accident of birth, but an aristocracy of worth.
The remaining sections of the Bill deal with election returns, general provisions, and election expenses. With regard to the latter it is felt that in as much as the election of members to sit in Parliament is purely a public matter and it is in the highest degree important that Parliament should be formed constitutionally without being dependent on the private means of candidates or individuals, it should be a fixed principle that all just and reasonable expenses in connection with elections should be paid out of the public exchequer.
To carry out this principle not only should the electoral officers in each district be paid for their services, but the representatives electors should be paid an indemnity for their attendance at the Electoral Court. Stringent regulations and a strict audit would be enforced as in other departments of the Government.
I read on page 117 of the Appeal issued by the Canadian Institute:
"The central idea of Parliament at the present day is an assembly of individuals representing the whole nation. The functions of Parliament are to act on behalf of the nation as the supreme authority, and — representing the nation — it possesses every power and every right and every attribute that the nation possesses. The fundamental idea and guiding principle of Parliament is, that it embraces all the separate parts that comprise the realm, that in fact it is the nation in essence."
Agreeably to this public appeal I have set myself to the task of devising "the means of forming an elective assembly that practically as well as theoretically will be the nation in essence." I have endeavoured with all the earnestness I can command to discover a method by which the whole people of Canada "may be brought to a central point, to a focus so to speak, in a deliberative assembly or Parliament."
The train of research I have been led into has revealed to me many curious recorded facts. For long centuries England, our political motherland, was held in the grasp of a confederation of feudal despots, and Englishmen were then in a very difficult social condition to what they, or we, now are. For a long period the mass of the English people were thrown into a state of vassalage. Now the subjects of Queen Victoria on that side of the Atlantic enjoy the rights and privileges of free citizens.
[page 18]
In Canada we are farther advanced as a representative democracy than our fellow subjects in England, for the reason that we are farther removed in some respects from the associations and still surviving influences of feudalism, the signs and marks of which are borne in the political constitution of the mother country. In Canada we find ourselves in a different condition.
The voice of history teaches us that we have more in common with the early ages of the English race than with the less ancient period of English feudalism and that the germs or our Canadian constitution must be sought for in the primeval institutions of the Teutons.
Satisfied on this point the Teutonic germ is the one which it has been my endeavour to unfold and develop, with what success I must leave others to determine.
It is not to be expected that a solution of the problem propounded by the Canadian Institute could fail to interfere with old electoral methods. As in every sphere of life there are some persons whose attachment to old usages is so great that submission to the most indefensible abuses would be preferable to any vital change whatever. Happily all men are not so constituted. If they were, all improvement, all advance in human affairs would be at an end. There is moreover a growing disposition, especially among men of a scientific habit of mind, to penetrate beneath the surface of things, to discern first causes, to recognize the actual facts, in order that rational conclusions may be reached.
The cardinal idea in our constitution is that the people rule. It must be understood to mean that the rule is of the whole, not of a part. It is well that it should be so — the broader the base of any structure the greater its stability. The people of Canada can rule in one way only. That is through a national assembly where every Canadian shall be present in person or by proxy — where the consent of the assembled body shall be taken to be the consent of the whole people. Our constitution is essentially that of a representative democracy. Our future must mainly rest on the fair and full representation of all Canadians in their own Parliament. This noble purpose cannot be achieved without change. It will exact a deviation from old-fashioned ways. It will invite opposition. It will involve much trouble and difficulty to overcome obstacles. But its achievement is an object of the most vital importance to us as a people. It would ill become the offspring of the great historic races, the heirs of a vitality born of a thousand struggles, to hesitate to enter on the final stage in the development of free institutions.
"DIGNUS VINDICE NODUS." [continued]
(Draft.) AN ACT RESPECTING THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF CANADA.
Her Majesty by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows:
I. (Electoral Officers).
1. The Governor General in Council shall appoint an Electoral Commissioner whose duty it shall be, under the authority conferred on him from time to time by Order in Council, to carry into effect the provisions of this Act.
2. The Governor General in Council shall, on the recommendation of the Electoral Commissioner appoint an Electoral Warden for each electoral District in the Dominion and shall authorize the appointment of a sufficient number of Electoral Officers and such assistants as may be necessary to carry out efficiently the provisions of this Act.
II. — (PERIODICAL ELECTIONS.)
3. The election of Members of the House of Commons shall take place in each Electoral District of the Dominion every fifth year and it shall be arranged as nearly as practicable so that one-fifth of the whole number of Members shall be elected annually.
To elect this object the several electoral districts shall be arranged (as in the schedule hereto) under the five headings or Classes A, B, C, D, E, so that one-fifth (approximately) of all the electoral Districts in each Province shall be in each class and elections shall be held in the following order [each seat coming up for election each fifth year, staggered so only one class of seats would be up for election each year]
[page 19]
4. Two months before the date of an election the Electoral Commissioner shall issue a proclamation directing the Electoral Warden in respect thereto and reciting such portions of he Act bearing on the choice of representative electors as may be deemed necessary.
[Sections 5.-11 not transcribed]
[page 19]
12. The representative electors being duly sworn, the Electoral Warden shall call the Court to order and shall make such announcements as may be necessary, the nomination of candidates shall then be proceeded with.
(A.) — Nomination of Candidates.
13. Any ten representative electors may nominate a candidate by signing a nomination paper in the form I. stating therein the name, residence and description of the candidate sufficiently to identify him. No representative elector shall nominate more than one candidate.
14. The Electoral Warden shall file nomination papers complying with the preceding section in the order in which he may receive them. The receipt of nominations shall be in order up to five o'clock on the first day of the general Court after which the Electoral Warden shall cause to be published a certified list of the candidates nominated.
(B.) —Election of a Member.
15. The election of a Member shall be proceeded with at ten o'clock on the morning of the second day of the general Court.
16. Should there be one nomination only, the candidate nominated shall be held to be the choice of the general Court and he shall be declared by the Electoral Warden, elected by acclamation.
17. In the event of there being several candidates, the election shall be accomplished by ballot or by a series of ballots as each case may require, reducing step by step the number of candidates by elimination in accordance with the degree of preference indicated by the votes. Should there be no marked preference for any one candidate made manifest by the weight of the votes given, the selection shall be made from the candidates receiving the largest number of votes and shall as hereinafter provided be determined by Lot.
18. Two of the Electoral Agents shall be appointed tellers to receive the votes and who shall be duly sworn according to form K.
19. The voting shall take place in the immediate presence of the Electoral Warden who shall mark off the name of the elector voting, on the list of qualified representative electors, as each vote is received.
20. The ballot of each voter shall be a small white card with the name of the candidate printed or written thereon, it shall be placed in a blank envelope by the voter before handing it at the proper time to the receiving teller. Cards and envelopes uniform in size for this and other similar purposes shall be supplied to those voting, during the general Court.
21. Should there be two candidates nominated, a ballot shall be taken as follows:
(a). Each representative elector shall in turn present himself at the voting table and shall show his qualification certificate to the first teller who shall report to the Electoral Warden.
(b). All being found in order the elector shall pass the envelope containing his ballot to the 2nd teller to be stamped. The elector shall immediately thereafter place the same in the ballot urn.
(c). When all the representative electors present have voted, the Electoral Warden shall open the ballot urn, and with the assistance of the Tellers count the votes and announce the number given for each candidate.
(d). In the event of one of the candidates receiving votes numbering more than half the whole number of representative electors in the electoral district, he shall be declared by the Electoral Warden duly elected. Should neither of the candidates receive votes equal to half the total number of representative electors the selection shall be determined as hereinafter provided, by lot.
22. Should three candidates be nominated a ballot shall be taken as in Section 21, and if one of the candidates receives votes numbering more than half the whole number of representative electors in the district he shall be held to be the successful candidate and shall be declared elected.
In the event of no one candidate receiving more than half, the selection shall be determined by Lot as hereinafter provided.
[page 21]
23. Should four candidates be nominated, a ballot shall be taken as in Section 21, and one of the candidates receives votes numbering more than half the number of representative electors in the district, he shall be declared elected.
If no one candidate receives more than half the total number, then the three candidates who have received the highest number of votes shall be eligible for a second ballot. The second ballot shall be effected as in section 22 and the election determined in the manner therein laid down.
24. Should five candidates be nominated or a larger number than five, a first ballot shall be taken as in Section 21 and if one of the candidates receives votes numbering more than half the total number of representative electors in the electoral district, he shall be declared elected,
But if no one candidate receives more than half, the four candidates who have received the largest number of votes shall be eligible for a second ballot. In this case the second ballot shall be conducted as if there were four candidates (see Section 23) and the election of a member determined accordingly as therein provided.
(C.) Determination by Lot.
25. When it becomes expedient to determine the election by Lot as in that alluded to in Section 22, the names of the candidates from whom a selection is to be made shall be inscribed on small white cards. The number of cards for each candidate shall correspond with the number of votes received by each, that is to say should the votes cast have been for
Candidate A 78
Candidate B 67
Candidate C 55 Total votes 200,
then the name of A shall be inscribed on 78 cards, "B" on 67; "C" on 55, making in all 200 cards. Each card shall be put in a blank envelope sealed and placed in a ballot urn.
In another ballot urn there shall be placed an equal number of blank envelopes containing in every instance except one, a blank card. In one envelope only shall be placed a card similar to the other cards but having inscribed thereon the words "This is the Member."
26. The two ballot urns shall each have been shaken so as sufficiently to mix the cards after which the drawing shall be proceeded with, the teller at each urn shall simultaneously and indiscriminately draw an envelope from each, and after stamping and numbering both alike the two shall be placed together in a third envelope and handed to the Electoral Warden.
27. After all the envelopes are drawn and disposed of, the Electoral Warden shall proceed to open them one by one in their order. He shall make known the contents of each as he proceeds, replacing the whole in the original envelopes.
28. The candidate whose name shall be found associated with the card bearing the inscription "This is the Member" shall be declared by the Electoral Warden duly elected.
29. So soon as the member shall be declared elected, the Electoral Warden shall close the General Court and proceed to pay the representative electors their attendance fees and mileage allowances as provided in Section VI.
V. Election Returns.
30. The Electoral Warden shall on the day after the closing of the General Court of representativeelectors, transmit to the electoral Commissioner a return of the election in the form L, certifying who has been elected Member. He shall likewise forward to the Member-elect a copy thereof.
31. The Electoral Warden shall accompany his return to the Electoral Commissioner with a report of the proceedings mentioning the several stages thereof and he shall make any observations he may think proper.
32. The electoral Warden shall transmit to the Electoral Commission. the nomination papers of the representative electors, the nomination papers of the several candidates, copies of the voters list and roll of representative electors and all other lists and documents used or required at the election. The Electoral Commissioner shall retain in his possession all papers transmitted to him by the electoral Warden for at least two years after the date of the election.
[page 22]
33. The Electoral Commissioner shall on receiving the return of any Member elected to the House of Commons, enter such return in a hook to be kept by him for such purpose, in the order in which the same is received by him, and thereupon give notice in the ordinary issue of the Canada Gazette of the name of the Member so elected.
VI. — Election Expenses.
34. The Governor General in Council shall determine the salary of the Electoral Commissioner and his assistants, the fees and expenses to be paid the Electoral Warden, Electoral Officers, the mileage and other allowances to be paid Representative Electors attending the Electoral Courts and all other legitimate and proper expenses necessary to carry into effect this statute. And shall establish a regular tariff in respect thereto, which tariff may be amended from time to time as circumstances may require.
[...]
[Essay 4.] "NEW OCCASIONS TEACH NEW DUTIES" [page 25]
It has been pointed out by one of the foremost Canadian investigators of parliamentary abuses and shortcomings that it is a "necessary result of our human nature that the end of government is primarily and essentially the welfare of the ruling class." The defects in our laws, the corruption in legislative circles and the turmoil of party politics are a necessary consequence of entrusting the government of the country to an absolute parliament, the members of which being human are more or less self-seeking, and being selected with reference to their position upon a confused jumble of various public questions manipulated by scheming individuals and inseparably bound together, are not fitted to represent the people upon any one question taken by itself.
Is not this pooling of issues a legitimate outcome of the system of the entire abdication by the voter of the law-making power in relation to many subjects in favour of one nominal representative? By far the better part of the community is practically almost disenfranchised through the platform system of politics. For men of thought and sincere patriotism will naturally arrive at independent conclusions upon public topics.
But if they support measures of which they approve, they are forced by the system to support those also to which they are opposed; thus, to them, the value of the franchise is lessened or destroyed. But the thoughtless, the narrow minded, the corrupt elements and those who place party before country, who think more of triumph than of truth, are not hampered but have an undue influence in public affairs.
It may be contended that the party platform system, while it may in individual cases bring to the support of certain principles those who otherwise would strongly oppose them, yet will, by a law of averages — by counteracting one error by another — by bringing one to support a certain proposal to which he is opposed instead of another who would really wish to support it, were he free to do so, and not led by the necessities of the system to oppose it because he considered it in bad company and the system obliged him to endorse the whole list or none — all conflicting elements being eliminated by cancellation — may in its results in the community as a whole truly voice the wishes of the whole people.
Is there any certainty that thus trusting to chance will straighten out interminable tangles? As well might a seaman endeavour to disentangle his lines by running his free end haphazard through the interstices of the snarl. It is the reasoning of the gambler who stakes his fortune trusting to a change of luck.
In theory, a portion of the community unites upon a set of principles that it unanimously wishes to advance. The triumph of the platform denotes the will of the people with respect to these principles. But, in practice, such is far from being the case.
Few men would approve of all the propositions of their party were the judgement untrammelled. But being part of the machine they must go with the other gearing. The majority of a party decide what the platform shall be. That majority in its turn may be a faction whose votes in caucus or convention are previously decided by the majority of that faction meeting among themselves. Similarly, the policy of this last faction may have been decided upon by the majority rule. This system of party within party is capable of expansion in theory until a minority of a very few individuals could impose a policy upon the public at large, having the political power rightfully belonging to a majority of the people. As a matter of fact, it is sufficiently developed to greatly impair the usefulness of parliament, to have an unwholesome influence upon the course of legislation and materially interfere with the welfare of the community.
Party government has been compared by its defenders to the balance-wheel system of a chronometer, the opposing tendencies counter-balancing each other in their excesses — in their variations from the proper mean. But if we consider a moment, the seeming analogy disappears. It is not the balance-wheel, going first to the one side, then to the other, that marks the time, but it is the steady advancement of the hands. With partyism it is the fanatical element, the opposing tendencies, first going one way, then another, which record the workings of the machine, leaving the sober judgement, the steady advancing sentiment of the people helpless and unused. Moreover, the waste of power in timepiece escapements is a defect such as is always sought to be avoided where economy of force is an important consideration.
[page 26]
In horological science, the waste of power being so small in comparison with man's physical force, we tolerate the defect for the sake of its convenience, having arranged for a perfect resultant action. In politics we exhaust our strength in pulling in opposite directions and the resultant action is necessarily erroneous, being secured by corruption or through incapacity, or a haphazard many-sided conflict of multitudinous interests.
Dr. Fleming has compared political parties to the crew of a row-boat determined to pull in opposite directions. "There would be much agitation of the water, but little or no satisfactory progress." Might I venture to add that this metaphorical row-boat is in dangerous waters, and the force of the crew's efforts being spent against itself the current is bearing the craft steadily towards the rapids.
In the strife between the evil and the good, let the good that is in men have but fair play, and we need not fear for the ultimate triumph of Truth and Justice and the progress of the race. But if we continue to render our best propensities powerless, our noblest efforts inoperative, the forces of evil, engineered with better tact, will continue to maintain their ascendency in politics and then interference with the welfare of the community.
Where the electorate is divided into two hostile parties and a summing up of the aggregate vote determines which of them shall govern the country, the best intentioned and most intelligent voters only nullify each other's votes. The majority of voters are fully resolved that they will never change their political faith. With many it is a boast that they vote as their father and grandfather voted. In all probability they will continue voting in the same way be it on the reform or conservative side, to the end.
If we were to despair of doing away with party politics, it would be a vast saving in the state and the individuals concerned if the votes of these self-proclaimed slaves of their present opinion or their grandfather's opinion, could be eliminated by cancellation, by a kind of clearing house operation without the useless requirement of going to the voting booth. Majorities only are counted in the end. The shifting vote governs. The "dyed in the wool" voters, reformers and conservatives would as much affect the result if they would arrange for their mutual disfranchisement.
Those who hold the "balance of power" are not slow to make the best of their opportunities. Some will sell their support openly to the highest bidder; others for promise of office or political advancement. Or, it may be a particular church or a society or those of a particular profession or trade that desires government favour.
But great as are the evils of the party system, they are not the only cause of the decadence of popular government. The average legislator in his public conduct is influenced by self interest. Personal favours, direct or indirect, from those seeking in influence parliament, frequently a money bribe, have much to do with shaping legislation, having no connection with party politics. A lawyer or a doctor or a money lender is selected as a candidate, not owing to any special fitness for the position, but on account of his ability to secure votes. They have bills and other financial claims against a large number of voters who by concession or pressure are brought to political servitude. The ballot has perhaps lessened this evil, but has failed to effect a cure.
When the candidate has become the representative he usually recoups himself in some way for the trouble and expense of the election struggle. Not that legislators necessarily accumulate riches, for politics is a costly game. When the corrupt representative does not fatten upon his ill-gotten gains, he is often losing his substance to the parasites that he carries.
As an instance of corrupt influence in a country of similar institutions and political morals to our own, the New York Central Railway runs a weekly dead-head train from New York to Albany and return during the legislative session, and gives passes generously for other trains. The fares, if collected, have been computed at four thousand dollars per week for the twenty-one weeks, a total of $84,000 per annum. The New York Central Railway is not a philanthropic enterprise. It expects value for its service.
That is but one act of a single corporation. Other interests adopt the same policy in this and other countries where parliament has the power of abusing its position. The Panama Canal Co. controlled by bribery so far as suited its purpose, both the French Assembly and the Congress of the United States.
The lobby is in every legislative hall. Money or its equivalent can secure almost any legislation, or prevent it, until some particular abuse becomes so glaring that the people are aroused and candidates are pledged to oppose it.
It has been advanced that the "representatives of the people in parliament should be left free to act according to the dictates of their own judgement, after full examination or full consideration of every subject."
But is it not "a necessary result of our human nature," that the removal of what restriction we now have upon the representative would open still wider the flood-gates of corruption by giving the dishonest legislator a greatly extended field of operations.
[page 27]
Though it is not true that all men have their price, it is exemplified continually in the commercial and legislative world that a very huge number of men have their price either in money or personal advancement. And since majorities rule and under the present system of delegating The legislative power to individuals, corruptionists can easily afford the price necessary to attain their ends. Capital and knavery combined will continue to unduly influence legislation until men are vastly more moral or until the power of betraying the public is taken from the hands of the politicians. So long as such glittering premiums upon dishonesty are displayed before the politician — so long as a man may attain riches without incurring legal penalties or forfeiting the respect of the community and has his sense of honour perverted by an unwholesome environment, he will not grow ill moral character. Those who have observed the different aspect in which the dishonest politician is viewed from the petty thief can attest to the demoralizing influence of political corruption.
In trying to remedy political abuses, we must deprive not only partisanship of its power, but corruption of its opportunity.
The recognition of the people's right of sovereignty has come slowly but steadily as that right has become more and more manifest. First parliament had to struggle for its existence. Then the franchise was gradually extended as people became enlightened until now we have so nearly approached manhood suffrage that practically speaking the term " the people "is synonymous with "the electorate."
In the early part of the century, Guizot in his college lectures defended a limited franchise, the confining of the voting power to "a fragment of society," "the most capable."
Thirty years later he wrote, "If I should apply, at the present day, to these historical studies of 1820 all the lessons which political life has given me since that period, I should perhaps modify some of the ideas which I have expressed in reference to some of the conditions and forms of representative government. This system of government has no unique and solely good type, in conformity to which it must necessarily and universally be instituted. Providence, which allots to nations different origins and destinies, also opens to justice and liberty more than one way of entering into governments. And it would be foolish to reduce their chances of success if we condemned them to appear always with the same lineaments, and to develop themselves by the same means. One thing only is important. That is, that the essential principles of order and liberty should subsist beneath the different forms that the interference of the country in its own affairs may assume amongst different peoples and at different epochs."
A growing public intelligence assisted by the press has fitted progressive countries for self government. We have now accepted the principle of the sovereignty of the people.
But the electoral machinery is not in harmony with the design, and the sovereignty is largely exercised by the mighty dollar, political cunning and blind chance.
In confining our efforts to voting for representatives we are nearly powerless as to measures. As this paper proposes a measure of practical direction of parliament, let us consider the exceptions to the rule when voters have been allowed to indicate their wishes independent of party politics. Perhaps we may learn something from the history of direct voting by the people. It is no experiment. It is an old institution. The germ of it, the right of petition, dates from the 14th Century. That was the initiative without the referendum.
In Canada we have been voting upon matters of municipal legislation for years; railway by-laws, waterworks, the control of the liquor traffic and various propositions involving the expenditure of corporate funds. And there are few who will say that the result has not been much more satisfactory than if those questions had been decided by the local parliament without this systematic consultation with the electorate.
These questions were referred to the people for the same reason that the directing of parliament in all matters is here urged. That is to enable the people to separate measures from men, and from other measures, and to avoid corruption.
In the New England states, direct legislation has been practised by the town meeting system ever since their settlement. In other parts of the U.S., laws concerning the liquor traffic, lotteries, tax rates, railroad regulations, public works of various kinds, the contraction of debts and many other matters must be submitted to a direct vote of the people. The practice has given unbounded satisfaction, and is now greatly on the increase.
It is in Switzerland, that most progressive country, that we find the principle receiving consistent treatment. In federal affairs and in nearly all the cantons the popular vote is either made obligatory or dependent upon the will of the people made known by petitions. After an experience of the system for over fifty years it is today more popular than ever. It has given them governmental control more or less absolute of all public monopolies, lowered taxes, withheld legislation sought by the privileged classes and removed the worst evils of party politics.
[page 28]
The successful working of the governing making power in municipal corporations, banks, insurance, railways and other commercial enterprises and the comparative absence of partisanship therein is due to their being more closely under the control of their constituents through annual elections and reviews of their legislative work — through being pledged to a certain policy and the views of the individuals being obtained by vote or conference upon all important questions.
In politics however, the legitimate directing power is silenced by overwhelming mass platform planks. All the issues before the people are so crowded together in their submission for their approval or condemnation that all is confusion. The result is left to chance or is decided upon personal grounds or considerations foreign to the vital question to be decided. As well might a judge try all the prisoners in court in one trial and acquit all or punish all, as the weight of evidence against the various defendants is little or great in the aggregate — if the greater part are guilty, punishing all — if many are innocent, acquitting all. Or, if even a few are guilty of some atrocious crime, condemning the majority though admittedly innocent. Under any uncontrolled system of legislation we do with public questions as such a judge would do with those brought before him.
It has been assumed that the possession of a sound general judgement would result in the exercise of the best judgement of the people upon all questions. It is scarcely conceivable that a legislator could be found whose judgement upon a variety of questions would coincide with that of the majority of the people, or a legislature constituted that, even if the conflicting personal interest of the legislator did not intervene, would form a correct estimate of the popular will upon all questions.
The voters are forced by the incongruous mixing of measures and men to vote for a representative who, they know, will misrepresent them in many respects in order that they may be represented in the consideration of other questions. It has been claimed in the past that a legislator's judgement would be superior to that of the people, but that position has been abandoned in progressive countries.
To confound measures and men and seek for a plan of representation that will be even approximately representative of the nation without some provision for the nation making known its wishes upon each question at issue independently is to approach a problem impossible of solution upon the face of it. It would be the production of law and order by the methods of chaos. As well try to travel to a dozen destinations in as many different directions at the same time. With one representative upon several distinct issues the platform and partyism become a necessity.
The only practical plan of a truly representative parliament independent for a time of all control would be to have an entirely different set of representatives for every question to be decided. That would be a perfect scheme of representation were it not for the fallibility of the representative. To secure that true representation in parliament in a simpler and safer manner the scheme of a parliament at all times under the virtual direction of the people, the principle of which we have repeatedly tried and approved of, is herewith submitted for examination.
To give "each elector due weight in the government through parliament and thereby to remove the gross political evils of this and other nominally democratic countries," I propose an adaptation of the optional form of the Initiative and Referendum, which has given such satisfaction in Switzerland, where it has long since passed the experimental stage. (Appendix). It is a reform rapidly gaining ground wherever brought prominently before the people. Notably in the U.S. it is fast coming into popular favour and most urgently needed.
It may be objected that giving the power of direct voting under certain circumstances would be giving the elector due weight in the government independent of rather than through parliament. It would do both. Parliament would be anxious to ascertain and give effect to the wishes of the electorate knowing that those wishes could be made effective without its concurrence. It is not proposed that the people shall vote direct, but that they may so vote in certain contingencies. The control would be mainly operative in its effect upon parliament. That body could not often oppose the apparent will of the people. Consequently, direct appeals to the electorate in opposition to parliamentary legislation would as the system made its influence felt upon politics, be few and generally unsuccessful. Parliament would anticipate the vote of the electorate.
It has been represented as lowering to the character of parliament to lessen its independence. Do we lose dignity in the faithful performance of a trust? Among the last public utterances of the late Phillips Brooks are these words: "Be master and servant. Obey and be obeyed; and one afternoon's experience, if you can make it, will make you so in love with the life of service that you can never again during life give yourself up to the life that you led when you tried to be lord and master."
Parliament should obey as well as command. It will not thereby forfeit our respect.
Lord Lytton has said: "In proportion as the freedom of the representative is cramped and his responsibility impoverished by the exaction of exorbitant and vexatious pledges, the general character of the representative class will he low and subservient, and the confidence it can command will be consequently small." That is the old aristocratic idea of government. Is there not a better gospel coming to the front proclaiming the duty of those who are entrusted with power by the people to sink selfish inclinations in the service of those who send them to represent them? Are the judges of our land "low and subservient," and do they fail to command confidence because, representing the public in its department of Justice, they are pledged to a certain line of conduct by their oath of office, and are not free to deal with criminals or litigants as they will, but must be guided by the law of the land?
Does the head of a municipal corporation lower his position who endeavours to ascertain the wishes of the electorate and is guided thereby, though as a private citizen, he might favour a different line of action? Is the president of a railway or other business objectionably low and subservient because he is guided in his conduct of the business by the wishes of the shareholders? When one performs a service voluntarily and receives recompense for that service, where is the slavery?
But if we admit the applicability of the term to the one that is subordinate to the other, is it not better that the representative should be the slave of the people than that the people should be as they now are, the slaves of the representative?
Is it not a virtue in a politician to make all possible effort to acquaint himself with the wishes of his constituents and to be guided by their wishes? The object of the annexed bill is to make that custom practically obligatory.
But we are told that voters are incompetent to legislate. If that were true, we had better go back to a more select voter's list. One who is capable of analyzing character, weighing motives and nicely balancing the interests that he entrusts to an independent lawmaker is surely capable of forming as correct a judgement upon a simple proposition divested of all personality. "Law cannot rise higher than its source." Nor can parliament be depended upon to rise higher than the electorate.
It has been assumed that public discussions on a large scale are necessary in order to reach proper decisions, separating the wheat from the chaff by the agency of — wind. But do not the people meet repeatedly in sections at every elections? However, there is a better agency than wind in the winnowing of ideas. The press gives information, and education gives capacity of judgement. The average elector can gain more wisdom deliberating all alone for five minutes than in talking politics for five years. For in controversy we strive to triumph, and grow more prejudiced, while in meditation we settle the truth.
Every question is discussed by the public at large as thoroughly as in parliament, and usually in advance of parliamentary treatment. Discussions in parliament are addressed more to the country than to the legislators.
It is not designed to supplant parliament by Direct Legislation. That body would still retain its proper function of interpreting the people's will, arranging details, compromises and modifications and moulding legislative schemes into the most acceptable form. If they did not perform that duty, then the people could assist. As an American writer says, we would have "a fire extinguisher that will cost nothing if we do not use it; but which in some emergency may be worth millions."
The actual work of legislation would remain with parliament. There would be no necessary delay in the legislative work. The people would only act in case of widespread dissatisfaction with any particular part of its work. Being subject to this ultimate control, political sagacity would enable parliamentary representatives to be the nation in essence as legislators, no matter what they might be as individuals. And is not this the only important point? They would be in touch with the people and they must respect the touch.
Why should we make a distinction in favour of those questions hitherto submitted to the people? Would not the same advantages arise from putting beyond the complicating and corrupting influence of party politics the consideration of custom's tariff, of railroad policies, of Civil Service Reform, and of the currency laws and of any and every question of general interest?
The people emancipated from party serfdom would be at liberty to change their views, and reasonable discussion would largely take the place of bitter controversy. The views of the people would be immediately reflected in the law-making chamber.
If we accept the modern idea of the sovereignty of the people, of parliament being the people in essence, and not merely a condensation of a certain portion of the people presumably more fitted to govern, it is difficult to imagine upon what grounds the principle of direct control by the nation over the law-making machinery can he logically assailed.
[page 30]
There are but two systems of government:
- by a majority of the people, accomplished either directly or by representatives giving effect to the will of the majority upon all questions, which can only be attained by being under constant control of the people; or
- by a part of the community, be it one or many, a king or a parliament, independent of the wishes and beyond the control of the people.
[he leaves out Canada's existing system where often the majority of seats in the House of Commons does not represent the majority of voter.]
A referendary control of legislation is feasible. Our own experience in submitting propositions to a popular vote, as well as similar instances in the U.S. and other countries, goes far to prove this. That it is a satisfactory remedy for political evils, nearly all Switzerland attests.
"If there be a political prophecy that it is safe to make at this time," says W. D. McCrackan in the May issue of Arena, "it is that our representative system cannot remain in its present form for another decade, if the republic is to endure... The institutions of the initiative and referendum, as practised in Switzerland, are the noblest political achievements of this waning century. They are capable of supplying our decaying democracy with the powers necessary for its redemption. Making laws by means of all-powerful representatives will someday be looked upon as a method fully as crude and primitive as that of letter writing by means of scribes on the street corners."
This proposition is designed to separate the issues before the people and to prevent the representative's betrayal of his trust. If it will do that, will it not solve the problem of our political decadence and rectify parliament?
A railroad company would not issue passes and grant other exceptional privileges to a sufficient number of voters to enable it to obtain coveted legislation, nor could it bribe the whole country.
It is incomparably more feasible to buy representatives every four or five years than the whole electorate annually. No individual or combinations of individuals could bribe the whole community. Therein consists the only hope of the salvation of popular government, assailed as it is by a more or less corrupt privileged class whoso power over parliament is continually on the increase.
Under a controlled parliamentary system, governments would not bargain for the support or purchasable members. They would not bribe constituencies to return their supporters by promised public works. Nor would candidates bribe the voter, for the motive would be lacking. There would be no money or other personal gain in politics, as there would be no arbitrary power to barter for money or favour.
And it is because there would be no money in politics and the privileged classes would be prevented from sapping the strength of the nation, that every proposition to remedy affairs is so bitterly opposed by those whose selfish interests would suffer. Let such self-seeking individuals remember that their descendants may not be politicians, and that they may be tramps. Even they themselves may fall. The ups and downs of life are so frequent that the efforts of those who are up to make more hopeless the condition of those who are down may sometime be viewed from a different though still selfish standpoint.
Most schemes of minority representation are founded upon the assumption of the necessity of party government. Give to the people their rightful sovereignty that would enable everyone to pass judgement upon all questions separately instead of in bulk, and the forces of partisanship will be scattered, and there will be no minorities, as we now understand the term, to represent, and no majorities to combat.
Though it might be desirable that some scheme should be adopted providing for giving due weight to the votes of every interest so far as practicable, representation of every interest would be secured by the knowledge that parliament was not supreme. It would be the tendency of the system to make every member of parliament the representative of every interest.
The savagery in the forest where man was free so far as governmental control was concerned, but living in discomfort and fear of his fellow man and of wild beasts, [then] the primitive monarchical systems that secured the welfare of the people or oppressed them as the ruler was wise and beneficent or ignorant and evil disposed [then] the feudal system with the masses in servitude, [then] the uncontrolled representative government system with political power delegated absolutely for a stated period to a selected number of professional legislators. [to be followed by] the complete sovereignty of the citizenship of the state through its practical retention of the law-making power — these mark the epochs of the political life of nations advancing from savagery to a complete civilization. That is government by regular evolution.
The old haphazard system of parliamentary representation, the best available perhaps in primitive times, is a monumental failure in our day. Our greater fitness for self-government and our growing needs require that we seek something better.
" New occasions teach now duties: Time makes ancient good uncouth,
They must upward still and onward who would keep abreast of Truth." [source not stated]
[page 31]
To make the system complete, a like measure might be enacted by the Provincial Assemblies in harmony with this proposed Act, and providing for the optional submission of provincial and municipal measures to a popular vote.
(Appendix). AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR REFERENDARY VOTING.
(Applied to Canada, but applicable in principle to any country with a similar Parliamentary system.)
Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
1. It shall be lawful for 15 percent of the whole number of electors of the Dominion of Canada, or 25 percent of the membership of Parliament, by petition, to obtain the submission to a popular vote of any measure for the repeal of an existing law or for the passage of a proposed law.
2. The text of proposed legislation may be deposited with the (Head of government department) together with its tide. Copies shall be printed and sent to the clerks of municipalities and the tides only shall be used in petitioning and voting.
3. Such petitions shall be in similar wording to Form A, hereto appended, with a distinguishing heading as there designated.
4. Blank forms of petition shall be furnished by the government under regulations of The Governor General in Council at the computed cost of production.
5. It shall be the duty of the Government when the aggregate number of public petitioners for the submission of any measure shall exceed fifteen percent, of the duly qualified voters of the Dominion; or when the number of signatures on any petition of Members of Parliament shall exceed twenty-five percent, of the whole number of representatives, to make provision for the submission cf such measure; to a popular vote at the next annual election provided for by this Act, providing there shall intervene a period of at least thirty days.
6. In the Provinces which shall concur by legislative enactment in the provisions of this Act the voter's list used for all Dominion purposes shall be prepared by a joint commission composed of an officer appointed by the Dominion government, an officer appointed by the Provincial government and a third appointed by the council of the municipality affected.
(1.) In case of dissatisfaction with the rulings of the Commission an appeal may be taken to the regular courts.
(2.) Such voter's list shall be used for Municipal, Provincial and Dominion purposes.
(3.) The voting upon any and every measure that may be submitted as well as the voting for members of Parliament so often as those elections shall occur, shall be at the same time and place as for municipal offices.
(4.) Voting shall be by ballot and one ballot shall serve for Municipal, Provincial and Dominion voting of every description.
7. In Provinces that shall not concur by legislative enactment in the provisions of this Act the voting shall be annually and at the same time as the municipal elections when there may be measures to be submitted.
8. Only titles of measures voted upon shall appear upon the ballot.
9. The majority of the aggregate vote shall decide ail questions and upon the passage of a submitted measure and upon its approval by the Governor General shall be declared in force, and the government shall make proper provision for its enforcement.
10. All Acts or portions of Acts conflicting with this Act are hereby repealed.
Form A. Public Petition for Referendary Vote. (Or Petition of Member of Parliament for Referendary Vote)
I hereby petition for the submission of (Title of Measure) the text of which has been deposited with the (Head of Government Department.)
(Signatures.)
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[5.] SPERO MELIORA. [page 32]
There is little doubt that the system of electing the members of Parliament, by the majority [plurality in many cases] of the votes in each Constituency, is objectionable in the extreme. Though it is the general practice in countries with a representative form of government, the plan is attended with features totally incommensurate with a well-ordered system of popular representation. The evils resulting from it have been repeatedly pointed out by political economists for many years past, and of late by Dr. Sandford Fleming, after whose able treatment of the subject it would be superfluous to repeat the objections against the system.
All who have given the subject attention from an independent standpoint are practically unanimous in the opinion, that the injustice possible, and the abuses continually occurring are largely attributable to the fact that the system of election followed does not give the people equal representation in Parliament. This aggravates and intensifies, if not causes, the strong party feeling that is so much deplored.
The desideratum is a plan that would ''give the whole people equal representation in Parliament." How is this to be accomplished? It appears easier to denounce the evil than formulate a practicable remedy. Several plans have been proposed by which it was thought the problem could be surmounted, but all seem to contain provisions that largely counterbalance the advantages that would otherwise accrue from them. The plan known as the Hare system has met with the greatest favour containing more advantages than any other proposed. Indeed with some modifications it has been the system of election in Denmark for many years. But it must be admitted that it has disadvantages that diminish its merits, though it is greatly preferable to the present system.
As it is only by friendly criticism of the measures proposed, their weak points may be eliminated and a more perfect scheme evolved, I propose to show in what respect they are faulty.
[on ranked voting]
The greatest objection to Mr. Hare's scheme and others founded upon it is the large proportion of votes counted for candidates who are only the second, third, fourth and even lower choice of the voters. In other words, voters are represented eventually by persons inferior, in their estimation, to the candidates of their first choice.
An elector should be represented in Parliament by a candidate whom he considers the best for the position and in whom he has implicit confidence. But under Hare any vote cast for a candidate who does not secure the quota necessary for his return is applied to secure the return of another inferior in the opinion of the voter. In practice comparatively few of the candidates would poll sufficient first votes to equal the total voting power of a constituency. This is without the difficulty mentioned by Mrs. Fawcett. [He gives example where] Candidate A receives 2000 votes, and the second name on half of them being for B, the second on the other half being for Candidate C.
If all the ballots with B's name second were used for A's return as the ballot could only be used to elect one member, B would be left without a single vote, while A and C receiving the full quota of l000 votes would be returned. Though B received the same number of second votes as C, through the accident of the ballots with his name second being drawn out first and counted to A whose name was at the top of the ballot, they were useless to B. How to prevent this occurrence is a yet unsolved problem. [TM: random selection of transferred votes became common practice and took care of this problem]
Any scheme where the result would largely depend upon chance, as in those where the selection by lot is the ruling principle, however meritorious it might be, would be likely to prove unsatisfactory. Many of the electors being uncertain as to whether they would really be represented at all would lose interest in the whole subject.
Another plan of proportional representation [party list pro-rep] is to add up and divide by the unit of representation the total number of votes cast for the candidates of the different political parties allowing each party its proportionate number of numbers. The objection to this plan is that it would draw the line between the parties even more intensely than at present. It would recognize party distinctions, which is one of the worst features of our political system.
It is now in order to formulate the writer's plan for the "Rectification of Parliament." Absolute perfection is perhaps unattainable but his endeavour will be to give a little assistance to the task of solving this difficult problem.
A plan that in the writer's opinion would meet the requirements of the case is as follows:
—beginning with the Registration of voters I would make personal application to the Registration Clerk necessary to the placing of an elector's name on the voters' list. This provision is rendered needful by the practice of Election Agents making applications wholesale without being particular, in many cases, whether the names are eligible or no. And in many cases the Registration Clerk is not over scrupulous if they are on his side of politics.
[Fair assembly of voters list] [page 33]
Sometimes it is difficult for those legally qualified to get their names on the list if their views are known to be opposed to those of the Clerks, perhaps appointed by the government on account of their extreme partizanship. This is done by the Clerk omitting to enter their names on the Register, so when election day comes the voter finds he is not on The voters list, or, if he discovers it beforehand he has to attend The Court of Revision, which he may be unable to do. Personal registration would prevent any dishonesty on the part of the Clerk. At the Office the applicant would be compelled to make an affidavit as to his qualifications when the Clerk would give him a certificate of registration similar to the following:
No Electoral Division of Date
This is to certify that A. B. of having complied with the statute governing the same, was this day placed on the list of Electors for the Electoral Division of ________________________________.
Signed.
Registration Clerk.
As it might be impossible or difficult for some to apply personally at the office, they could make their affidavit before a magistrate or Justice of the Peace who would send it by registered mail to the Registration Clerk together with stamps to pay postage. The Clerk would send the certificate by return mail to the applicant. This would meet exceptional cases, but as the applicant would be at the expense of postage both ways and magistrates fee it would not become the practice. At the polling booth the voter before he received his ballot would have to produce his certificate that would prevent the impersonation often practised. The certificate would then be stamped on the back by the Deputy Returning Officer, stamp to bear date and class of election (this to prevent the certificate from being used again at the same election by another person) and then it would be returned to the voter.
The ballot before being handed to the voter would be stamped in the same manner so as to prevent the collusion sometimes practised. When the voter has been bribed, to ensure that he "stays bought," a counterfeit ballot, already marked, is given to the voter before he enters the booth. This one is returned to the Returning Officer, instead of the genuine ballot. The genuine ballot is given to the briber as a proof of their mutual perfidy.
The appointing of the Returning Officers and Registration Clerks by a party government, when strong partizans [party loyalists/fanatics] are always chosen, has been the cause of much dishonesty and corruption, for these officials have opportunity to take an undue advantage of their position with little danger of detection. This consideration has led me to propose the formation of a "High Court of Election," such as appears in the Section No. 2 of the accompanying act, the composition of which would command the respect of the whole Electorate.
No matter how Parliament might be divided, the minority would have the same power in the Court as the majority while the three neutral members would ensure that no party could control it. This is no doubt an innovation and perhaps in the annexed "Act" in its crude state, but I am sure that the principle will commend itself to fair-minded people.
If it does that, improvement can follow, it would at least remove the stigma of partisanship, whether merited or unmerited, from the Executive Government.
[To prevent Voters being barred from voting]
Another point where injustice is perpetrated is in cities, or manufacturing centres, where it is in the power of the employers to prevent their workmen from going to the polls or at least those whom they know to be of different politics. There are many ways this can be done without a positive command: stress of work is the usual excuse and the employee dare not disobey as it would be met by instant dismissal.
To obviate this in many European countries, the elections are held on Sunday. But as this is liable to lead to desecration of the Sabbath, I would have the day on which the General Election was to be held proclaimed a Public Holiday, or at least half the day on which all work in factories, etc. would be suspended.
A plan for Electoral Representation to work satisfactorily must harmonize with the following propositions: —
That the majority of Parliament represent the majority of the Electors.
That the minority of the electors have a proportionate voice in Parliament.
That every vote should have its due weight in securing this result.
That the ordinary elector can easily comprehend and practise the system of voting.
With these objects in view, the writer proposes the plan of measuring the voting power of each member by the actual number of votes received, thus securing the principle of a member representing the actual number of electors who vote for him.
Of course the number of members would be increased by this plan. But an excessive number would be prevented by the provision that limits a seat in the House to those receiving at least 20 percent of the vote cast in their electoral Division.
[page 34]
If the number of members is an objection, it could be met by reducing the number of electoral Divisions, which in any event might prove beneficial. But I apprehend no difficulty on that account. Meritorious broad-minded candidates would offer themselves for the suffrages of the people and be elected. Under the present system they would be snowed under by narrow-minded partizans with nothing to recommend them but slavish adherence to party.
With reference to the relation of Parliament to the executive government, it should be an understood principle for the Representative of the Sovereign to appoint as Prime Minister a member whom the House of Commons would by resolution designate as worthy of the position. [someone with support of a majority of the chamber]
[A direct vote of want of confidence]
Further, a measure introduced or supported by the Government being defeated should not have to be followed by the government's resignation. Rather than face the prospect of defeat, the Government will often withhold beneficial legislation. On the other hand, measures of very doubtful utility become law due to their supporters not desiring to defeat them by voting against the Government and causing a new election or possibly a deadlock that would render all practical legislation difficult if not impossible.
To remedy this, I would have a direct vote of want of confidence necessary to the resignation of a Government. A general election would not then be necessary, but the member in whom the House voted confidence would be entrusted with the administration. [TM: the prime ministership would be offered to another member instead of having election.]
It might be advisable, eventually, to extend the choice of the electors so as to allow them to give original votes for candidates in any part of the country. But perhaps for the present the Act goes far enough in that direction. The Act will at least do away with Gerrymandering and the distrust often felt in the public mind, whenever a change is made by the administration in the boundaries, etc.. And it would ensure each elector having his actual weight through his representative in the councils of the nation.
In conclusion, the writer ventures to hope that the general features of his plan will meet with the approval of those who wish for some improvement in the realm of politics. Imperfections there no doubt are, and to his ignorance of the legal form of legislative enactments must be attributed any errors in the accompanying draft. But in his humble opinion any difficulties that might be encountered in the working of his plan could be easily surmounted.
[signed] Spero Meliora.
ELECTION ACT. An Act for the better conduct of Elections and the choosing of Members of Parliament.
Preamble. Whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the equitable representation of the people in Parliament and as such is not done under the Act at present in force:
Therefore Her Majesty by and with the consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada enacts as follows:
Interpretation.
1. This Act shall apply to all Elections held in the Dominion of Canada for the purpose of electing members to represent the people in the Dominion House of Commons; and this Act may be cited as the "Dominion Elections Act" and the following terms therein shall be held to have the meaning hereinafter assigned them unless such meaning be repugnant to the subject, or incompetent with the context that is to say:
(1). The term Electoral District means a district within certain defined bounds, the Electors of which return one or more members to Parliament.
(2). The term Elector means a citizen entitled to vote.
(3). The term High Court of Election means the Court where the result of the Election in each division is ascertained and the votes apportioned to the candidates entitled to them.
(4). The term Parliament means the aggregation of members forming the Dominion House of Commons.
(5). The term Returning Officer means the official appointed in each division to receive the nominations of Candidates, and the results of the polls from the Deputy Returning Officers.
(6). The term Deputy Returning Officer means the official who presides over the poll at which polling place in the Division.
(7). The term Candidate means a person who offers himself for election to Parliament.
(8). The term Member means a person duly elected to Parliament.
(9). The term Section means a section of this Act with a separate number, sub-section means a clause with a separate number or letter in smaller type.
The High Court of Election.
2. The High Court of Election shall be charged with the supreme control and management of election to Parliament.
[page 35]
(1) The High Court of election shall be composed of seven members, as follows: Four members of the House of Commons of Canada, one member of the Senate, and two judges of the Supreme Court of Canada.
(2) These shall be chosen in the following manner: Two members of Parliament will be elected by a majority vote of the whole House of Commons, then two more will be elected by those who were in the minority at the previous division, alone.
(3) The four members so elected shall then choose a member of the Senate of Canada upon whom they can unanimously agree.
(4) The five members shall then choose two Judges of the Supreme Court who must also meet with the unanimous approval of the five members.
(5.) The seven members so chosen shall constitute the High Court of Election of Canada.
3. Should any person chosen a member of the High Court of Election under the provisions of the preceding section after receiving a legal notification refuse to act in that capacity without giving a satisfactory reason for doing so, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding dollars and a substitute shall be elected in the manner provided under Sec. 2.
4. The members shall act for one year and be eligible to be again chosen.
5. After taking a prescribed oath the members when sitting in their official capacity shall have the full power of Judges on the bench as to the subpoenaing of witnesses, etc., on all matters within their jurisdiction.
Duties of High Court of Election.
6. It shall be the duty of the High Court of Election to appoint the Returning Officer for each Electoral Division.
(1). To keep records of all the candidates nominated previous to an election.
(2). To finally apportion the ballots cast for the candidates and declare those elected together with the voting power of each member.
(3). Finally adjudicate all appeals and disputed returns.
7. At least sixty days before the date fixed for an election the High Court of Election shall notify the Returning Officer in every electoral division of the date of the Election, which in a General Election shall be the same day in every Electoral Division, the said day to be a Public Holiday, by Proclamation of the Governor General.
(1) On the receipt of the writ and notification, the Returning Officer shall appoint deputies to take the vote of the people, a Deputy for every polling place in the division.
(2) It shall also be the duty of the Returning Officer to post up in a conspicuous place in the town or village where he will make his headquarters during the Election (which shall be as centrally located in the Division as possible) a Public Notice giving the date of Election, and places where polls will be opened, also the dates and where nominations will be received, together with the Proclamation of Public Holiday.
(3). The Returning Officer shall also send a copy of The Notice and Proclamation to each Deputy Returning Officer who shall post them up in a conspicuous part of the polling booth.
Nomination of Candidates.
8. Any citizen qualified to vote at an Election for members of Parliament, may be nominated as candidate for the said office in any Electoral Division in the Dominion.
(1). The nomination must be in writing in the following form:
Address and date I hereby nominate (here put name address and occupation or profession of proposed candidate) as candidate for member of Parliament for the Electoral Division of and I consider the said (name) a fit and proper person for the position.
(2). The nomination must be signed by at least five of the electors residing in the Electoral Division for which the candidate is nominated.
(3). An acceptance of the nomination, signed by the candidate, must be endorsed thereon.
(4). The nomination shall be deposited with the Returning Officer for the said Electoral Division not more than forty or less than thirty days before the date fixed for the Election.
(5). There shall also be deposited with the nomination whatever sum in legal money of Canada, Parliament may by law direct, for which the Returning Officer shall give a legal receipt.
(6). No candidate can offer himself for election in more than one division.
[page 36]
9. The Returning Officer shall immediately on receiving all the nominations for his division, send a certified copy of them, together with the deposits, to the secretary of the High Court of Election. He, within ten days after the receipt thereof, shall send a printed list with the names and addresses of all the candidates nominated in all the Electoral Divisions of Canada to every candidate, also Returning Officer, and Deputy Returning Officer in the Dominion, whose duty it shall be to post it up in a conspicuous position at each polling place.
(1) Every candidate shall then make a sworn declaration before a Magistrate or Justice of the Peace, setting forth the candidate that may be any candidate nominated in the Dominion of Canada to whom he wishes the votes cast for himself to be counted in the event of his failing to secure the number of votes necessary to his return, except the elector directs differently as provided by Sec. 10.
(2) The candidate shall then send the declaration to the Returning Officer, who shall cause copies of it to be printed and sent to every Deputy Returning Officer in the division whose duty it shall be to post it up in a conspicuous place at every polling booth in the electoral division, at least six days before the election.
The Election of Candidates.
10. The ballots to be used at an election shall have the names of all the candidates legally nominated for the electoral division printed thereon, and opposite to each that of the alternative candidate mentioned in sec. 9, sub-sec. 1, as in the following form:
Electoral Division of
Instructions to Voters.
[Column 1] Names of Candidates.
[Column 2] Mark an X in this column opposite the name of the candidate for whom you desire to vote.
[Column 3] The persons named below will receive the votes cast for the candidate opposite their respective names, should the said candidate not receive the number necessary to his return unless the voter otherwise directs, as hereinafter provided.
If the alternative candidate opposite the name of the candidate voted for does not meet with the approval of the elector he can write the name and address of any candidate nominated in the Dominion, in the space below to whom his vote will be transferred.
Name
Address of candidate.
(1). At the polling booth each candidate can be represented by an agent or scrutineer appointed at least three days before the election under written authority of the candidate.
(2). Such Agent or Scrutineer must be an elector in the Electoral Division.
(3). The duties of the Agent or Scrutineer are, to exercise a general supervision over the election in the interest of his candidate so as to prevent any unfairness being practised.
(4). Each Elector must present the certificate of Registration as provided in the Act for the Registration of voters, on the certificate being found satisfactory the Deputy Returning Officer shall stamp it on the back with a stamp bearing date and class of election, it shall then be returned to the elector.
(5). The Deputy Returning Officer shall then, in the presence of the scrutineers, hand a blank ballot paper to the elector, after stamping it on the back as directed for the certificate in the preceding sub-section.
(6). The elector shall then take the ballot to a part of the booth entirely secluded from observation, and after marking it shall fold it in such a manner as to leave the stamp exposed but prevent any person from seeing how it was marked without unfolding it. The elector shall then hand the ballot to the Deputy Returning Officer who in the presence of the Elector and Scrutineers, shall without opening it, drop the ballot into the ballot-box, which must be made of some incombustible material.
[page 37]
11. When the poll is closed the Deputy Returning Office shall unlock the ballot-box and count the number of votes cast for each candidate.
(1). After the ballots are counted they shall be placed in the ballot-box together with a declaration signed by the Deputy Returning Officer, and the Scrutineer of each candidate as to the number of votes cast for each.
(2). The Deputy Returning Officer shall then give a similar statement to each Scrutineer.
(3). The ballot-box shall then be securely locked and sealed.
It shall then be the duty of the Deputy Returning Officer to take the ballot-box to the Returning Officer for the Electoral Division.
12. The Returning Officer on receiving all the ballot-boxes for the Electoral Division shall, in the presence of the scrutineers appointed under the provisions of (1), or of the candidates themselves, break the seals, unlock the ballot-boxes and proceed to count the ballots cast for each candidate.
(1). When all are counted the Returning Officer shall write a statement of the result, said statement to contain the total number of votes cast for each candidate, together with the names of those to whom they were to be transferred as provided by sections 15, 16, and 17.
(2). The form of statement shall be as follows:
Electoral Division of (Date)
Result of Election held on the for the Election of members to the Parliament of Canada. I, Returning Officer for the Electoral District, of ___________ do solemnly declare the following is a true statement of the votes cast on the above-mentioned date.
Names of Candidate No. of votes cast for him.
The name or names of Candidates to whom they are to be counted if the original candidate does not receive 20 percent of the total votes cast in the E. D. either originally or by transference.
No. of votes to be counted to each and so on till all the result is given.
Signed Returning Officer.
Names of witnesses, who are to be the candidates or their agents.
(3). This declaration must be made before a legally qualified magistrate or J.P.
(4). This declaration must be deposited in the Office of the Clerk of the County Court for the Electoral Division, and a certified copy sent to the Secretary of the High Court of Election by the Returning Officer within three days thereafter.
13. Should there be any ballots marked in such a manner as to render the meaning of the voter doubtful or if the scrutineers cannot agree as to the candidate in whose favour it should be counted, the Returning Officer shall not count such ballots to any candidate, but shall make a note of the fact on the declaration mentioned in Sec. 12, Sub. Sec. (1.) and shall send all such ballots to the High Court of Election with such declaration.
14. The Secretary on receipt of the returns from every Electoral Division shall lay them before the High Court of Election who shall then proceed to ascertain the candidates elected together with the voting power of each. This will be accomplished in the following manner:
The Electoral Divisions will be taken in alphabetical order.
The name of the candidate or candidates who have received 20 percent, or over, of the total vote polled in their respective Electoral Divisions, will be placed on a schedule as elected, together with the number of votes polled for each candidate so elected.
15. The candidates who may have failed to receive 20 percent of the total votes polled in their respective Electoral Divisions will then be considered in the same order of divisions [alphabetically]. Any candidate who can make up with the assistance of the votes transferred to him from other candidates who failed to receive the required 20 percent, or number of votes equalling 20 percent, shall be placed on the schedule as elected, together with the number of votes, either original or transferred, cast for him.
16. Should two candidates who failed to receive the 20 percent, quota be mutually mentioned as the alternative of each other on their respective ballots, the votes shall be counted to whichever candidate received the highest number of original votes.
[page 38]
17. If any candidate is unable to secure a number equal to 20 percent of the total vote cast in his Electoral Division, either by transference or otherwise, he shall be considered to have failed of Election, and the votes cast for him shall be counted to the candidate or candidates mentioned as alternative, and if the alternative is not elected they shall be counted to his alternative and so on till they are disposed of to a candidate elected.
18. The total number of votes standing to the credit of the members elected after the final apportionment, under the preceding section shall be their voting power in Parliament.
19. Each candidate elected shall be furnished by the High Court of Election with a certificate of such election and the number of votes received by him, which will be entered in the Journals of the House of Commons and be prima facie evidence of the member's voting power in Parliament.
20. All sums received under the provisions of Sec. 8, Sub-sec. (3), shall be returned to the candidates depositing them, unless any candidate failed to receive a number of votes equal to 10 percent, of the total vote cast in his Electoral Division, in which case the amount deposited by him shall be forfeited to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.
21. In all divisions in the House of Commons each member shall vote the number of votes credited to him, and the side on any division that has the highest aggregate number of votes shall be considered a majority of the House.
22. The members shall be elected for two years.
23. Any vacancies through death shall not be filled unless the Electoral Division would be entirely unrepresented and the next General Elections are more than six months distant, and a session of Parliament is to be held between the election of a successor and the General Election, in which case a writ will be issued.
(1). All bye-elections shall be held under the provisions of sec. 8, 10, 11, and 12, and thirty days after the issuance of the writ.
(2). The Returning Officer shall send the declaration of result of election, direct to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the candidate polling the highest vote shall take his seat in the House and vote according to the number of votes received by him.
24. All the expenses sustained by officials, candidates and members in complying with the provisions of this Act shall be reimbursed to them by the Government on the validity of the claim being proven.
25. The members of Parliament shall be paid whatever indemnity for their services Parliament may by law direct.
Amendment to Sec. 8.
Should only one nomination be received under the provisions of Sec. 8, the Returning Officer shall declare said candidate elected, and his vote in the House shall be half the total voting power of that Division.
[signed] Spero Meliora.
[end of part 1 on my blogsite]
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